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I  JOSEPH  CHAMBERLAIN: 
I 
Conspirator  or  Statesman  ? 
,fixr  lS/lilfI1\i.1TION  OF  THE EVIDEIVCE AS T0  HIS COIMPLICITY 
!  IIV  THE 3AAalESON  C*clAiS/?rnAC~  ;rc)(;ETf$ii~  GVITfi Th'& 
11'Ell'i.Y  /'~/:/,/s~l~l>  I,l<?'TERS  01:  TH/: 
I/,f  l'l~A-.s/,l~  I' /)OS.\~I/~l<. NR.  BALFOVB,  in his recent epeeches at Nanchester, explained that the 
reason mhy  the Government had not mde  auy objections to the arma- 
ments of  the Boers was because their hands were tied and  their mouths 
were  closed by  the Raid.  But as the Sugt, a Kinisterialist Organ, at once 
ointed  out,  this  excuse  is  worthless  uuless  it is  assumed  that the 
%abinet was responsible for the Raib, mhich, of  coiirse, it scouts as im- 
possible.  The Spcctator  oes a step further,  und  says tLat thß diiliculty 
urose not from hhe Raid, fut  from the leniency mith mhich  the Govorii- 
ment  chose  to  deal with Mr.  Rhodes 'und  the Chartered Company. , In 
this pamphlet  the reader  will  find  ample  material  to  ennlile him  to 
appreciate the justice of  Nr. Balfour's excuse, the pertincnce of  the S.!~l's 
remark, und the explanation of  the leniency which~excites  the monder9;nd 
regret of  the bat-eyed S'cctutor. 
The Cabinet was not privy to the Conspiracy.  No  one in the Cab:not 
buh  Nr.  Chamberlain was privy  to the Conspixaey.  I3nt thc Cabiiet, 
after the event,  made itself  the aecomplice  of  Mr.  Chaniberlain, ,und 
thereby became  5 partaker  not  only in hia  crime, but in the Impirial 
impotence  mhich  follomed  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  hie  @lt. 
Ministers milfully shut theic eyes to the evidence of their colleaguo's actiou, 
they  aided  und  a&@ed  the  perpetratiin of  the scandal  of  the Soiith 
Airican Comqittee, und as a result they wvere  paralysed before Nr. lduger 
und  Mr.  Rhodea.  If Ministers had  dared  to take away >Ir.  lthdes'x 
Pr&  Councillorshi ,  the truth about Mr. Uhambe~lain's  complicity qould 
fi~vek4d  on mhat the Duke of  Argyll once describeil ns  1'  the 
housetop of  the world."  Mr.  Chamberlain veutured to 60 heyond  the 
prescribed limits of  censiire mhen, under sore duress, he signed the lyipg 
report of the Committee.  Be was  promptly hrought  to  heel,  und  mhen 
his  tmice-repeated  eertificate of  the personal  hoGur of  Mr.  Rhodos 
revealed  even  to such trusting  innocents as Sir W.  Harcourt  und  Nr. 
Courtney someglimpse of the real truth, from mhich up to that time th 
had resolutely averted their  eyes, Ninisters  then and  there inherited 3 
the disabilities of  Mr.  Rhodes, mhich  mere  conveyed  to them in bulkjy 
liis confederate, Mr. Chamberlain, with the results mhieh &G.  Balfour no' 
Irankly confesses.  P 
i  The publication of  the Hawksley Dossier by  the I?uZL'pe~uZa?zco  Bcbc 
has contributed not a little tq the enlightenment of  the piiblic mind  as to 
the nature of the conspiracy which  is now  partly uninasl<ed.  The effedt 
of these illicitly obtained documents has been immense.  On the Continent 
they  Ure  univeraally  held  to  prove  Mr.  Chamberlain's guüt.  The  Same 
opinion ~~~~~~8  to  prevail among Nr.  Ohamberlain's  filends,  for  mith 
almest unpreceaented unanimity they have decided  that they  dare  not 
fillolv their reder8 au opportunity of  perusing them.  From  the  to 
the  News they  have ruthlessly suppressed every  allusion to their 
oxistence.  Rom their  Point  of  viem  they  are  right.  Re  they  caunot 
cxplain away the significance of this authentic evidence from  unwilliug 
witUesaes,  ~1.11  they  can  d0  is  t0 supprßss it.  This  they  have  done so 
thoroughly that it 1s probable many readers will iearn  of  th~  existente of 
ehe Dossier for the Brat time from this pamphlet. 
The recognition of  the fact that me have been befooled  und  misled by 
a  conspiraoy to shield  a  conspirator  Opens  a  door  through  mhich  the 
uatioii inay honourably escape from  the preeeut intolerable position.  If 
!  IIr. Chamberluin was in very truth a conspirator mith >Ir.  Rhodes against 
I  Pwsident Kruger in 1896, it was inanifeetly impossible  to  expect  any 
othoi.  issue  than  mur  from  neeotiations  iii  mhich  he  was  the  chiet 
negotiator.  Mr.  ~hamberlain'ä  War  was  the natural, sequel  of  Nis. 
Chamberlaiu's Cons~iracv. The dismissal, if  need be the~m~eachment,  of 
Nr.  Chamberluin ~<oiild"be  the first  step  towards  tKreZstablishment 
of  the British Empire in South Africa.  He is the Jonah vvhose  presence 
on boa~d  the ship of  Stute is the cause of  all this commotion.  For indeed 
"  there in a mighty tempest in the sea, und the ship is like to be broken." 
Iii this pamphlet I reprint, mithout alteration,  "The  Scandal of  the \ 
South African Committee " as it was issued in  October last,  and add to 
it the Hamksley Dossier as a sequel.  I have only to Bay  that I havo not 
oue vord to withdram or to add to the statement which L made in West- 
niinster Ohapel on  Oct.  16th, when every ode  was  quite sure that our 
armies mere going forth to certain victory.  I said then  und  I say again 
to-aay : 
'~The  real  root  question which  underlies  everything, und of  wvhich 
this  present  trouble in the  Transvaal  is  but  a  symptoln, is  the 
tion  whether  or  not  me  believe  that there is a  Dod  mho  jud  et  in 
the emth, who loves righteousness, and mho  abhore a lie.  The \v%ole  of 
our  trouble in tbe Transvaul springe  out  of  the  delibprate  conviction, 
frankly expreseed und iinhesitatingly acted upon, thams  is not true, und 
that it is sometimes good  policy  to  tell a  lie  und  stick  to  it.  Know- 
ing that  Tve  are going  forth  to  battle mith a  lie in our right  hand,  I 
tremble us to the result.  Nom the question mhether or not it i?  right  to 
lie, to lia before Goa and mnn foi. politic ends, is a qiiestion ?vhich 1  have 
been discussing for the last three years iutimately, closel  ,  with men mho  9  believe that it is, und vvho  acted upon their belief. dnd al  the trouble that 
n.e are in novv  has come from their acting upon  that belief.  I remember 
discussing the  uestion three yeors ago, after the Jameson Raid, mithpeople  7,  who icuem all a  out it, mhomere in it up to the neck, und the questionwas, 
' Should  we  ovvu  up, or should me  lie ? '  Some of  them omned up, und 
others of  them lied ;  und those vvho  omned up  did their best to shield the 
otliers who lied.  I discnssed this matter seriously, passionately, earnestly 
mith  them all, from Mr. Rhodes  downmards, und I  said to the mall, '  I  -, 
do not care mhat you may say, vvhatever evils there  may  come, mhutever 
trouble there may  come from admitting the truth und  adiiiitting frankly 
that mhat mas  done in South Africa was done  with the cognisance und 
approval of thc Colonial Office, let us have the  truth, tell the truth, anti 
shauie the devil.'  And they mid, ' Oh, no, we  cannot.  It  is inipossible. 
If  me  were to admit it 511,  if  wo  vvere to prodiice all the cables, if  me mere 
to produce all thecorrespondence, if  me  were to shom that me had not taken 
a atep vvithout  sending to the Colonial Office  in order to get  their advice 
und approval, what positiou nrould England oeeupy before the mcrldl  In 
mhat posihion vvould  the Government of  the Queen stand?  Hom could me 
admit it?  No,  we  cannot.  We have got to Cover the Colonial Office, and 
if it is lying, then we must lie, lie und get !t  tbrough.'  diid they  did  it. 
It covers me vvith  shame and regret to think of  that ghastiy farce mhich 
was played ab  the South African Committee at We8tminSter.  It Bat  und 
professed to examine into the truth of  thinga, but  in reality hushed evory- 
thing  up,  refused to insist upon  vital  eyidenoe, und, mhen  they 60t ono 
witnegs in the box who mas ready and milling to spealc the truth, ordere& 4  P?ejkce. 
hin1 outof the box, arid theu drew up a lying rerdict, which was approved 
by the House of  Commons.  From that all  our  trouble has conie.  One 
contemporary  Trench  observer  said,  ' It  marks  the abdioatiou of  the 
Uritish  conscience.'  kom that time  when we  bad  our  Colonial Office 
whitewashed, wo  had 8 declaration going forth to South Africa,  to the 
Transvaal, und  to  the Dutch of  South Africa, that British honour, that 
British fair-play, that British tmth no  louger existed, and that we  were 
willing to do anything, to resort to perjury, lying, suppressionof evidenoe, 
rather that admit the truth.  From that came  a deep bitter distrust of 
everything that me  could say or do in tha minds of  Paul  iKruger und his 
advisers. 
"I remember in Ireland a long time ago I was  talking to an Irish- 
woman, a very beautiful Irishwoman, who had been hunted from holding 
to holding by a scoundrel of  a landlord's agent,  an  immoral brute  who 
wiihed to make her his mistresa. and ehe refused.  Shs man  turnsii  out 
~ ~~.  .. ..-  -------  - -- 
on  the roadside over  and over .again.  She was then sitting in her cabin 
by  her fire of  turf.  I said to her,  '  How  is it, if  the  man is such a 
scouiidrel, you never got anybody to kill him?'  And  she looked  at me 
in a curious kind of  way, and said, < Oh,  eir, becauee I am afraid  of  God.' 
We are now  engaged  at  the  present moment  in the assassination of a, 
people,  and I am  afraid of  God.  You  say to  me,  "Then what is our 
duty 1'  What  wo  ought to  do is plain.  We should order a real, strict 
investigation into the cbarges made against the Colonial O&ce of  perjury 
and lying in connection with this matter.  If  it should turn out that there 
~~  ~~  ~ 
wns  lognl  ovidenco procurable, that is to sny, if the cnblegams now  hnvo 
not only been suppresscd but destroyod, if  the correspondenco still exists, 
nll  perlurer8 should  bo  ~~rosecuted.  Than  let  ug  nond  tho bast mnu we  - .  . .  - - - -  -  -. 
could geh  to Paul Kruger,-and say  to bim,  We  have been led into this 
war by an infernal conspiracy of fraud end lying, me  have foroed you to 
attack us.  We  admit that we  were  wrong.  Retire  to your  own  terri- 
tories, and let us agree what damage we have done to you, and we  will 
pay you compensation for the same.'  I aslc  you in your own conscience, 
before high  heaven, whether, if  it be triie what I say, anything lese than 
that woyld meet the deinanda of  justice 7  Put yourself in Paul Kruger's 
place : imagine that you  had been unjustly driven  into a war lilce thia, 
und  imagine that your  Opponent  bad  suddenly opened his eyes to the 
crime which he hnd committed a~ainst  vou. what would vou exnnnf;  hirn 
---r---  to do?  Surely to malre a confes~on  of  "sin.in  the first in&ance, anti theu 
to m@e  such reparation as he could.  I know that in this matter I nm  na  --  a vo!ce  arying in the milderness.  I know that in the present moment of 
passion and fury, when  passion is excited, aud the streets ring with the 
cheers for the soldiera going to fight in this unholy  uarrel, my voice  will 
hardly be  heard.  But mark my morde ;  if I um  ri&t  we  shall not  have 
long to wait before we  aha11 find that God  is  not  dend,  neither is ISe 
asleep ;  und if, as I believe, He loves this Bngland of  His, and this people 
of His, altliough but  a smali remnant  are still faithful t6 Him, thon, as 
upon  Israel  of  old  when they sinned arid  went  in opposition to the 
Uivine will, will desceiid disaater after disaster, until wo  turn from lying 
and all theae ovil ways into the patbs of  justice and truth." 
In October this was prophecy.  It is history to.day, 
But still there'e more to follow. 
W.  .  STEAD. 
PART  I. 
BEFORE  THE  PLAN. 
CEZAPTER  I. 
A  QUBBTION  OB  PIOBAIi  NDRIDIAN. 
"  OP all forme of  prestige," says Nr. Lecky, in his new boolc,  "The Map 
of  Life,"  "moral prestige is tbe most valuable,  and no  stateeman should 
forget that one of  the chief elementa of  British power is the moral weight 
that ia behind it.  It ia the  conviction that British policy  ie  ossentially 
honourable and straightforward, that the word  und  honour of  its states- 
men  and  diplomatists may be implicitly trusted,  und that intriguee hnd 
deceptions are wholly  alien to  their  nature."  "The  stateaman,"  says 
Mr.  Jiecky,  must  steer his way  between the fanaticism of  those who 
have recognized no morality in  Imperial  politica  und  the fauaticism of 
those who  imagine  that in  dealing with  savage or half-aavago  military 
populations it is possible to act with the same respect for the technicalitiee 
of  law and the same invariably high standard of  moral sorupulousness as 
in a peaceful  age ,arid in a highly civilized country."  Thie  is true, and 
aamirably well said. 
The  popular  memory  is  so  ahort  und  the passioii  of  controversy 
so  hot,  that people  are apt  to  forget eveiything but  the  last impres 
sion;  und  as  it  ha?  beeil  my  lot  to  oppose  the  preeent  war  as 
unnecessary  und  un]ust,  it would  not  be  siirprising  if  Mr.  Lecky 
were  to  put  mo  down  aa  a  representative,  perhaps  the  most  con- 
spicuous  representative,  of  the  latter  class  of  fanatics.  So  far  from 
this  being  the  case, I feel  that  I  lie  under  much  greater  danger 
of  condomnation  for  an  emctly opposite  reason.  I do  not  think 
that;  there is  ltny  one  in  this  couutry  who  has  asserted  so  uncom- 
promisingly  the  injustice  of  judging  men  who  live,  let  us  say, in 
the moral meridian of  Pwtoria as if,  they wero  ethically in  the 1atit.e 
of  Westmineter.  No doubt inany of  those with whom I am  now  acting 
have done so, and have  in times  pnst  deemed it their duty to denounce 
me very roundly for what they considor my failure to apply an un?lterable 
standard of  right and wrong to all men  in  811  places  aud at all timea. . I 
reco.gnize  the honesty  of their  censure, und sympathize largely with lts 
motive;  but  it has alwaya  seemed to me  unjust  to expect  that my, 
whether  tliey  are  Boere  or  Britons, who  live  in  the aniorphous,  semi- 
ohaotic conditions  that prevail in South  Afrioa  should  be  expected.to 
conform to the same high atandard of  constitutional corractitude on which 
ms have a rieht to  insist from atateemen mho  are dealing with problems  ~~ 
in a land  life ours, i'of  old  add just  renown,  where freedom broadens 
slo~vly  down Erom  precedent to  precedent."  It inust be  aamitted  that 
circumstances alter cases, aiid that when you are dealing with thieves and 
niurderers you  can  hardly act in eractly the same way as you 'kould if 8  Th@  Jumeson  Plan ,iuus 
is no  doubt tliat,Mr. Rhodes und  his allies honestly believed  that the 
Outlanders were prepared to make an insurrection, and  that  all  they 
required to encourage them in the enterpriee, which on  that supposition 
bvas  laudable enough, was the moral support of  their kiusmeu on the other 
side of  the frontier, und such material assistauce as they  needed in order 
to take the field. 
I  shall  descrihe  more  at  length  in  the  next  chaptar  some  of 
the  statements  which  mislod  Mr.  Rhodea  und  Mr.  Chamberlain, 
but  all  that I um  contending  for  nolv  is  that  on  the atatement  of 
what  were  then  believed  to  be  the  facts,  their  conduct,  homever 
constitutionally  unjustifiable,  could  hardly  be  regarded as  the  subject 
for  severe  censure  from  the  poiut  of  viem  of  the  moralist  und  the 
revolutionist.  What  Mr.  Chamberlain did  was  much  lese  than  what 
was done by  Cavour times without end, and  Cavour  to  this day holds a 
high placo among the statesmen vvho are lauded by English Liberals.  The 
analogy between  Cavour and Rhodes is much  closer  than  mcst  people 
ima-ine.  Cavour,  howver, acted  under  oircumetances mhich  requbed 
mucx  more  serious justification for a revolutionary attempt than  auy of 
those prevailing in South Africa.  He intrigued and conspired, und aesisted 
in the intriyes and conspiraciee of  others, in an old European country, in 
vhich the rules of  international lam  mere  in  fiill force.  Not  even  the 
most  censorious critics of  Mr.  Rhodea  can  deuy  that  a revolutiouury 
attempt among the scattered Europaan populatious of  South Africa was 
much lese likely to be disastrous to tho permanent welfare of  the country 
than auy similarmovement in the densely peopled, highly organized states 
of  Italy.  Biit neither Mr. Rhodes, Dr. Jameson, nor Mr. Chamberlaiu ever 
contemplated any of the bloody campaigns which the Garibaldiui waged 
in Ttaly.  Their  calculation  was  that a  very  little  extraneoue support 
mould euable the Liberal Party in the Transvaal, aided'by the Outlundera, 
to  overturn  the  Goverument  of  Paul  Kruger,  wheu  the  iiiterveiition 
of the High  Commissiouor mould be evolced, und  a  plebiscito would  bo 
taken mhich would  transfer the coutForof the TransSil Republic froiii 
the hands of  the Tories of  the Kruger school to those of the Liberals, who 
were quite prepared to march ivith the tiines and readjust the institutions 
of  the  Transvaal  to the neceesities  of  the modern  etate.  Everythiuy 
miscarried, otving to thc unfortunate iuroad of  Dr. Jaineson ; hiit if that 
.bad never taken place, there mae  U good prospect  of  a beueficent revolii- 
tion beingcarried through in the Transvaal. mhich  mould  have hrtd  tllo 
ouormous advantage of  placing the control of the South Africaii  Republic 
in the hauds of  the majority of tho adult male population of  the coiintry. 
Hence I have never been able to joiu  in the outcry against Irr. Rhodes 
und  Mr.  Ohamberlaiu  for  the  Part  mhich  they  toolc  in promoting  the 
Jameeon  Plan in  1895.  They mere  misinformed as to tlieb facts, arid 
their weil-meaiit plan  appears to have miscarried o\viug to two  causes: 
Erst, the reported insistence of  Mr.  Chamberlaiu upon forciug the Uniou 
Sack upon the T~ansvaal;  und, secondly, Dr. Jamesou's ill-judged inWad, 
whioh was  precipitated by messagae  from people  in  coinmunicatiou  ,ith 
the golonial Ofice.  Thie will appear inore clearly in subsoquent chaptern, 
CHAPTER  11. 
TIIB  INVERTED  PYniiNID. 
IB the  contemplated revolution in the Transvaal lacltod primary justifi-  ; 
cation  in the absence  of  auy  large  section  of  the  population  driven  i 
sufficiently mnd  by  oppressiou  to he milliug to  risk  life  and  property 
in a revolt agaiust the Government, it certainly did not laclt justification  1 
in the economic und political condition of  the country. The South Africau 
Republic was in the position of the inverted pyramid:  the majority of the  ', 
population, possessing more than half the land und nine-touths of  the mealth, 
and paying nineteeu-twentiethe of  the taxes, had practically no  share in 
ita  administration and no  voice in its legislation.  The Government of 
Paul IIruger rested  upon  the support of  an armed minority of  burghers, 
whose numbers are variously eatiinated at from tmenty to thirty thousand.  i 
But this minority was almost evenly dividad into tmo halves.  Whon the last 
Presidential election toolc  lace, the vote was so even betmeen the supporters 
of President Iiruger und tgoseof  Gmerul Joubert th„  three attempts mere 
necessary before they could aacertain on which side the majorityactuallylay. 
After the third attempt, the figures sholved a veryslight majority for Presi- 
dent Kruger.  Notwithstauding all the excitement of  the election, not 15,000 
burghers could be hrought to the~l],  und of  these ahout 7,500 voted for 
President Kruger aud 7,000 for General Joubert.  What may be  called the 
old  Tory party of  the burghere, therefore, hardly numbered  one-half tlic 
biirghers on the electora~~ll,  and the other half contemplated wvith  grave 
dissatisfaction the reactibnary  und  oxclusive  policy  of  Oom  Paul.  Tho 
Tory minority, dich  had thus been installed in oeco hy the uarrowest of 
majorities, acted as Tory majorities aro wont to do  uudar similar cironm. 
stances.  They proceeded  to  streugthen  their position  by  all legitimste 
und illegitiniate  meaus.  The Outlanders mere the natural allies of  General 
Jouhert arid the Liherals~vhofollomed  his lead.  It was, therefore, deemed 
necessary in the intereste of  the existing rdgi??tc  to increase the safeguards 
against the mmping  of  the existing &ct?rnt.e  by the too rapid introduc- 
tion of  nem burghers who mere alien in sympathy and opposed in politics 
to tho dominant oligarchy.  In his effort  to intrench himself  morc fiimly 
in possession of power, Presidont Iiruger, mith the Tories of the Trausvaal, 
extended  a  welcome  hand  to  various  foreip adventurers, mhom  they 
called to their councils, und mhom  they permitted  to katten on  the tas- 
levied  lunder of  the Outlanders.  The aituation, however, was onemhich  ~- 
was deficate und  daugerous, owing to the animosity aud jealousy which 
bad been exoited by tho annexation of  the country in 1877, und the limita- 
tions with dich  their independence had beeu fenced  round mhen  the 
Transvaal was given back in 1881.  If  the Boers und the Outlanders hnd 
been left entirely to themselves, they would, sooner 01,  later, have arrived 
I 
at a siodira viiiozdi;  but President  Kruger was able, mhenever  his power 
was seriously tlireatened, to invoke the spectre of  Britieh interveution or 
British aggreesion, and conipel iuto hia rank8 the unmilliug recruits, who, Wq.eckecZ  by tke  Jameson Raid. 
t  although they disliked tlie prospect  of  British  intervention, dislil~ed  still 
more  the prospect  of  losing  their  cherished independence.  Thß morde 
of  mhich  me  hear  so much  to-day, suzerainty  and  paramountcy  arid 
British  ascendency, mere  the  trump cards in Paul Ifi.uger'8 hana.  He 
could almays point to some foolish speech or  publioation which appeared 
to justify his contention that the British were only waiting an opportunity 
to west from the burghers their cherished independence.  The position, 
homever, of  Paul Kruger was an anachronism, und  every year it became 
more und more impossible. 
The rich gold deposit of  the Rand had in tvfo or three yeara attracted 
a  great  emigrant population.  Johannesburg  from a  inining camp  had 
emollen in the Course of  three or four years to the  diuiensions of  a city of 
100,000 inhabitants.  The yield of  the mines rose to eight or nine millions 
a year.  Railmays  orossed  the country from  Natal  und  Delagoa Bay, 
mhile from the Cape the ceaseless streum  of  emigrants crossed  the veldt 
und  smelled the  emigrant  population.  These new-comers mere  looked 
upon  mith  scant  favour  by  President  Kruger  und  the  small  ring  of 
Hollanders  mho  rau  the  Transvaal  Republic.  They  mere  treated  as 
straugers in a strenge land; und  instead of  making  any effort  to bring 
them  within  the &of  the  Constitution,  President  iiruger  und  his 
advisers  delibarately  set  to work in the opposite direction-instead  of 
opening the docre.,  they narrowed the portals of  the Constitution. 
In the time of  President Uiirgers the Republic's franchise mas about as 
liberal as that of  the Pree Stute.  In 1883 (after  the War of Independence) 
the mbation was  raised  to five years.  In 1889 the Second Raad  \\,as 
invented;tobe elected to its Watory  labours upon a lower franchise; but 
the First Rand was  still nhut aGiFfrom the Outlander iufluence, and in 
1890  the term wasincreased to foiirteenyeara. Theiirst sessionof the Second 
Raad was in 1891.  In 1898 the First Raad hemmed itself in still further 
by enacting a tmo-thirds clause, to  make it impossible for any franchise 
exteusion to be voted even by  a majority of  burghers.  That  showeq that 
the clique at headquarters knem that the feeling was changing amou  their 
omn  burgher electorate.  Wnally,  in  1894,  in  aii orgie  of  react  T'  onary 
prejudice, they toolr amay the birthright  of  franchise from thoee born  in 
the country, if they happened to be  ehildren of  Outlandere. 
It xvas  obvious that such a condition of things could not last.  Sooner 
or later the nem-comers, whose right to settlo in  the land was secured by 
a elause in the Transvaal Convention, would  demand the right to have a 
voice in the levying of the tares aud in the spending of  the  same.  They 
would also claim the right to munioipal government in Johannesburg, und 
they could not be ex  ected to acquiesce in a  refueal  to have the English 
language taught to tffeir ihildren in tlic scliools.  All  this was reccgniaed, 
but the miniiig population was so busy extracting gcld  from thesaef  that 
political questions remained  in&  ance.  Proin  time to  time petitions 
mere presented praying for the privses  of citizenship, hut mithout result. 
It  is,  however,  unnecessary to  labour  this  poiiit.  At  present  the 
Ninisterialists, mith Mr. Cliamberlain  at their  head, und  a large section 
of  the  Liberals,  are  employed  day  und  night  in  dwolling  upon  the 
!Xlievances  of the Outlandera.  Tn  1896 little was known of the jvrongs of the 
Outlanders, arid very fern of those who  are now most  clamorcus On  +,beir 
behalf knem mho  they were  oi. cared  anything about them.  ~t  the  ~xistence  of tliiß inverted pyrainid in  the Traniivaal which  invited ravolu- 
temPted  Mr. Rhodes  to  embarlt  on the enterpriso mhiah, not- 
withstanding the benevolent assistance of &Ir.  Chamherluin, uufortunntely 
miscarried. 
UHAPTER  111. 
AIR.    HO DES'S  POSITION. 
1  NBED not wastc time in repeatiiig oucc more my deep conviction that 
the  conventional  estimate of  Nr.  Rhodes,  mhich  MY. Labouchere und 
Sir \Villiam  Harcourt have  done mucli to popularizixe, is utterly untriie. 
Nr.  Rhoaes is a statesman, und  a great  statesman,  mith a  firm  psp 
of the essential principles of  democratic  government.  There are many 
Unionists mho  condeinn  NP.  Rhodes's gift  of  &10,000 to Nr. Parnell, 
on  the  ground  that  it was  a  payment  for  political  Support,  instead 
of  being  a  contribution  to  a  political cause with  mhich  Mr.  Rhodes 
was  in  entirc  sympathy.  Rb.  Rhodes,  little  ns  it  is  suspected  by 
those mho abuse him daily, is a man  of  the broadest popular sympathies. 
He is  more  nearly  a  Socialist  iu his  ideas  than  any mealthy  man 
or leading ~tategman  of  my  acquaintance.  He is  not  merely  a  great 
Englishman, he is a great  Colonist, und  he  understands  perfectly mell 
the  fundamental  bases  of  the  stability  of  our  Empire.  Our  colonies 
are  loyal  because  they  goveni  themselves  according  to  their  owii 
sweet  will  und  pleasiire,  withoiit  any  interference  from  Downiug 
Street.  Nr.  Rhodes  cayried  this  priuciplo  out  mith  frank  blunt 
logio, \vhioh paid little resurd to the exigencies of party politics.  He saw 
that in Ireland the mnjonty of  the population was excluded from power, 
and that in consequence, r<vherever  Irishmen merofound all over the world, 
they were as selt in the inortar of  the Imperial  fabric.  He sa~v,  further, 
that the Home Rule mowmeut was the lever by mhich it was  possible  to 
introduce the prinoiple of  federation into the British  Empire.  Although 
there is iio more loyal und enthusiastic Imperialist thau Mr.  Rhode~,  his 
political ideas are distinctly Oolonial or American, rather than those mhißh 
find favour among English Conservatives.  The prinoiples of  the Americaii 
constitution seem to hirn as they seem to most colonists, the niost obvioiis 
and practical method  of  applymg democratic principles  to  the  olitical 
prganization of  states, und iio man, by  training, constitution, uni study, 
1s  more absolutely opposed to the high-flying doctrine of  the paramountcy 
of  Downing Street, which at the present moment is so  much in fashiou 
mith the ma'ority at Westiuiiister.  Indeed, Ur. Rhodes for  a long time 
laboured un i  er great suspicion in this country among the Conservatives on 
the grcund of  his velyoutspokeu denunciation oi the Imperial factoriii  South 
African aEairs.  He was acoused of  publicly declaring that the one object 
of  bis policy  was  to eliminate the Impepial factor, und  this  accusatioii, 
together mith his gift to 111:  Parnell, couse him to this day to be loolced 
at askance by  some  of  the zealots of  Unionism.  But it was  loyalty to 
England und  to the English idea whioh  made  Ny.  Rhodes so strong  a 
Home Ruler, und  so lceen to reeent the intrusive und often misohievoiis 
interiuuddling of  tlie  Iiiiperial  faotor in  Soiith  African  affairs.  It  is 
probable that if  the iiiaii iii  tho stieet to whom  Mr.  Chamberlaiu appenls 
\vere  to be aslccd  to naine  t,he most  distinctively British Im  erialiet in  i  South Africa, he would iinhesitntingly naine Cecil Rhodes, an  ho mould 20  Tl~e  Jun~esou  Plan  wtcs 
Wreol~ed  by  the  Jmeson Raid. 
openly at Domning  Street than at No\vbray House.  The  net  resnlt of 
his arguments in favonr of the immediate taking over of  Iihaine's territory 
was  to leave  me unconvinced  add  utterly at a  loss  to understand  the 
cause  of  this urgency.  There was  a  railway  to be  made northwa~d, 
no  doubt,  und  the  Rhodesians  natwally  xvanted  to  estend  the 
area  of  Rhodesia;  but  the  railmay  could  be  built  mithout  trans. 
fering  the  protectorate,  and  the  net  result  of  hia  misslon,  so  far 
as  I  was  concemed, was  to  leave  me  unconvinced  und  bewildered 
as  to  the  urgency.  There is  no  hurry  ahout  the  matter,  I  said, 
and  1 could  have  come  to  no  other  conclusion,  because  the  key 
to  the whole  matter was  withheld from  me.  The  key  to  the  mhole 
matter  was  not the railmay, but the neceseity for haviug a jumping-qff 
place  for  the  armed  force  mhich  was  to  aesist  the  insurrection  in 
Johannesburg.  But of  that I heard not a mhisper, not even  the most 
yarded allusion. 
Dr. Hwis  had of  necessity  to pursue a very different  Course when 
he  sam  the  Colonial  Niister.  If  he  had  only  spoken  to  him  as 
he spoke to me  he would  have produced  the same impression, namely, 
that  there  was  no  need  for  hurry,  aud  the  oblect  of  his  mission 
mould  have  been  defeated.  It was  indispensable,  therefore,  that  he 
should shom his  hand und  exulain whv the territorv was \vanted. other- 
it  mould  not  have  been  made  &ver.  ~efori  accompan~igg  Dr. 
I  Huris in his visit to Mr.  Chamberlain, it is mell to recall the circum- 
stauees under which it was made. 
'f  "  Mr. Chamberlain was juat feeling his feet in the Colonial Office.  He 
,,B*?VL"/ -  U  man  full of  ambition,  bringing  the  instincts  of  a commeroial 
,,-~ 
je.. -  travelier to the affairs of  the Empire.  Pushfulness was tobe the match 
mord  of his  Colonial administration..  Mr.  Chathbedain at the  general 
election fopght in July, 1895, had gained a great  personal  success, und 
come out of  it as its greatest fiyre.  He was the hero of the election, und 
mhen he mas established at the Colonial Office it was at once iecoguized 
that he mould have a free range throughout the modd.  He had not been 
in office a month when he suddcnly found himaelf  confronted,mith  Mr. 
Rhodes's demand for the immediate cession of  Bechuanaland, on a pretext 
of railway building, a plea most oalculated to appeal to the instincts of  &Ir. 
Chamberlain.  His path was made clear for him bg the fact that he was 
merely required to malce  good his prede'cessor's proinise.  But here it is 
wellto.stop for a momenti,  und  to reoall  the previous dealings of  the 
Colonial OEce und theformer High Commissioner mith the same problem 
which was then exercising the mind of Mr. Rhodes. 
*i'  It is impossible  to  judge  Mr.  Chamberlain faiply, or  to &derstand 
hom  natural it was  for Mr.  Rhodes to turn to  ,the Colonial  OBce for 
su~port,  mithout going hack to 1894, mhen Lord Loch paid his memorable 
visit to Pretoria.  In the  ear 1894, Lord (then  Sir Henr ) Loch heing 
High Commissioner, and d.  Cecil Rhodcs heing Prime duister of  the 
Cape, the Transvaal teacup aeemed  as if  it was  likely to boil over.  The 
immediate occasion of  Lord Loch's  visit  to  the Transvaal was  the need 
for arranging th5 difficulties as to the commandeeiing, or impressing of 
British  subjects for military service, in the Trausvaal.  He'had also to 
arrange theSwazi settlement.  His visit to Pretoria was regarded by the 
Outlandors of Johannesbnrg as an indication that the Biti~h  Government 
meant t0 have a saY  in the settlement of the question between the Trans- 
vaal Clovernment und  the Outlandors. .  , 
Dfrr.  Li0nel Phillips, immediate1  before Lord Loch's  visit, bad been 
meaitating  an  appeal  to  Mr.  ~ho&s,  .but  he  had  shrunk,from doing 
so oming to  the intense jealousy  with mhich m. Rhodes: was regardrded 
by  President  Iiru er.  He  and  his  friends  were  halting  between two 
Courses.  They  (7ig  not  know  mhether  to appeal  to  the  other  South 
African  States or  to the British Government.  At  that time Mi-. Lionel  ; 
Phillips was not snre about trusting Mr. Rhodes, und was inclined to see '  ,  .  ..  .. 
what money could do by way of purchasing an honest Government Tor the  . ,+>  ,(  I  Transvaal.  About Midsummer, Lord Loch came down und had tmo long  ,P:P,v 
conversations mith Mr. Lionel Phillips.  We have tmo  accounts of  their .  ' '  '"'  i..  I 
conversations, one  from  Mr.  L.  Phillips, mritten  at the time,  another 
given by  Lord  Loch  to  the House. of  Lords  three  years later.  Nr, 
L.  Phillips, in letters ~vhich  he mrote to Mr. Wernlier  at the time, met 
Lord Loch full of  the idea that the British Governmeat should interfero 
in the affairs of  the TransvaaL  In his omn phrase, "  The Govsrnment is 
absolutely rotten, ~nd  me  must have reform ;  the alternative is revolution 
or Engliah interference."  After Lord Loch's visit  Mr. Phillips seems to 
have come to the conclusion that it might be possible to combine the tmo 
latter alternatives und  arrange for both a  revolution  und  British  inter- 
vention.  Mr. Phillips wrote :- 
"Sir  Henry Loch (with mhom I had tmo long private interview~  alone) 
aslsed me  some very  pointed questions, such ae mhat ums me  had  in 
Johannesburg, mhether the population could hold the place for  six days 
until help could arrive, &C.,  &G.,  and stated plainiy that iftheie had been  . 
3,000 rifles und ammunition here he would certuinly have come over.  He 
fusther informed .me, in U  significant way,  that they had prolonged  the 
Smazi agreement for  six mouths,  und  said  he supposed in that  time , 
Johannesburg would be better prepared; as much as to say, if things are 
safer then, me  shall actively intervene."-Uape  Jtquii?~  dppedix, No.  4. 
Nr. Philliws then ment on to ex~lain  hom it was that the High Com- ; 
missioner didnot come to Johanneiburg+  and then proceeds as foiioms :- 
'I  . . . .' .  The Government has had a fright, and knoms that the iirst 
shot unjuatly fired by the burghers mould mean Bnglish intervention und 
the 106s of  the independence of  the Re ublic.  In  case of  hoatilities, apart 
from the loss of  life. the Boere mould  5  oubtless do  no  end of  darnage  to 
machinery.  Of  coirse, we  don't want any row, but, as I told EyGelen 
aad Levds. if  the Government or Raad does nothing to pacify the people,  -  - 
me  shaü hive a revolution soouer or later. .  . . . ."-I& 
- 
On July 6th Mr. Lionel Phillips was still full of  the idea of  a possihle 
disturbance.  He reports that a good many men are bnying rifies  in case 
of  contmgencies.  "If  Sir Henry Loch  coines  back  in a  fem  months 
about Swaziland there may  he a  row.  We don't  mant  a row;'  and he 
ment on to state that their best plan was to ruise a  fund of  from teu to 
fifteen thousand pounds  with  which  to  "improve " the Volksraad.  A 
month  later he replied to  Mr.  Beit,  promising to  aee  ~vhether  it was 
possible,  mithout creating unnecessary alarm,  to  get  the companies  to 
possess themselves of  a few  rifles.  If  the Boere lmexv  there mere  8,000 
or so men  there armed mith rifles,  there  mould  he  leas real danger  of 
mi  ing  out  Johannesburg.  If  the  spending  of  money  does not  bring 
re  P  orm. the onlv alternative ia force. und  that will  come in time.  So far  L  ... 
Mr. ~fonel  Phifiips. 
-1 
Lord Loch afterwards explained that he had been iitterly misunder- 
stood, und  that his inquiry as to the number of rifies was only to remind 
them of  the houelessness OE their position from  a military point of  view. 
That niay hnvibeen  so,  und  the'mieuuderstanding  maf  liave  becn  per- 
fectly gonuiue on b0t.h sidcs.  But mhat was vital to Nr. Rhodos  xvas  tho 
plan mhich Lord Lochintonded to corry out in caae distnrbancos  broke out in ! 
22  !Pile  Jumeson  Plan  zvas 
Johannesburg.  That Nr. Rhodes knew that plan was certain, for even if 
he did not lmow it as Prime Minister of  the Cape, he Bnew  it from  Sir 
Graham Bower, with whom he discussod it in view  of  a  similu*  occasion 
mieing.  Lord Loch  has himaelf  publicly told  the world  mhat  was hia 
~lan  from his place in the Houae of  Lords. 
Reading Lord Loch's  explanation together with Nr. Phillips'e Report 
of  the conversation in Johannesburg, it is easy to aee how the essential 
factora of  Lord Loch's  plan must hure appßaled to Mi-.  Rhodes.  Lord 
Loch's  idea,  as W. Rhodes understood it, was that after disturbances 
broke out in the Transvaal, a telegram should be sent waining President 
&gar  of  his duty to protect the iives und property of  British subjects. 
Now it was certainthe live8 und property of  Uritish subjects xvould suffer, 
to homever  small an extent.  Thereupon the High Commissioner would 
telegraph that as President Iiniger  had failed to provide  tha necessary 
protection for the iives und property of  British subjects, the High Com- 
missioner would take steps to  give the British the protection which they had 
faüed to find  at the hanas of  the President.  This was believed to mean 
that the High Commiaeioner would  have marched in from Bechuanaland 
with  every  soldier  whom  he  had  mustered  for  this  event.  As  the 
representative of  the paramount power  in South Africa, he would  then 
have negotiated a settlement, on the aeaumption that both parties should 
disarm, that tho Outlanders have  a vote, and  that the question ~hould 
I  be  referred for settlement to a vote of  all the adult male residonta 
That mas  what was knomn  as the Loch plan.  If  Dr. Harris had got 
I 
one thing more firmly fixea in his head  than another, it was that he had 
got to secure from Mr. Chamberlain the cession of  land und  an armed 
force that should enable Mr. Rhodes to carry out the Loch plan vith such 
I  veri6cations as circumatances might  dictate.  Dr. Harris, with the Looh 
plan  at his  hger ends,  went  to  the  Colonial Office  feeling  confident 
that he was going to the Department which bnem all about the Loch plan, 
und mould probably be only too glad to be relieved from the responsibility 
und risk of  oarr ring it out  themselvea.  For as Sir William Harcourt had  h  been wvilling to  und  over Uganda to Mr. Rhodes, aud even to give him  a 
eubsidy if  he  would  undertake its  administration,  so  the  Rhodesiaus 
believed that Mr.  Chamberlain would  have been  delighted to leave tho 
re~~onaibility  for applying the Loch  plan to Mr. Rhodes.  Nor did  they 
anticipate an7 difficulty in the shape of  a refusal to supply them with the 
temto~  arid the troop.8 necessary for the due execution of  their part of 
the contract. 
CEZAPTER  TI. 
THB  PLAN  NADE PORSIBLE  BY  hIR.  CHANliE11I<.iIN. 
.  ON Aug.  Ist, before  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  been  a  month  ab  the 
Colonial  Office,  he  found  himeelf  confronted  by  Lord  Grey  und  Dr. 
Rutherfoord Harris.  Lord Grey introduced Dr. Earris as a representative 
of  Mi:  Rhodes, und the interview took place in the Colonial Office  in thes 
presence of  Nr. Chamberlain mnd  Lord Selborne, Under Secretary of  the 
Colonial Office, while Ur. Pairfield mnd  Sir Richud iVleo.de,  although not 
preeent, appear to have occasionally entered the room during the conver- 
sation und to have been well aware it tookplace. It ie well to remember that 
Mr.  Chamberlain was  nem  to the  Colonial  Office  traditions,  und  it i5. 
probable at that time knem nothing about the Loch plan.  The  interview 
lasted for  sometime.  There was, of  courae, the necessary erplanation as 
to the promise  given by Lord Ripon and the necessity OE  completing the 
transfer and  pushing forward the  railway.  Mr.  Cha~iiiberlain  listened 
with interest  and sympathy.  The subject was new  to  him, he did not 
wish  tto eive  a definite auswer.  He intimated distinctlv that he did not  .  . .  .  - .  .  0-'  -  --  -~~ 
think there was any need for hurry. 
Then it was  that Dr. Harris bronched  tho subjeot, the real  secret of 
his mission. 
Mi..  Chamberlain gave the Comiuittee this accoiint of  this interview :-  - 
Dr.  Rtitliorfoord  Hnrrio  iprsad  ueiy  stroiigly  for  tlio  imnicdinto  transfur  of  tlio 
Deoiiiinnnland Protcotornto to tfie ~linitnrnd  Com  nny.  I told Iiim f11nt  I iynn  nniv  to my 
ofloo,  tliot I coiild not bo liiiri.iud, und, in fnot, $t  I wns zvorso to  tlio ~iolioy,  niid  tlint I 
mupt dcolino, nt nll ovonts nt tlint time, to considar it. . . . . 
But I pointacl out to Iiim tlint for tliis Iinrposo it  wns not nbsolutoly iiocassnr  tlint tliw  iY  Pi.otccto~nte  sliaiild bo  trnii~fcrrad  ;  tlitit it  r\.oiild  bo  sullluioiit that t~st1.i af lniii  slioiild bo 
resorvccl siiilioioiit for tlio iunliiiig und tlio pmtoetioii  of  tlio rnilway ;  an$ I suggcstod  tliis 
ns nii  nlternatiro  coiirso, ussiiriiig Iiiiii tlint iindor  nny ,airciirns~iccs,  wl~ntovor  migliF?o. 
tlio fnto of tlie Protcotorutn, I \voiild siippoPt Iiis a iplicatioil niiil viv0 Iiiin  nll  tlio  fnoiiities. 
tlint ho might raqiiirn for tiio piir ioso of mnkiii,. tilc rnil<iSay. S:  in rng-nrd  to tliis poiiit,  1  wliicli ocoiipicd, 1  ~lio~~l~l  sny, rt wt niiia.twi8is,  or nt nll ovoiit~  I,y  fni. tliu grentcr  inrt,  !  of tlio vcry lciigtlioiind disoiission ~vliiuli  took ]>lnoo  on tliis occnsion, tliq  not i.csiilt V  .thß 
oonvo~sntioii  \vns  tlint I rafiisod tlio  Protcotorato,  biit  tlint I  promiacd  ovary  ]~ossililo 
siipport to tlio railwny. .  . . . 
Proin tlint momont tlio ti.aiisfor was dooidou upoii, und of courso sitli tlia tmnsfor ~ont 
tlio nnlien-tlint  ivns a inost iiatiii.nl 06nSo~iIOIiOO  iii  niy miiid :  not ono ivllioil nmliscd  tho  ...- -..--  .~~  ~ 
sliglitost siispicioii in iny mind.  . . . . 
' 
On rny rotiitii  froiii Sliniii, or  sliortly nftorwnrds,  imotlior intoi.viow  ivu  Iiold nt tlio 
Coloiiiul  Oflico, I tliink oii  Nov.  Gtli or Nov.  Btli, aiid nt tlint iiitnrvies tlic tliroo  ohiofs. 
ivoro  iicsoiit wjtli tlio niiusionai.icu,  ~vlio  notod ns iiitorpretols for tliom.  . . . . 
iinl'cis told ino tlint iiis iiiforrnation lodliiln to  boliova tliot tlio rofurmors, ns tlicy woro 
cnllcrl, woro axliousting overy pcncaablo  nlotliod  foi.  obtninio~  rcilrosu ;  thnt tlicir applicn 
tioiis,  \vliidi Iiad bcan roslioctfiilly iiiiirlo to tlio Govoriiinciit at tlio Tpisvnnl. Iioil bcoii mot 
witli insult and tlioir domniids rejcetcil ;  tlint tlioii. lliiti0ii~0  \vns bccoiniiig aslinustad, irnd tlint, 
sooiior 01'  lntor it  was  rluita  iossiblo tlint  n riai~ig  woiilil  tnko pliico.  Ho sniil tlint, in Iiis 
opinioii,  suc1i.n rising woiil$  bo  aii absoliitcly Iloodlcrs rcvoliitiaii ;  thnt ho,tliooglit Vio 
notioii of tlio T~iiswal  Govcriimorit IVRS  UII~OPDIRI',  not m~rcly  lvitil tiln ~llgildl,  bllt \\'ltil 
tlio @out inrjority, of  tlic Diitcl?iii  tli?  Cu  io  Colony, nnd  tlint vor  inniiy of tlio subjcots 
ortlio Transvnnl itsolf synipatliizail witli t\io  griovniiccs of tlio  roJrincrs, nid ivoiild  not 
ba propnroil for aiiytliing iiLo R forciblo rolircssioii of tlioir inoriomcnt.  It i~,ns  in tlio eoiilsß 
of tliis  aonvorsatioii  tliitt 110  mnilo  tlia  roiiinrk,  tlio  osnot sords of  wliioli  I  oould  not 
possibly lilodgo iiiy maIllOl'y to alt  tiiia distniico of tiliie, but it  \vns to th6 ol)i.?t:  'I i couid had  the run  of  the Colonial  Office, und  ehe was in the habit, at least 
three times every week, of  calling at the depostmont to talk over Colonial 
affsjrs  either with Nr. Chamberluin, JIr. Fairfield, or Sir Robert Meade. 
She.wasarmedwith the private cipher handed over to her by Di. Hams, on 
his departure from London, in order that secret confidential communica- 
tions might be made by her to 11r. Rhodes, aud receired by her from him, 
for  the purpose of  passing them on in London.  It is impossible to imagine 
that any one  plaoed in  such a  responsible  position  mould  go  a  hair's 
breadth  further  than  what  was  warranted by  iiiformation  received  by 
her from the Colonial Office.  So much for her. 
Nom for the source of  her authority.  She says she did not have it fiom 
Mr. Chamberlain, she had it from 1Ir. Fairfield.  She hnd gone down  to 
the Colonial  Office full of  the news  that  the insurreotion,  &ich  &Ir.  - ~  ~ 
Rhoaes  was  supporting, was on  the  verge  of  breaking out.  She hnd 
special knomledge hom  soon matters would  be  brought  to an e~plosion. 
Arid &h  this information in her mind, ehe weilt  down to the Colonial 
Office  to discuss matters with Ur. Fairfield,.vho, on his part, was as well 
amare as herself  of  what bad been going an.  He  then said to her, with a 
sigiiificance which she fully  appreciated : "  Well,  if  the  Johannesburg 
buighers are going to rise, it is to be hoped they will do it soon"  (9656). 
The reason was obvious.  The trouble dth  America over the Venemelan 
1  dispute was coming to a head, to say nothing of  complications in Euiope. 
I 
The manner  in lvhich  he said it convinced her that she was justified in 
sendin.  a private und confidential messa  e to Mr. Rhodes, that it was the 
'1  1  <Cpi~h  OS Mr. Chamberlain that the Britis  71  in Johannesburg should make 
i 
their rising  immediately.  Attempts  have  been  made  to explain  amay 
Mr. Fairfield's remark.  All  the  changee are rung upon its being a hypo-  , 
!  thetical  observation, und  not in earnest.  Against  this we have the fact 
!  that Miss Shaw knem that the rising was  imminent, and that whatover 
she sent to Mr. Rhodes would  be roceived  as a ward of  command froiii 
1  Mr. Chamberlain.  She bad not merely heard  a casual remark from >Ir. 
Fairfield, ho gave her a ~varning  which justiiied her in  sehding the mes- 
sage to Mr. Rhodes, as Mr.  Chambcrlain's wish. 
Under  the  impulse  of  such  telegrams  from  London,  telegrams 
emanating from a Person ~vho  was in constant confidential communioation 
with the Colonial Office,  intimating in set terms the desire of  the Colonial 
Office that theinsurrection should be  hurried  on,  is it to be wandered 
at that Dr.  Jameson's head got  hat,  and he decided  to rush mutters? 
Hence we had the Raid, which destroyed the Plan. 
It  may be said that this is nonsense und that there is not a  ward  of 
ti-th  in any of  the stories that the Colonial Office was responsible cither 
for the fiag incident or for preoipitatiug  the Raid.  But, though I fully 
admit that as most  of  the  evidence  has been  carefully suppressed, and 
the witnesses were practically bound  over not to speak the truth if they 
mere called upon,  it is impossible to prove the matter up to the hilt, as it 
ought to have been proved, and  coula have been proved, before the South 
African  Oommittee,  still  the  evidence  which  is  afford.ed  by  the frag- 
mentary tele~ams  to ~vhich  I have referred, tho two relating to the ~l?g, 
and the one transmittin~  Xr. Chatnberlain's wish  that the insuneotlon 
should be  precipitated,  iustify a horrible suspicion that  chambor. 
lain may  have been not meroly  passively privy to the  Jameson  plan, 
but the inspirer of the fav more indefensible British Blag arid xurry  up 
Plan.  If  this wer6 SO,  hat  lurid light mould be cast upon  the origin 
of the Present war, in which also the Biitish  Flug is hurrying up ta the 
Transvaal with a vengeance. 
PART  111. 
AFTER  THE  PLAN. 
CHAPTZR  I. 
THE  COMNITFEE :  ITS  OO,U8TITUTION. 
THW  South African Committee of  the House of  Conimons was  appointed 
"  To inquire into the origin und  circiimstances of  the incursion into the 
Soiith  .4frican  Re  ublic  by  an armed  force,  and into the  administra- 
tion  of  the  ~riti&  South  Africa  Company,  and  to  report  thereon; 
and  fuither,  to report  xvhat  alterations  are desirable  in  the  govem- 
~iient  of  the territories under the control of  the Company." 
The Committee inquired first into the origin and circumstances of the 
incursion into the South African Repiiblic.  It  was first appointed at'  the 
end of  the session of  1896, but, beyond a formal meeting, it did nothing 
that yeur.  It was  xeappointed on Jan.  Bgth,  1897, und  was  coniposea 
of  the folloming tnembers :- 
Jfi~~istdalists.  Libcrizls. 
Mn.  SWUI~ETU~Y  CHAPI~EREAIN.  SIR WILLIAX HABCOURT. 
THE CHANOELLOB  OB TW OSOHEQUER,  SIR H. CANPBELL-BANNERBIAN. 
NR. W. L. JLic~(so~  (Cl~aimmmt).  NR. SYDNEY  BUXTON. 
THE ATTO~NEY-GENDI~AL,  Q.C.  Mn.  B~aua. 
SIR W.  HART  DSUE.  MB<  JOHN  E. ELLIS. 
&fn. J. L. WHARTON.  Mn. LAEDUOHERE. 
Mn. BI~H~N,  Q.C. 
Mn.  C~IPP~.  Q.O. 
NB. G~onctn  WSNDHAN. 
This Committee of  fifteeu, of  whoiu sevcu were to form a quorum, had 
lea~re  to hew counsel to such extont as they should aoe fit,  und had power 
to send Kr Persons, Papers, und Records. 
It held its first meeting on Feb. 5th 1897, and its last ineeting for the 
hearing of  witnesses an July Bnd,  1897.  It hold twenty-nine sittings for 
talcing evidence, und three more for considering its Report.  The Report 
was finally approved  on  July 15th, 1899, by  teq votes to one, Nr. George 
Myndham being the solitary dissentient, four being abseut.  The ten who 
voted were :- 
~Ui~zistcrialists,  Libonls. 
>In. Svnxns BUSTON. 
Mit. .JOIIN  E.  EELIB. 
JIr. Blalco retired before the consicleration of  the Report. 
0  B 3G  Tlje  JCLVIL~SOIL  Plan  tucbs 
Rhodes Was  under examiuation for five days und a half.  He Was 
nsgea 2,126 questions.  His evidence occupies 121 pages of thevolnminous 
Blue Book. 
~r,  Schreiner was under examinatiou for three duy~  ~nd  a half. 
1  Dr. Rutherfoord Harris waa in the wvitness-box on four different ~UYE. 
Nr. Chamberlain twice  eiitered the mitnese-box, on euch  occasiou to  !  explain away the evideqce of  Mr. Rhodes',emissaries, mho  had spoken 0f 
the communications \vliich they made to him. 
The Report und the Proceedings of  the Committee f0m.a ~uI~Y-~u~. 
Boolc  No:  311hcontaining  GO1 pages  of  lett-press,  price  4s.  9;d.  In 
2ddi~~oi;the're  1s  an Appendix, 311, I,, pr&e 1s. 2d., und  an Index, 311, 
II., price llhd. ;  tota1,.846  pages. 
The Cape Jsy  ?v%ä  ~appöiuted  May 28th, 1896.  It was conductod 
by  C~cöSXttee  of  seven  members  appointed  by  the Speaker.  They 
mere :- 
SIR Taonr~s  UPINGTON,  Tl10 Atto~x~?/-Ge~~crul  (Oliuiri~iui~.). 
Mn.  SCH~(BI~.ER.  Mn.  Du  TOIT. 
NE. ROSE  ~NNES.  Mn.  JONES. 
Mn. NEREINAN.  NR. FULLEU. 
The Chairman drem up and sibaed solely a minority Report  exouerat- 
i  ing Mr. Rhodes, but all tlie other  iuembers of  the Committee signed the 
Re ort  of  July llth, 1896.  They were unable to secure the attendance 
1  eitier of  Nr. Rhodes OS  Ur. Jameaon or of  Dr. Harris.  Tlie cablegrams 
\vhich  bad  passed betweeii  London und  Capetomn had beeu removed to 
Loudon,  aiid  the  inquiry,  although fairly  complete  as  relates  to the 
organization of  the Raid, did not touch upon the question of  the relations 
betmeen the conspiracy und the Colouial Office.  Its Report, a s U  t Blue 
Book,  coutaining 263 pages of  evidente)  106 pages of  rep?r$Zd  268 
pages of  appeudix, is very interesting, chie5y on account of  its translation, 
of  tbe eonteiits of  the Transvaal Green Book, No.  2. 
The taslr of  investigating the circumstauces of  the Raid was  therefore, 
roady to the band of  the  South African Committee.  Almost  the  only 
questiou  that mss  left ovec  was  the  alleged compliaity of  the Colonial 
Office in tbe plaus of  &Ir.  Rhode8. 
Instead, however, of  iuv&stigating this,  the  Committee devoted most 
of  the time (1) to hearing evidence as to the may  in mhich  Johannesburg 
was  overned by President Kruger, and (2) to thrashing  out  once more 
the tirioe-tlirashed chaff of  the stoiy of  the Raid.  These subjects, on mhich 
IIO ono had auything freah to ssy, and  all  the facb mere ou record, mero 
made  the  subjects  for laborious  examination  und  crosi-examination. 
The real matter at issiie, mhich  touched  the houoiir of  the uation,  tlie 
estent to mhich the Colonial OIlice was iiiiplicated, wvas  dealt  with most 
gingerly, appa~~eiitly  with the object of  avoiding at ,any  tost the 
of  the triitli. 
'  CHAPTER  11. 
IF  >IR.  OHAUBEBLbIN IVEEE  INNOCEBT. 
BUT  in order to bring into clear  relief  the essential hollomness of  the 
so-called inquiry, I appeal  to the reader to aslc  himself  mhat  course he 
mould  hrwe taken if, being innocent, he had, like NY.  Chamberlain, found 
that he was the subject of  such midespread suspicion.  Would he not have 
eagerly seized every opportunity at the inquiry of  turning a flood of  light 
upon every dar]<  und ahady place, of  insisting upon the production of  evecy 
ehred of  available evidence, aud especially of  fuiliishing to the Committee 
every document iH  his possession, und of  lending his  active CO-operation 
in the seareh for all documeutary or  other  evidence mhich might be in 
existencel  That siirely was  vhat any uhouourable member, wvho  was 
also an honourable man," to say nothiug of  bis  being a Minister of  the 
Crown, mould have done.  Here was the opportuuity mhich, of  al1 others, 
an innocent Uinister must have longed for in order to viudicate his honoiir, 
und to dispel to the miuds the foul fog of  suspicion mhich  had gathered 
so densely round  the Colonial  Office.  Hom  did Xr. Chamberlain  avaii 
himself of  it ?  If  there had been nothing in the story of  his complicity iu 
the conspiracy which was spoiled  by the Rdd, this issurely mhat  Ns 
Chamberlain mould have done :- 
He mould haye met the Cqmmittee by a full stateAeut, accompanied' 
by  the preseutation  of  a  copious  dossio!. of  all the  documents in the 
Colonid Offlce bearing upou the questiou at issue. 
He mould have callqd as Secretaiy of  State upou  the cable company 
for copies of  all the cables e~chauged  betmeen Loudou and Capetomn from 
August, 1896, to January, 1896.  L: 
He  ~vould  have further handed in a list of  all persons ' with  wvhom  he 
had communication on the subject, und  have requested  that they shoiila 
be caiied to give evidence on oath. 
He mould  then  have  tendered  himself  for  examination  und croas- 
esamination, aud mouid.have insistecl upon  continuing the inquiry until 
the last vesti  e of  suspicion had been cleared amay. 
That is m%at'&~r.  Chamberlain could  have done if  there  had'been no 
truth in the story of  the complicity, aud it is obvious mhat  an immense 
advantage it vodd have been to him and to the Government of  mhich he 
is a member if  he had tabu  this course. 
But that is just mhat MY. Chamberlaiu did not do. 
The Committee had beeu sitting from February till April 80th hefore 
he tendered himself for exaniination, aud then he merely appealed to be 
allowed to  give  his versiou of  mhat occurred at the interview mith Dr. 
Harris immediately  after Dr.  Harris's  omn  statemept.  He made  his 
statement.  fi.  Labouche~e asked  hiui  four  questions, und  then  the 
examination  of  D?.  H&rris maa  resumed.  The  incident  bore fi  very 
ourious resemblance to the eitraordinary method in mhich, ab  Rennes, 
members of  the General Staff claimed the right to interrupt the evidence 
of  mitnesses wylienever their testiiiiony ment against them. 38  T/ie .Jcdnzesoi~ Nccn  ~UCLS 
chamberlain did not enter the mitness-box again until some of the 
cablegrams had beeu  produced.  The Chairman introducea  him,  ing,  f  U I understand you desire to make a statemant, on  the  conclusion 0  the 
evidente, as to your recoiiectioii of  mhat took pluce  your recollection 
of the telegrums as far as you reme~nbe~  them." 
That was all.  A  desire to  make tmo  specific ~tatement~  rnhicl. Nere 
intendea to weaken the force of  the evidence of mitnesaes already heara- 
that was the extent of  Rfr. Chamberlain's  desire to a88iSt in the elucida- 
tion of  the faots  I  If  he hau nothing to couceal, why this extraordinary 
backmardness in coming formard 7 
If it mere true as the Committee reported, Nr. Secretary Chaiiiberlain 
being one of  the siguatoriea, that 
!  I'  Neither  the  Secretary of Stute for  the Colonies, nor auy of  the 
officials  of  the Colonial Office received  any information mhich 
made them or should have made them  or  any of  them axvare 
,  I  of  the plot during its development," 
Dar.  Chamberlain ~vould  surely have challenged  any und  every n7itness 
!  und exhauated every source of  information in  order to dispel the doubt 
!  mhich has filled the ~vodd  mith suspicions as to our good faith. 
But, no, that was the very last thing mhich  Nr. Chamberlain did.  It 
mas expected hy those innocents, xvlio imagined that the Committee met  ' 
to investigate, and not tobe hoeussed, that the Secretary of  State mould 
have laid before them, before  a single question was asked, copies  of  all 
telegrams,  letters,  und  memoranda  in  the  archives  of  the  Colonial 
Office  mhich  diectly or  indirectly bore  upon  the matter  at issue.  NP. 
Chamberluin,  it was  believed,  mould  presont  the Committee mith  the 
folloming documents :- 
1.  Co  ies of  telegrams und dispatches exchanged between the Colonial 
Office an(; the High Commissioner from  the day of  Dr. Harris'a  guarded 
allusion to tha revoliition in  Johaunesbiirg, down  to  the crossing of  the 
I 
!  frontier. 
2. Co  ies of  all notes und meinoranda by himself, or by officials of  the  8  Colonial  ffice, as to the nature of  comaiunications made to the emissaries 
und friends of  Mr. Rhodes, between August und January, on their visits to 
the Department. 
3.  Copies of  all letters written to or received from  the representatives 
of  Mi:  Rhodes, especially those letters iutorchangcd between the Colonial 
Office  und  Nr. Hamksley  mhen  the cablegramii  mere  submitted to Mr. 
Chamberlain und  returned by  him,  as mell  as the correspondence  that 
follomed thereupon. 
It is difficult  to believe that Nr. Chamberlain, after receiving so plain 
an intimation  from  Dr.  Harria  us  to  the impending  revolution  in 
Johannesburg, abstained altogether fyom  mnting or cabling one word of 
marniug to the  High Commissioner.  Such  messages,  mith  the High 
Commissione?s replies, xvould have beeu vital to the question under  dis- 
cussion.  The abaence of  aay such communicatione, if  there were none, 
mould be  almest as eignificant as if  thoy existed.  But of  information On 
this point Nr. Secretaiy Chamberlain gave us  never a mord. 
That ~~~oranda  exist in the Colonial Office as to the visita  aia by 
und  COmnunicationS received by emissarias of  im  ortant  Colonia  Prime  i  F 
Ministers ia a matter of  Course.  Thie was prove  by  the productioil in 
the middle  of  Dr.  Earris's  evidence  by  Mi:  Chambcrlain  of  lettec 
mitten by ur.  Fairfield to Mr. Chamberlain, mhiah muat  obviously Luve 
only been one of  a series.  Mr. Chamberlain, beiug oftcin at  Birmingham, 
TTr,~ecked 1)g  t/a .Jant~so,~  Bcbid.  39 
must have received copious uotes froin his officials in  town.  But this, 
und this alone, was produced by him. 
That  there existed correspondence betweeu  the Colonial  Office  und 
Nt.  Rhodea's  solicitor, is nom  well known,  und  has  been  admitted by 
Nr. Cliamberluin in the House of  Commone.  Part of  it was produced  by 
Mr. Hamksley.  None of  it was ever brought  formard by  Rfr.  Chamber- 
laiu,  When cballenged to produce it after the inquiry in  the House of 
Commons,  he first  of  all  took  no notice, und then the cliallenge bein 
repeated  two yeare later, he disdaiiifully refused  to gratify the "spitefu 
curiosity "  of  his questioner.  3 
Nom let ue turn to the matter  of  obtainiug the evidenoe of~vniJable 
mitnesses.  The persous who mere more or lass incriminated at  the Colonial 
Office were &Ir. Ndmard Fairfield and Sir R. RIeade.  Both mere ill mhen 
the  Committee mas appointed.  Both have since died.  By every tie of 
loyalty  they  were bound to make  out  the  very  beat  caee  they  could, 
both for their office und  their Chief.  If  they  could have  made a state. 
ment before  a commission, absolutely refuting the statements made as to 
their knomledge  of  the plot, it is difficult to believe that they mould not 
have done it.  - 
- 
But although the xvhole case pivoted on their evidence, notably on Nr. 
Pairfiela'a, Mr.  Chamberlain  took  no  steps mhetever  to secure for  his 
accuaed  &fficials an opportuuity of  declaiing tlieir  iunocence on  oath. 
They Ware left to die mith all the suspicion hauging round  their  heads, 
nor  can anv  one  nom  obtain their  evidence.  If  Nr.  Chamberlain had 
been innoc&t, the statement made by these iuen before the commissionor 
char~cd  to obtain their ovidence on oatli xvould have beeninvaluable. But 
as it-was not taken, mhat is the obvious ~oncliision? 
The secoiid group of  witnesses whom it was  expected Mr. Chamberlain 
mould summoll in order to prove  that he  received  no  communication as 
to  tho plans  of  Nr,  Rhodes  were  the  emissai.ies  and  frienda  of  Mi: 
Rhodes, mho between August und December mere in full possession of  the 
plans of  tlio conspirators, aud mho wer8 also, h  a curious coincideuce, in 
more or lesa constant communication with Mr. d  hamberlain, Nr. Fairfield, 
and  Sir  R. Meade.  These  witnesses mere  Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, Mr. 
Naguire,  Lord Grey, Ur. Eawksley, Mr.  Beit, aud  Miss  Blora  Sham. 
Bub iiistead of  summoning euch of  these  ersona to the mitnese-stand und 
g  %  asking thein lvhether inan  may they ha  ever made any communication 
to him as to the Plan whic  the Raid upset, one, the most iutimate confi- 
daut of  Mr. Chamberlain, Lord  Grey, was safely interned  at Bula~vayo; 
a  second, the inost  iutimate counsellor  of  Mr.  Rhodes, was no eooner 
found to be  giving dangerous  evidence thau  he was  ordered out of  the 
mitness-box und not pennitted to return;  und the third, Niss Flora Shaw, 
was only called obving to the insistence of  hli'.  Labouchere, mho, for once, 
overoame the o position of  the Attoriiey-General.  Yet it was Niss Sham  f  mho had aetual y telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes that Nr. Chamberlain desired 
the insurrection to be  brought  aboiit at onco I  The examination of  Nr. 
Maguire was a farce, aud that of  Nr. Beit not  much  botter.  Both mere 
only called at the last moment, und  neither was aslred  a single qucstion 
as  to how  far he had,  by  cable or  by  mord  of  mouth,  done  auything 
mhich, rightly or mrongly, prodiiced the  im  ression on  the  minds of  the 
conepirators in Afsica that their designs ha!  the approval und benediction 
of  the Colonial Office. 
What iuferenco caii bo  dmrvii froin such a neglect of the simplest und 
inost obvioiis method  of  dissipatiiig the  doiusion  that Mr.  Chamberlain 
was "in it "-excepting,  indeed, that mhich  evey one has  draxvn, via., that it waa no delusion?  If  those documents were not produced, if those 
witnesses  were  not  pressed  to  speak,  and  if Nr.  Chamberlain's  omn 
evidence was  so f~a~~entary,  und  tendered  in  so extraordinary  a may, 
why was it ?  As  Cardinal Manning once said to me, spealting of  another 
famous instance of  alleged innocence: "  I never say to any one mho  aays 
that he is innocent that he is guilty, even if  I  have the proofs  of  hia guilt 
in my  hand.  No,  I almays address him  thus : 'You  say  you  are an 
innocent man, I am  glad to haar  it ;  but if  I aai to believe it, you must 
act as an innooent man.''' 
Can  any one in  face  of  the tactics of  the  Colonial Secretary mhen 
confronted with  this  accusation say  that he has acted  as an innocent 
man ? 
CHAPTBR  111. 
THE SIQNIFIOANOE  OF 'EHE  OADLEQRAXE. 
THE Cape Committee of  Inquiry bad  attempted to get  possession of  the 
cablegrams which had been sent from Londou to the conspiratore in Cape 
Town.  They  had failed, as copies  of  cables  are sent  to London  after 
fourteen days and destroyed after  tmelve  months.  It  was  pointed out 
when the Cape inquiry closed  that the production of  the cables was one 
of  the chief  reasons for holding the inquiry in London.  There the cables 
wer8  within  reach.  Mr. Rhodes  mould  be  in the  mitness-box.  The 
missiug link in the chain of  evidence could be easily supplied. 
Ur. Chamberlain does not appear  to  have taken the slightest trouble 
to secure possession of  the cables or to prevent their destruction.  It is 
evident, theu, to the meanest underatanding that, putting it at  the iomest, 
the cablegrams did supply a  contemporary record  of the communications 
exchanged between the ohief conspirator anä his emissaries, who weie in 
constnnt touch mith the Colonial Ofice.  The telegrams may have  roved  \  nothing, but they mere admittedly regarded as authentic by Mr. R  odes. 
He acted upou them as genuine dispatohes,  and after he had ample oppor. 
tunity of  comparing notes  ~vith  Ur.  Chamberlrin, he evidently saw no 
reason for mithdrawing his  oonfideuce from his friends und  agents, mho 
6 
remaiu his friends aud agenta still. 
Nr. Chamberlainlcne~,  no one better, that it was the cablegrams which 
according to the gossip of  London society woulrl establish his complicity 
in the conapiracy.  It might havo been thought that, at all costs, mitlioiit 
even  counting the cost, lie would have moved  heaveu und  eaith in order 
to secure their production.  But ngainst this Chere  is to be  put  the fact 
that he knem the contents of  those which pnssed  betweeu  Mr. Rhodes 
und  Dr.  Harris.  He had read  tliem all carefully, und  knew that they 
were regarded by Nr. Rhodes as being  the autheiitic record of  negotia- 
tions batmeen himself und the Colonial Office.  Nany of  the cablegrams- 
those from Mr. Rhodee-Mr.  Chamberlain did not see for the first time in 
June,  1896.  Most  of  the  ooutents of  those  sent  to  Mr. Rhodes  were 
siiminariea,  more or lass exact, of  communications iiiade by Nr. Chamher- 
lain  or the officials at the CoIonial  Office to  the agents of  Mr. Rhodes. 
Biit  although he  declared repeatedly that he  had no  objection  to their 
~ublication,  he refueed to  take any step that mould have  secured their 
$roduction; 
- 
NY,  Rhodes refuscd  to produoe the cablegrams or to answer questious 
about them, ae they vvere  all confidential (413).  NY.  Chambedain never 
asked him to do  so.  The  Comniittee never  preased him on the point. 
Onlv at the verv last  3fr.  Labouchere ventui*ed to ask Mr. Chamberliain 
if  hi  nrould not Bndeavour to procure them. 
The folloming questions and ausmers show the rcsult :- 
(0684.)  MI..  L~inbo~~duiw:  I..sul>p~o  yoii  ~~~oiilil  liko  tlioso lolog-rnnls  to  apporn 71 
311.. Oliniriliorlnin :  I rcdly ain qiiito iiiiliiiaroiit. 
(PGBG.)  Woulil yonnliply to 311,.  Rnliodes ar Uolonini Secrotary ?-I  do not tiiirik i iinvo 
nny riplit to iippronoli liiin ur Coloiiinl Scorotnly in allcii R mnttor., 42  !Il~e  Jameson Plan  tucts 
(9580.)  Or in  yolir  iidiviclunl cn  ncity l I do not tbinl; Iio ii.oulil pny tlie Ienöt  ntten- 
.tioii to  ii:o : if foi.  8nv ~CICIOI)X 11"  &Sires 12  to produco tlicni, I tliiiit Iie woiild  not  bo 
We are, therefore, reduced to the necesaity of  piecingout the fern cable- 
gram8 which  did appear by  the elucidatory information aupplied by the 
mitneasea. 
I  begin tbe atory with the may in which the existence und importance 
of  these cablegrams were firat  ofticially brought to the attention  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain. 
When  Nr.  Rhodes came  home to face the music  after the Raid, he 
told  Nr.  Hamkaley,  who  travelled  with  hiin  in  the  train  from 
Plymouth, that the cables from London-mhich,  of  Course, Nr. Hawksley 
lmem  all  about-had  been  considered  by  him  und  communicated  by 
him  to others, aa  aupporting  the  action he had taken in South Afnca  , 
(8733, 3741).  Aa  aoon  U3  Nr.  Hawksley heard that, he advised  Mr. 
Rhodea  that  the  Colonial  Office  ahould  be  informed  of  the  fact 
that thoae cablegrama had been used in that sense.  Nr. Rhodes aaaented, 
und  Nr. Hawksle  no  aooner  arrived  in London than he went to the 
Coionial Office  anBtoid hli.. Fairfield.  <I i toid him  that telegrams from 
Dr. Harris, reporting what Dx.  Harris had done in London from  time to 
time as he did it, had been received by  Np.  Rhodea,  und had been acted 
upon  by him " (3733).  They had a talk for half an hour,  discussing the 
matter, und  mhen  Nr. Hawkaley left, Mr. Faiitield said he would  think 
the matter over (8751).  The existence of  the tele  ums maa  no nems  to 
Nr. Fairfield, the only iiew fact was the use thatgr. Rhodea  had made 
pf them, jn  order to aecure support for the Jumeson Plan.  On the follom- 
ing morning Mr.  Hawkaley received thie letter from Nr. Fairfield :- 
(8762.) 
- .  .. .  - .. .  .. J 9  E.  Y.~IUXIELD.  P.S.-Por~iaps  yoll lviil coino und sco mo witli tlto  eopics. 
Mr. Hawksley replied in the following letter :- 
1Siiia.l 
I tlio116llt  I Iln~  bottcr follow  oiir oxnmplc, nnd so to~d  RI,O~CS  of my tnlks ~ith 
pou.  I Iinro  not  seon Qfoy  b11t  slinlf do so to.tnorro\v.  Groy, I uiiilei~tnnd,  hns  novois 
cnblcd nnythiil  to Soiltll ~dicn,  niid  tlio informntion  ivcii to tlio  oolile  iii ~~~~~~~~~~bi~~g 
1108 nll  bccn ~9.  I tliink.  flicrcfore, porlinps  ciiougf  iins bcoi  jonc,, und ivo &ny  Iwo 
ninttors nt  tliis poilit.  Nr. C. linoivs  tliut  I Iinoiv,  uiid  cnn  SI~UI,O 111s roan;o witli tliis 
I<nol~~I~d60.  Y011 knoiv, olid I do not, ~11ut  Iins pnavcd  botwacii ttio 11ig11  Conimissioiicr 
llis Sccrotot~  nild  tlio Coloiiinl  Ofllco.  8s  I Iiopo I inndo  to you,  tllcro ja  not tlio  aliglitcst intcntio:  to mnko niiy iisc wlintcvor of  coiiii,icntinl  coinmiiiiicatioiis,  ~f yot~  entl 
Iitln~  tllo pllblioatlon of tlio dislinteii nboiit tlio UitlunrIcrs it iroii~d  do mucli good. 
T'01y  tr11ly  yolllY, 
Bi~uiic~irsii  B.  H.ITI~I~RLCI: 
M'.  Chemberlaiu aaya that Ur. Fairfield reported that the Harris cablea 
coutained accounts of  interview8 with officials at the Colonial Office  aiid 
with himself (9569).  Mr.Hamkaley did not take the copies of the cablegrems 
to Nr. Bairfield, biit allowed the matter  to rast.  Nr. Chamberlain, who 
aaw Mr. Rhodea immediately after hia arr!.val,  und  had  trvo  hours'  talk 
rvith him, in the presence  of  a  third  party, at the  Colonial Office, never 
aaked him a single question aa to the use hehad madeof the Hamia cable- 
gram8  (9659).  Neither  did  Ur.  Chaiuberlain make  e  aiogle  effort  for 
inonths to ascertain \%,hat  the cablegrams  contained which had  led  &Ir. 
Rhodea to nroduce thein aa evideiice of  the  com~licitv  of  the  Colonial  -  - 
Office to hciitnting  confederatoq in South Africa. 
Still moro atranoe, it \vaa after Iie had recoived, tbroiigh Nr. FairGeld, 
thia explicit intima&ou that &Ir.  Rhodes had not only aupported the revo- 
lutionary movement in Johanneaburg, but had ahorvn telegrams aent froiu 
London which appeared to prove tliet the Colouial Office Na3  lLin  it,"  he 
eolemnly declared to the Houae  of  Comiiionu  that, after  exaniining  the 
atatementa  of  all  parties  concerned,  "to  the beat  of  his  kuowledge 
und  belief,  everybody,  >Cr.  Rhodea  iiicluded, were  all  equally  igiio- 
raut of  the intentiou  or action  of  Dr.  Jameaou"-rvhich  was true, no 
aouht. as to the Rsid. but mhich oroduced an entirelv misleadinp imvrea-  ~~~  ~~~~ ,  ~~.  .-  ~~~~..~  - 
sion aa to the part pl&ed  by lIr,~hodes  in the mat&r. 
It was  not  till  Mav  that  i\Ir.  Chamberlaiu,  Gudiiig  Loudou  full 
of  rumours that he mni in  the  conspiracy,  und  tbat  the  cablegrama 
proved  it,  bethought  hiiuaelf  that  it  might  be  aa  mall  to  see  how 
far  the  reported  interview8  with  himself  and  hia  officiala  jiistified 
the  current  gossip.  He heard  riiinours,  he  aaid,  dich wer8  ciirrent 
in London about  the existence of  these telegrains, und  about their cou- 
tainiug somethiug  verg iinportant indeed.  "I  then determined that I 
would  aee  exactly what was  in  them, und  accordingly I inatructed Nr. 
Fairfield to insiat upon their production" (9660).  So Mr. Hawksley coiu- 
piled from copies and froin  origiiials (8796) as ful!  a  coll?ction of  cable- 
gram8 to aiid from Nr, Shodes, sent by  Dr, Hama aud ha  friends, aa  lie 
could  put togethei:  The oollection, however, did  not  contain the tele. 
grams to und froin Miss Flora Shaw.  RIr. Pairfield'a requgat for thecable. 
grams was made in Rlay.  It was not till Jiine  6th tliat  Mr, Hawkaley 
forwarded the copiea  of  the  incilminatiiig cablea to the Coionial  Office. 
He accompanied them with a letter aalting tliat they should be treatcd es 
confidential  und returned after peruaal.  The other conteuts of  theletter, 
which =.  Chatqberlain deacribed as o!ly  au  ordisary covedng letter," 
Nr. Chamberlain hss not yet inade public. 
The copies of  the ~ablegrama  were kept by Mr. Chamberlain for ten days, 
&ring wlich time lfr. Labouchere has atated they were  submitted to the 
Attoruey-General. They were examiued aud annotated by Mr. Ii... Fairfield 
und  Sir  R.  Neade.  NI*. Chamberlain  return?d  them  ou  June  l%th. 
He sent them back with a lleter, mhich, whve giving fiill permisaion  for 
their publication, led to a correapondence, still in Nr. Chamberlain's pos. 
sesaion, mhich he carefiilly withheld from the Biiowlod~e  of  the Coiuiuittee 
vzdo  anewer to  Dr. Cladc,  EIouse  of  Commoua, Aug.  3rd, 1897).  The 
&o;Iorving extract froin the examiuatiou of  Nr. Hawkaley by  the Attorney- 
General afforda  an iiietructive example of  the  may  iii  mhich  the Coin- 
mittee of  No  Iuquiry coudiictrid the "iiiveatigation." 
On  tho 26th IIay, Nr.  Hamltsley  beiiig  iinder  examination  by  the 
Attorney-General, aiid RIr.  Secretary Chainberlaiu beiug preaent, we have 
the followiug rccord of  questioii aiid ansmer :- 
($777.)  No\,.  diil yoli acnil tlloln  (the cnI~lrg~«i~l~)  in JIIIIU to tllo  Coloninl OLlico, 1i.itli 
n IottCr  ,I  v~rb~,l  iiiesmgc 1-1  probnbly  sctioiit a eo~ariiig  liotr. (8779.)  Hiivo yoii got  tlic covoriiig iiotc 1-xo. 
(8779.)  I slioiild bo glu<l  if yoii xvoiild pioducc it, if  yoii plcn~0  :  it ni~iylinro  b benriiig 
on tlic qiietion.-I  suppobo it is nt  tlic Coloninl Olfice. 
(And lfr. Sccretnry Cliamboi~laiii  alt vtill oid  said novcr n x~od.) 
(8780.)  I iiicuii 0 ooliy  of your 1ettor.-i'cs. 
And theii the Attoiney-General suddeul  diverged to the subject of  the 
cablegrams, never, by the way, giving the ‘3'  ommittee a single hint that he 
himself had been shomn copies of the famous secret cables. 
Theu, after asking aome  questions on  the subject  of  the qables,  he 
suddenly hded  back to the covering letter :- 
(8804.)  No!"  I must ask yaii mlictlicr yoii hnvo not got  n copy of  tlic  eovoring 1Ctt~r 
bci,c:a  1Vcro thoy sont to tlic Colonial Oilico undcr thc scd of sccrccy 1-Tlicx  xtrorc. 
And  thereupou this astonishing cross-exainiuer, \vho  had stated that 
this covering letter  may have a bearing on  the question," did not  even 
press for an  ansmer to the first part of  his question. 
So matters remained until the trial  at BW  The  officers  accused 
aaid  nothing of  the  assurances  given  them  as to  the  sympathy und 
Support which the  conspiracy commanded in  the Colonial Ollice.  Biit 
when  the  officers, after being  sent to  gaol, mere  advised to resign their 
commissions, Sir Sohn Willoughby mrote  the folloming letter to the War 
Office :- 
(6622.)  I Iinxso tlio Iioiioi1r  to statc tliat I took pnrt in tli~  prcpzration of thc military 
as cdition,  und  wnnt  into  tiic  Trniihvaal,  in  piiraiiniico  of  ordcn  reccivcd  from  tlia 
~(Fministrntor  of Llntnbclclnnd,  and iii tlio lioncst nnd boirajdc bcliof timt tlio stcps wcro 
takon with tlic kna\i.locl  e niid assont of  tlic Impci,inl niitlioiitics.  I was informcd by Dr. 
Jnmwon thnt this was tfe foot.  It was in tlicsc  eireuniatnnccs  nnd  on  tlicso  stntoiiiaiit.. 
tliat I took  in  tlic otlicr oficcrs xvitli  iiio,  nnincly,  ;\lnjor H,  F.  'Wliitc nnd  Cnptains E. 
Orcy und E. Wliitc, nnd tlio forrgving osl~lnuations  npply  to tliom  nl~o. 
He enplained afterwards that  he  had  used  the  words  "Impeiial 
authorities " on  Dr. Jameson'a  word.  Dr.  Jaiiiesou  deuied that he haa 
ever  used  the mords "Imperial  authorities."  He said that Mr. Rhodes  .  Sud never told him that he had the sanction anti approval of  the "Imperial 
authorities."  Dr. Jameaon  was not aslted  whether he had not told  Sir 
John  Willoughby that the famous Plan had tbe sanction and  approval of 
the Colonial Secretary  1 
Fine diatinctions are necessary in delicate c~cumstauees. 
There was a long mrangle with the War Office about the commissions. 
Ultimately  the commissious were  restored, excepting that of  Sir Johil 
Willoughby. 
It was in the autumn of  1896 that, believing there was  no  ehance 
of  averting the holding of  the iuquiry, und that if it was held there was no 
possibility of  sohocea  Parliamentary Comiiiittee as to avoid  the 
disclosure of the cables, I bethought me of  putting the very best possible 
face upon  Mr. Chamberlain'a part in  the couspiraoy by telling the whole 
story in my Christmas Aiinual, \vhich that year was entitled <'  The History 
of the Mystery: or, The Skeleton in Blastus' Cupboavd!'  No sooner, how- 
ever, was the book on the machine than urgent messages were brought  to 
me representing that the cablegrams would be suppressea and never need 
be produced if I conseuted to oinit all reference to the cables in my story. 
I hsd  sent  the  proofs of  iny  story  to  MY. Pairfield, mho  hold  that 
everything would  OE  necessity  come  out.  This, homever, was not  the 
oplnion of  others, who  said  that it was  my story, und  my  story alone, 
mhich  would  render  the production of  the cablegrams unavoidable.  I  ahrank from takiug the respousibility  of  forcing a  revelation  as  to  tlle 
extent to mhieh out Colonial authorities liad been iinplicated, even with 
the  most  praiseworthy  motives, iii  a revolutionary conspiracy,  und  so, 
under  urotest. I coiiseiited  to  black  out  evecv  passage in which  anv 
wferenie to cables or  cablegrums occurred.  I iieided Gainst my hettir 
iudement to the imuortunity of  the representatious made to me.  I aaid I 
baäcertaiu it moulh be imiossible to preveut a Parliarnentary Committee 
from insisting upon the prodiiction o!  oablegrams, which mere  obviously 
vital to the subiect iinder iuvestiaatiou.  Alus 1  I little knew  the extent  .. ~---  ~~~~ 
to which it is p&sible for a ~arliaÜ?entar~  Committee to substitute a game 
of  oolitical  blindman's  buff  for  the  serious  searching inquiry  which  1 
the?  were iustructed to malre into matters vital to the honoiu änd good & 
faith of  our country.  I 
It was about this time that I had vehement disputes as to whether  or 
not  it was justifiable to lie to suppress the cablegrams und to conceal the 
exteut to which the Colonial Office was im  licated.  I argued hotly that 
deliberate lying such as that mhich  ~~~as  !eclared  to  be  necessary  for 
reasons of  state not 6nlv would  do  no  good  hi tlie longrun, bat would 
certainly eutail dire pendties in the near futiire. 
It was this  cynicl but perfectly  sincere  expression of  a  convictioii 
tbat in ordev to get u Rlinister out of  a scrape any  amount of  lying  was 
justified that uiade ine realize that the South African  Committee  bad  to 
try a much bigger issue  than the comparatively trivial one  of  the Raid. 
It  was not the career of  Nr.  Rhodes or  the character  of  Ur. Chambeii 
laiu  yhich was  at  stake.  The  question  was  immeasurably  more 
uomentous.  It was mhether  both  parties  in the  State,  including the 
Ei.&&  meu of both front benches, appoi~ited  by the House  of  Commous  .:K.&~ 
to ascertaiu the triith und report the sauie, c0.d  be so far worlted upoii  .  >. 
by  one or another motive  us to use  the  inachinery oqrated  for  the  dis-  , .  ~c -. 
covery  of truth into  aii iiigenious  inethod of  palmiug a  fulsehood upon  t. 
tlie world.  And behind that, agaiu, there  was  tlie  still vaster und more 
terrible questioii, if the deadly game  ~ucc?e~~d,  yhether  a nation  ~vhose 
supreme aiithoiity appointed to make iiiquisition into the faots lent itself 
to a conspiracy to concel~l  tlie truth und declare the tbing +ich  is not- 
whether such a nation could look formard to anythingbut ternbl'e t~ibulatioii 
to come.  filany mistal<es, errors, criilies  can  be  committed by  nations, 
but  for  a  Select  Committee  of  the  House of  Commons  under  stress 
of  aiiy  temptation  to  stoop  to  \vith  us  iii  a  double  sepse-  ,.';{r.  : 
to convert aninv&tigati'on on oath into a geiieral hush-iip und yhitemash  .> 
arrangement,  aid  to  r tiirii a  falae  verdict  by  diut  of  suppression  of 
evidente-that, I confe8~;  seemed  to me  mOre  than  any  nation  could 
essay und come ofl'p&eless. 
Despite all iiiy protests, the game was,played out to the end, althougli 
with some difficulty.  Oming  to the iusistence of  oue or  t5v0  members 
of  the Committee,  soine  of  the cableg~a!i~s  mere  prodiiced;  but  the 
inquiry " was closed, so as to reeer !t  iiiipossible to secure the others. 
1Ir.  Rhodes hiinself  expected the iuquiry to  be resuined in 1898, wheu 
böth he und Lord Grey <,ould be available as ~vituesses. 
The reader can form his omu opiiiiou of  the iniportaqce of  the cable- 
grains by examiuing those dich  mere mith tlie utmost difficulty prociwed 
for tlie inspection of  the Comiiiittee. support of  his action in South Africa.  But althou h all of  those persons  f  mere placed in the witness-box, not one meinber o  the Committee asked 
one of the three mhether or not, in their opinion, the contents of  the cabie- 
grams justified  Nr.  Rhodes  in  the  inteiy~etation  whioh  he  put  upoii 
them,  or  afforded  any  material  of  which  a  couspirator  would  be 
justified  in malcing  use  as  a  proof  of  the  fact  that he  enjoyed  the 
confidenae  und  support of  the Colonial Office.  A  series of  telegrams 
so  critical,  dealing  mith  a  quqstion  so  danngerous,  could  not  buh 
have  made  soae impression  upon  their  minds,  und  in the  absence 
of  the  cablegrams  themselves,  the  next  best  thing  mas  to  ascertaiii 
what  those who  had seen them  could  tell  us  of  their  real  character. 
Then there was a  further question that euch of  these three might have 
been asked, namely, whether in their judgment theremas any justification 
for the imputatiou so freely cast upon the aenders of  those telegrams, that 
they bad either @ven free rein  to their imagination  or hltd deliberately 
lied in accordance with instructions to vsp  up telegrams for the pui-poses 
of  conspiracy.  But here  again the Committee did not deem it necessai'y 
to obtain  the opinion of  those who were most  competent to judge,  und 
theu, after having persistently neglected to make the most obvious und 
elementa~y  in  uirica  as to the facta,,it did not  hesitate to dra\v up the 
most  positive \  eolarations as to bhe innocence of  the  Colonial Office und 
1  the giilt of  MY. Rhodes. 
CHAPTEH.  V. 
?!HE  HARR18  ü.411L~OinA~fS. 
WHEN  YOU  once get a Committee of  Investigation a&ointed,  and fully 
launched upon  the task  of  malcing believe  to inquire into the  facts, it 
is almost impossible to avoid  some  shreds or  fragmeuts of  faots  being 
b~ought  to light.  Although the Committee had half  finished its labours 
before any of  the cablegrams mere  produced, when it  was  drawing to  a 
close there was extmcted fiom the cable compmy a very incomplete und 
imperfect  colleotion  of  cablegrains eschauged between Mr.  Rhodes und 
1iis:agents.  Some  of  these  cablegrams had no  bearing on  the subject- 
matter of  the  inqiiiry, but  there  were  several which touched  upou  the 
subject.  Their  signiticance will be better appreciated if  they are printed 
in consecutive order, as they were reoeived, with such elucidatory reinarks 
as can be extracted froiu the evidence of the witnesses. 
Dr. Eurris, London, to Oharter, Uapetown.  July 31st,' 1895. 
Inform  Dr.  Jameson  sour  telemam  received,  doing  ow  utmost, 
do not think I shall fail. 
This telegram was despatchecl by  Dr.  Harris iinmediately after his 
arrival in  Xnglsiid  oii  his mission to the Colonial Office.  The telegram 
from Dr. Jameson  to which  it was  in  reply is not  in evidence,  but  it 
appears to have beeil a inessage iirgiug him  to  spare no  effort  to obtaiu 
from  the Oolonial  Office  the  te~ritory  und  tho troops necessary to carry 
out the famous Plan.  Dr. Harris saw Nr. Chamberlaiii for the first time 
iu  August,  und  from  that  time  on~vards  cablegrams  were  constautly 
interchanged between DY.  Harris und  &Ir.  Rhodes.  All  commuuications 
made  to  the Oolonial Office, or received from  the Colonial  Office, were 
forwarded by cable,  so that Mr. Rhodes was  kept informed as to every- 
thing that went on.  But none of  these cables between 31st July aud 21st 
October are in existeuce.  This @p occurs in the critical period wheu Nr. 
Rhodes was fwious witli Nr. Chainberlain for refusing to hand over the 
tewitory und  troops  necessary for  carrying out the Jameson Plan.  On 
Oct.  2lat  the  Britisli  South  Africa  Company  sent  a  long  tele,qram 
relating to some defects~in  recent consigiihients of  c~~tridges,  but  there 
is nothing to prove that this had any relation to the Plan. 
There is another gap after this for nearly a fortuight, a period  within 
which falls the dispatoh  forwmded from London to  whiah  Mr.  Rhodes 
'ieplied on Nov.  6th, relating to the question of  the Bug.  This cablegram 
was popularly xeported to liave declared that no support could be counted 
iipon from the Colonial Office iinless the movement  took place under the 
British fiag, und that assurances were necessary from Mr, Rhodes thati sucli 
would be the case.  Tliat report, however, tiue or false, was one among the 
inauy eleinents throwing suspicion upon theColoiiialOffice, ~vhich  the Soiitli 
African Committed  dia nothing  to dissi  ata.  The serios  of  cablegrams 
fiirnished by the cable coiiipany containe  1  no copies of  the dispatches that 
mere sent by mny of  Durban, so that not even for the iiioiith of  November 
did the Committoe obtain a coinplete  set  of  the messages interchanged 
betwoen  Mr.  lZbodes  und  Dr.  Hawis.  It  will  be  seen,  ho~\,evcr, that 
D TI~i.ecliecZ  by  tlie  Jnnlesor~  Raid. 
those  which  were  produced  assume  on  both  sides  that  constant 
communication  was  going  oii  between  Dr.  Harrie  und  the  Colonial 
OBice.  Dr.  Harris  was,  in  fact,  Ur.  Rliodes'ö  ambassador.  3lr. 
Rhodes  sent him  his  instructions  aiid  reccived liis ieports evidently in 
absoluto  good  faith.  &Ir. Rhodes's telegrams are vüry churacteilstic, und 
certainly show no trace of  having been coolted for th? purposc of  infiuen? 
iug  l~iiblic  opinion,  if  ever  they  came to be  piiblished.  The  ßume  is 
alrnost  as obvious  iu  the  case  of Dr.  Harris's  dispatches.  I quote 
the cablegrams, from th&Apper#lia  to the Re otpf  the South African  4:  Inquir  The  number  quoted is,,-_e  num  er amm\e& to  the teleg~alli 
ii~li~~;-~ll~these  telegriSi-6f  Noveiuber  are  cither  Irom 
to Mr. Rhodes or from Dir. Rhodes to Dr. Harris.  hlr. Rhodes 
was  not  examined concerning an)' of  theiu, as lie had left  the country 
before  the cablegrams mere  produced.  Dr. Harits was examined very 
closely upou them all, und did his best to iuiniiiiize theix significauca, a?d 
esplaiii  awny anything that mioht  appeay to conlpromise  the  Colonial 
Ofice;  but,  notwithstanding this,  his  evideuca,  talcen mith the cable- 
arams, is  certainly  verp  far  from  justifying  tlie  confident .Report  of 
Che  Committee.  - 
No.  I.  Hurris to Rhodes.  November  2nd.  1895.  - 
Very Confidential. 
If you  cunnot  oarry out the plan  of  Dr. Jameson, have  every 
reason  to believe J. (Ihamberlain intends  active policy  Imperid with 
intention to federation Eritish sphere of  inflnence in his way and he 
will expect you  to adopt his views, 
The  plan  of  Dr.  Jameson,  Dr.  Harris  esplained  (8197), was thß 
shortest may of  expressing in  cable  Ianguage the intention  of  placing U 
British force on the front&, to act if Mx. Rhodes decided it xvae  necesaary 
in the event of a revolntion occurring at Johannesburg.  Dr. Harris coiild 
not  remernber  the grounds upoii which he brtsed. liis atatement bhat he 
had  every reason  to  believe  tliat  RIr. Chamberlain had the intention of 
pursuing a more active Imperial policy in South Afrioa, but  he  evidently 
believed  that the Colonial  Secratnry  was  prepared  to  carry  out  a 
policy of his omn, if  Ur.  Jameson's plan  could  not  be oarded out, the 
object of both policies being  the same-that  of  the federation  of  South 
Africa.  Should  the Jameson  Plan  miscarry,  lfr. Chamberlain  would 
expuct  Ur.  Rhodes  to  adopt  his  views.  There  was  evidently  sonie 
jealous  on  the  art  of  Dr.  Harris as to a  possible  supersession  of 
Ur.  Rgodes  as  t  %  e  leading  fwtor  in S~uth  African politics  by  i\Ir. 
Chamberlain,  and  he  marned  his  chief  that  if  the  Jameson  Plan 
failed,  foi  which  Dr,  Hai~is  had  come  to seeure  Mr.  Chamberlain'ß 
aupport,  or  if  it  ~as  not  cariieä  out,  Ur.  Chamberlain  would 
expect  Nr. Rhodes  to  support  bis  policy.  In reply  to a  qnestion 
as  to  whom  he  learned  this  from,  Dr.  Harns  replied  (8291): 
''TT'e  (Xr.  Maguire  und  myself) coiisulted  together, and  that  was 
o11r  impression at the time.  I really cannot say mbom  I learnt it from. 
That was merely iriformation conveyed to our chief."  They lcnelv  that 
the Imperial garrison in  Soiith Africa was being reinforoed  (8293), and 
as it  had  been  up  to that time  aii axiom with  Nr.  Rhodes that there 
should  not  be  direct  Imperial interveution  in  South Africa,  uiilees  it 
absolutßly could  not  be  helpeä, tbey  did  not  send  this  information 
(8297) with auy feelings but those of  iegret.  To this telegram Mr. Rhodes 
docs not seem to have made any reply by wire. 
170.  2.  Hurria tos  Rhoder). 
(lonfldential.  November 2nd, 1895. 
Earl  Grey  hold  an interview with J. Uhamberlain we  have  seen 
Native chiefs decline our proposal but we  hope they will make Counter 
proposal.  J. (Ihamberlaio will put Pressure upon them to settle.  Fear  .  NE  must  increase  Khama's  boundary.  Large  breakfast  to be giveu 
'  .Khuma 4th Nevembex,  London.  Fear  speeches will  damage  Eritish 
South Africa (Iowuny, but  R.  Maguire Dr.  Hmis hold an interview 
with speakers to-morrow, hopins to  influence  these.  Country press very 
much in favour of  Khqma. 
The date of  the iuterviqw between Lord Grey und Mr. Chamberlain is 
somewhst in doubt.  It  mugt have been before the  2nd, but  just  at that 
time Ur. Chamberlain appears to have been in Birmingham, and did not 
return to London till after thd4th (8204).  -.  The objection of  Khama to come  under the Chartered  Company was 
the one geat stumbling-block in the may of the cession  of  the jumping- 
off  place.  The missionary public was strongly in favour of  Xhauia, und 
Nr. Naguire und Dr. Harris were doing their utmost to  counter-work the 
agitation  in favour of  the one  South African  ehief  who was  known  und 
Iiked in this country.  ..  C, 
No.  3.  Harris to Rliodes. 
November Znd,  1895. 
Willoughby and Khama state YOU  had  promised  them lad  up  to 
Panda  3Ta  Tenka.  I have  been  trying for  Sir Uharles  Warren .may 
Y.*.  Position.  Telegraph authoritative denial.  .  .:;.-..  ..  ..,V, 
J - 
"  Willoughby " was  the  Rev.  Mr.  Willoughby,  ~ho  wus  personally 
\
'
'
+
+
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condiictiug  the  Afticaii  chiefs  rouud  England.  The  '~a~ithoritati~~  denial" aslced for is not produced. 
No.  4.  Harria to (Iharter Uapetown. 
November 2ud,  1895. 
(Iommunicate the following to  Dr.  Jameson I have obtained you 
ikanning, and *ll  probably get Protectorate.  Oun you  cmry out your 
plan or can you  not. 
Ilcannhg wus  U  chief  of  the fxontier territory  on which  the  troops 
mere to be stationed, uiid which was to sorve aa the jumping-off place into 
tho Transvaal.  The telegrmn was  sent in order to  g~t  defiuite informa- 
tion from Dr. Jauieson, so that they might be  in a position to kuom how 
soon  tlie negotiations  as to  the  transfer of  the  Protectorate  must  be 
concluded (8206). 
It  will be seeu that there mere four  cablegranis on Nov. 2nd.  There  ' 
is a lapse of  two days, and theu there are three ou Nov. 4th. 
No.  5.  Harris to Rhodee. 
November 
Registered address of  Earl  ffrey  ia  ffothical London. 
regi6ter this on  your  side at once. 
Lord Grey's address was  registered  becanse  &Ir. Beit nur1  D'.  Earris 
were iutendiug to go oilt to the Cape, and they thought it well to give 31r. 
Rhodes Lord  &ey's  addrese.  Lord Grep does  not,  however,  apperw. to 
havu  sent any teleyrains to  Ur. Rhodes, nor did Mr.  Rhodes  send any 
telegramrl to "  Gothical." 
.  D2 No.  8.  Harris to Rhodes.' 
November 6th, 1895. 
We  have se0n E.  Fairfield, Hon. R. H.  Msade, (lolonel aould Adams, 
and  we  have agreed to what land we give native chiefs.  Secretar~  of 
State for (lolonies holds an interview with us to-morrow afternoon three, 
und  after native chiefs if they  are satiefied und they will be  present. 
Secretary of  State for Colonies he will graut Brltlsh Soiith Afrlca Oom- 
pany Ewe  protectorate with police.  We  reported your  letter to 
A.  Beit  during  the month  of  August  to these und  Flora we  have 
these solid. 
This telegram was importniit as innrking the cessiou of  the jurnping-ofi 
plaee for which  they bad been in  negotiation so long.  In August, hIr.  ' 
Chamberlain had said he could not give  them the land or the police  for 
two  years.  On Nov.  5th we  see the vital  question is settled, und  the 
neceaaary cessiou is promised from mhich they will be  able to support the 
Johaunesburg insurreetion from  the outside.  With reference to the last 
clause in this telegram, I should meution that this letter of  Nr. Beit's is 
onc of the uuexplained mysteiles.  When asked nhoiit it, Dr. Harris snid 
it bore on the question of  the trnusfer of  the Protectorate.  There might 
have been other matter in it, but Dr. Harris's iiiemory utterly failed him. 
He could not say what it was.  That it was importaut is evident.  All the 
contents were communiceted to Mr. Fairfield and to i\Iiss Shaw, but only 
part of them were read to Colonel Gould Adams (8817 . 
The  hrase  ns to having  "these  an6 Flora  soli 1  " was  elaborately 
explaiuef; mithout shedding much light upon  the question.  Dr.  Harris 
explained that "  thcsc "  referred to Fairfield, Gould Adams, und Neade, hut 
he afterwards said that Sir R. 3Ieade did not knom about it (8318.)  The 
implication of  Course  is that 3fr. Pairfiold, Goiild Adnnia, und Rfiss Sham 
were solid in suppovt of the Tameson plan.  I£  this is not  the  meimiug, 
it would be interesting to know what meauing it could  hnve.  Miss Shaw 
volunteered the cxplanation that "  tlwsc"  did  not rek  to her in tlia least. 
It  was  the first  of  the extraordinary  espositions by  whioh  hliss  Shaw 
achieved a unique reputation before tlie Committee.  Whon  Bfr.  &it  was 
called, he does  not seem  to he  been  aslced  any qiiestione as to  thr 
eontents of  this letter. 
No.  9.  Rhodes to Harris. 
November  Bth,  1895. 
As  to English  flag they  must  very  much  misunderstand  me  at 
home.  I of  course would not riak everything ns  I am dohg excepting 
for British flag. 
This is the iirst  telegram  froin Nr.  Rhodee  wbich  nppears  iii  thu 
eollection-a  very signifieant telegram it is.  The lcey  to this telegram ie 
missing.  DY.  Harris's explanation given before the Committee was merely 
that two sections of people at home-"  people one iueets iu ordinary dnily 
life "-(8322)  differed in opinion coiicerniiig &Ir.  Rhodes's action.  Oue 
section doubted Mr.  Rhodes' loyalty soiuemhat.  Another  section  lcuew 
he was absolutely loyal, but they doubted whether bewould have sufticiciit 
in0uence with theleaders of the movement at tTohanuesbu~g  to seoure that 
the movement should be turned to the advantage.of Great Britain (8390). 
Dr. Harris, as usual, could  not remembar  the mords of  his telegrain, 
und  as all the telegrnins up to Oct. Slst had been  destroyed (8828), no 
evidente cau be obtained ae to mhat  Ur. Rarris seut, but  the stntement 
freely made in Africa at any time since tliat  telogram  mas  dispatcheil is 
to the effect that Dr. Harris  telegraphed \varning Ur. Rhodes  that  ho 
could  have no suppoxt for  Tmeson's plaii,  iinless  lie  could  gire  Nr. 
Chamberlain as a sure guarantee  the presence of  the British flag.  What 
is quite ciear is that some  one of  sufficient authority  aud inüuence in 
London  raised  the  question,  and  by  raising  tlie  question  spoiled 
overylhing.  Sir  Milliam  Harcourt  croas.esainined  Dr.  Harris  U  oii 
this  nt  considevable length  (8319-8:3G8). Sir Villiam  Harcourt's  C  ief 
point was to fasten upon  Mr.  Rhodes an  imputation  of  double-dealiug 
in  that  he  assured  Ur.  Hariis  that  he  was  risking  everythiug  for 
the British fing at the  Same time thal he  had  eutered  into a  definite 
arrangement  With  the  Transvaal  Coinmittee  that  the  insurrection 
ahould talte place under the Transvaal flag, and not under the British flag. 
As  usual, Sir William Harcourt was led by a red herring off  the real sceiit. 
There was uothing whatever iiioompatible in Mx. Rhodes's assursnees to 
Dr.  Harris  for the reassurance of  3lr.  Chamberlain und his agreement 
with the Transvaal Committee.  If  the Jameson Plan hnd siicceeded aüd 
the insurrection hnd replnced Presideut  Kruger by  n more  reasonable 
Prcsident, the Transvaal, still retainiug its .Ba$,  iii  accordauee with Ui: 
Rhodes's well-lrno~vn  principle, would have united with the othei Stakes 
in  a  federation  of  South  Africa,  which  ~vould naturally  have  been 
carried out  uiider  the  protection  of  the  Union  Jnclt.  Dr. Hurris was 
never asked mhcther any of  the persons to whom 31r.  Rhodes referred  ns 
those "mho  must veiy much  misunderstnnd ine" iucluded the Colouial 
Secretary.  Dr. Haryis's explanatiou was a model of  lucidity (847472). 
"  NP. Sydney Buxton : Referriug to the cablegraiii No. 9, printed '  As 
to Euglish flag, they miist very much  inisunderstnnd me at home.'  I did 
not  quite  understand  whom  the 
'  theK 
' meant.  Dr.  Harris:  I have 
explaiued that that was the people of  m oin we heard  one mould say one 
thing  and  another  auother.  That did not  refer  to  auy  actual body  of 
people, but, as you say those people und those people, it was they!' 
No.  10.  (Extract,)  Rhodes to Harris. 
November 8th, 1896. 
I marmly thauk you for your work. 
The rest of  the telemm has no bearing upon the qiiestion.  -  -  - 
No. 11.  Hruria to Rhodea.  November Bth, 1895. 
See cable to acting High  Uommissioner  from  E. Fairfield  releasine: 
police and give us balance of Protectorate are you  satisfled wlth? 
No.  12.  (Extract.)  Rhodes to Harris. 
November Bth,  1895. 
Do  we  get  ownerehip on  ten  mile  strip  I  suppose we  ahall  get 
land as far as to TransvaaJ. Border up  to Palla as it mould bo  absurd 
to have few miles native territory between us and border. 
The rest of the eablegrarn relntes to details concerning native reserves, 
and need not be quoted.  The ouly thing to uote in tliis telegram is Nr. 
12hodes's  iiisistenoe  upoii  the  neoessity  of  liaving  the  ten-mile  strip 
contorminous with the Traiisvnal border. 
No.  13.  Barris to Rhodes. 
November Sth, 1895. 
Thanks  they do  not  misiinderstand  you  but fenred if  you  should 
have power  insint upon it;. 
This is a rcply to tlie famous cablegram (No. 9) $oncerning the Uritiah 
nag.  Here again me  have the inysterloiis  <'  thcy.  Wlio  are "  thoy "? Curreut rumour said that "they "  iiieaut Ur,  Chambcrlaiu und the Colouial 
OfIice.  lfr. Chamberlaiu, mho  r~as  suspicioug of  1Ur.  Rhodes, was said 
to  Want  the  0ag  to  go  iii as  his  seciirity.  ii'ithout  that  he  did  not 
think it possible to count upon  tlie  suppoyt  of  the  Britinh  public.  >Ir. 
Ohamberlniu's  suspicions,  if  he  eutertuiued  thaui,  mere  uudoubtedly 
jiistified  by the facta, for the atteinpt to socure that giiaraiitee to satisfy 
tbe Rritish public ~vreclced  the mhole couspiracy. 
No.  14.  Harris to Rhodes. 
November llth, 1895. 
Private native chiefs sailing intormediate Steamer 23rd Nov.  I am 
rotuining with Baiiey und others 29th  Nov.,  will it  be  in  time  re~i~ 
by telegraph.  Native chiefs and Willoughby acted like pigs. 
This telegram  is  importaut ns  shoming that Dr.  Harris feared the 
iusurrection  iu  Johanuesburg  iiiight  be  bmught  to  a  head  early  in 
December.  Xe therefore mished for direct informatiou from  Nr. Rhodes 
as to mhether, if  he left Loudou oii the Wh,  he mould be iu time. 
No.  15.  (Extract.)  Harris to Rhodes.  November llth, 1895. 
Held an interview 6th  E. Fairfield. 
Telegram continues to give details as to the admiuiutration of  strip of 
Trausvaal border. 
E. Fairfield he  will advise any  natives  resident must  remove 
to  reserve in the usual way in South East Afrioa therefore leaving 
British  South Afriaa  Company  ownership  alear  except in aase  of 
foreign natives it does not affeot your arrangement ikI0hwe Ikanning. 
and Iüontsioa therefore no  native  administration hetween you  and 
Transvaal and you are border authority. 
~fter  more  details,  chiefly  geographical, tlie  telegram  conaludes as 
folloms :- 
After oonsultation with E. Fairfield we have made an offor verb- 
ally as follows that we ~villgive  up 200,000 1.  in exchange for owner- 
ship  strip  and  ownership  balauce  Protectorate  as far  as  regards  ,  / three native  chief~  and with  the addition of  public buildinp  and 
lines at  Qaberoues  as in Oase of  British Bechuanaland to Cape Colony 
but me  will pay for horses and equipment Bechuanaland Border Police 
at valuution not at oost price. 
No.  16.  Rhodes to Harris. 
November 12th, 1896. 
29 Nov. will be in time. 
Thia was the ausmer to Dr. Harris's telegram No.  14 ou  the previous 
day. 
No. 17.  (Extract.)  Rhodes to  Harris. 
November 12th, 1896. 
I note your verbal offer 200,000 1. you must have ownership land 
in return otherwise besides saving British Cloverument 60,0001. U year 
me  shall have got nothing  you must  cousider  shareholders.  It is 
humiliating to  be utterly beuten by these niggers they think more of 
one native at home than the whole of  South Africa. 
dftor explaining that tliey had got omnership of  all land outside native 
rcserves, Dr. Harris continues :- 
No.  18.  (Extraot.)  Harris to Rhodos. 
November 13th, 1896. 
Native chiefs with Lord Loch und  temperanoe  carried Englaud 
with them  and your repeated instructions to aaquire police by  7th  , 
Nov.  &Jod  British  South Afrioa Company terribly.  Referrlng to  X:: „ 
,::  .'. 
your  reaent  telegram to  grant 200,0001.  und  more  if  necessary to  i'  k  ,  . 
seoure date of  oourse Xe might have doue better if we had been given 
time. 
Ur.  Ha~riswas  esamiued at souie leiigtli by  Nr. Blake ou this telegram. 
From Dr. Earris's statements it woiild appear that Mr. Rhodes hud  been 
telegmphing repeatcdly und  ugeutly to get the jumping-off  strip und  the 
polica at any eost, und his  extreme urgenzy that 'the trausactiou  should 
be  coiiipleted by  Nov.  7th hauipered hin1 iu  the negotiatious with  the 
Golonial  Office.  Dr.  HarriGexplaiued  IIr.  Rhodes's  urgeuoy  on  tmo 
suppositious : first, thut he ~vauted  to spur tliem ou; und  secoudly, that 
IIi..  Rhodes  thought,  omiug  to  the  Drifts  question  und  khe  strained 
positioii  with  the  Trausvaal,  the  ri.i~iiig  at  Johanuesburg  was  then 
immiiicnt o;liuost immediately (8620). 
Tolegram No. 19 is of  uo importauce. 
No. 20.  (Extraot.) 
i  Rhodes to Harris.  I 
November 15th, 1895. 
High Commissioner in South Afriaa received this morning houndary 
reserve from  Oolonial Office you  have got nothing and you  have given 
Matabeleland to~hama.  ....  ........  .........  There is nothing got for 200,0001. 
excopting  worthless  strip  along  Qerman Border.  Settlement  is  a 
scandal  ..... ..  .  ... .. .  ..  .  .  .  . 
RIr.  Rhodes was  evidently wrath, und  this  espostulation oii his  part 
led  to esplanations  und justifioations on  the part of  Dr. Harris, ns  rve 
Shall 603. 
No.  21.  Harris to Rhodes. 
November  18th, 1895. 
Your  telegram of  the  16  reoeived, referring to your telegram of Oct. 
26  referring to your  telegram  of  Nov.  3  referring to  yoiir  telegram 
of  Nov.  5  wo  believed  yoii  considered immediate Settlement securing 
administration railrvay strip with  Bechuanaland Border Police  of  the 
ntmost importanco, and to be  secured at any sacriflce referring to yonr 
teiemam of  5th as to flnal boundury Khama reserve from which we  are 
tryiüg hard to exclude everything ~thm  our ciistoms line.  Do gou hom 
thnt Colonial Offico havo nover yot brought our ndministrntive line down 
to customs Une.  11:.  . 
This oablegram spealts for ituelf.  It  shows that Dr. Harris considered 
tlii~t  his  one  duty  was  to  obtaiu  the  jumping-off  strip aiid ,the  polico 
necessary for the support of  Jamosou's  plan, the supreme ohject  rvhich 
I 
11'.  Ehodes desired, aud  that iu  order to  obtaiu it he was prepared  to 
malco  auy  sacriiice.)~The cablegrail~  is  also  importaut  as  eontaining 
roferonaes to thrco telegrams froin Ni..  Rliodes ou Oct. 26th und Nov.  3rd 
i 
aud tth, all of  mliioh have disappearod.  Thoir nature, homever, is uot in 
aoubt.  They were lirossing  DY. Enrris to  obtaiu the juuipiiig-OE strip 
niid the police at aiiy cost.  Dr. Hi~r~is  explained thom iu this sonse.  He 
I 11'~-cckecl i~y  tlte  J«~,i~sola  Raid. 
No. 28.  (Extract.)  Harris to Rhodes.  November 23rd,  1895. 
Our long cable of 22  Nov.  and yours 22  Nov.  crossed.  We  *re  f0r- 
wkding letter to  Colonial Office accordingly. 
The rest of  the telegram relates to Ifhama's ciistoms liue. 
No. 29.  Rhodes to Hurris.  November 24th, 1895. 
Dr.  Jameson back from Jobanneaburg everythiug right my judament 
is it is certainty we think A.  Beit (he) must come with you  20 Nov.  oll 
score of  health you will be just in time A. Beit to stay with me here 
and go up with us und the Qovernor.  A. Beit must not consult Phillips 
who is aii right bue  anxious to  do  everything himself aud he does not 
wish to  play second flddle inform A. Beit he musC  come.  . . 
~hii  pnblegram sho~s  that the plot was  ripening.  Dr. ~an;ds;n,  ou 
his return from Johaunesburg, reported that everything was all rigl~t,  txud 
that the rising was a oertaiuty.  It was necessary that NP.  Beit and 1)r. 
Earris  should  hurry  back  to  Capetomn.  He would. be  just  in  tiiiie. 
My,  Beit was  needed  to go up  to the Trausvaal  ~vitli  Xr. Rhodes and 
the High Commissioner.  It wasal~vays  part of  the plan that tbe High 
Commiasioner hud to proceed to Pretoria to "  see fair,"  and settl~  niatters 
' in the interests of  peace-aud  agaiust  President  Icruger.  Dr.  Jameson 
haa talked to the High Commissioner in  parables, and hid obtained froni 
%  a more or  less definite statement as to  what he might do  in  the 
hypothetical  caseof  an insui-reetion  occnrring  in Johaunesburg.  The 
Ini erial  Secretary, mho was the virtually  Actiug High Commissioner, 
hal  already been told  at the  end  of  October  qr25),  but  the full dis- 
closure  of, the plan  to Siy  Heroulec  Robinson  was ~Ibferred  until Nr. 
Bhodea'c,ould inform him  fully  of  the part which  it wp  necessaxy  he 
shoiild  pliy in  the drum&.  That  Sir  Hercules  liOIjinson  would  have 
made uo objection to have follovr.ed on the line already laid down for hiiii 
by  his predecessor, Lord Loch, none of  the coiispirators eutertained any 
doubt.  Phillips was Mr. ~ionel'Phillipe,  Mr.  Beifs*paytner in Johaiines- 
burg,  extracts from whose  corres  ondence  figure  conspicuously  in  the 
Trausvaal  Green  Book.  It'was g  e ~ho  had the oouversation with Lord 
Loch about the rifles.  He, in 1894, did not  'I think iiiany people cared n 
fig  about the franchise " (Cape 3~q~iry  .,1pp.  A, No. 1).  It was he also 
vho-was  very 10th to consult Mr. Rhodes uutil he liad received positive 
assiirances from Mi:  Beit that Mr. Rhodes was to be trnsteddfi.,  No 2k 
Mr. Beit, according to his evidence (9221 50) acted  in  accor  anco  wit 
Mr. Rhodes'n wishes, telegraphed to Mr. P  h  illips, autl Xveut  to  the Calie. 
No. 30.  Harris to Rhodes. 
November 26th, 1895. 
This,  although  marked  "very  confldential,"  solely relates to the 
settlement of the natives. 
No.  31.  Rbodes to Harris. 
25th November, 1805. 
See Flora and  get some  oue  to review book  Three Qreat African 
Chiefs by Missionary Lloyd just publiahed by Fisher Unwin. 
Dr. Harrik spoke to Miss Shaw about this boolr, aud in hie easy-going 
way  imagined that +e  bad had it reviemed, accordiiig to instriictions in 
U.  Tzntos (8264).  Miss Shaw, ho~vever,  \was  at pnins to inform thq Coni- 
inittee that no review of  the book had ever appenred in the Tilibcs, for iE 
there is  one thing that Niss Shaw ~esented  morc  than anything else in 
this  business,  it was  the suspicion that Dr. Harris had her solid,  aud 
could seiid her hither aud tbither at his bidding, or could secure the inser- 
tion of  anything iu the Til~zca that he pleased, if  he sent her a mord  of 
coiiiniand (8825). 
No.  32.  Harris to Rhodes. 
November ZGth, 1895. 
'Crew conftdential OE Course it is great pleasure to  read your cablc to 
J, Chamberluin I as near  as possible  warned  C.  J.  Rhodes last week 
from information received kuom there is great dauger Phillips Leonard 
they can or may be doing business without assistance from British South 
Africa Company and also indeoeudentlv British flao it would havn serinns 
~~~  - .-  ..  .......  ~~ 
effect on  ~our  position  he&  I sau  this very  confldential You  must 
telegraph present reply Dr. Harris, Monomotapa only Dr. Harris will leave 
30 of this month without fail.  Flora suaaest 16  Dec.  celebrate Pretoria 
di8tric.t  1880.  I wiU  trs make best po&Cble  terms J.  Chamberlhn  for 
200,000i.  which I was compelled abandon thus could only secure English 
position. 
Here Te have once more the reflection of  tbe dread mhich prevailed 
in soine oficial quarters-popularly  believed to be Ur. Ohnmberlaiu's room 
in the Colonial Office-that  the Johannesburg movement might talre place 
under the Transvnal flng.  There were mauy qiiestions asked Mr. Hairis 
coneerning  this telegram,  but  with  the in+~&tude  which  characteiized 
the proceedings  of  this  extraordinary  Committee,  no  one  nsked  iUr. 
Chambcrlain what cable it was that was read to him, whethex it was  the 
cable  of  Nov.  23rd,  or whether, as is more probable, tlie reference is to 
another telegram, of  which all trace has disappearcd.  Tlio terms in mhicli 
Dr. Harris refers to it would  imply that the latter is hhe  case, for there 
could have been no grent pleasure to Dr. Harris in reading to Ni: Chamber- 
lain the growliug, grudging telegrnmcousenting to pay him the ~tart-mgey 
which tlie Colonial Onice had esacted in return for conceding t%%,ud  in 
time to be iised in executing tlio Jameson plan. 
fiom the contest  also  it mould  seeiu  to  have  been  soiue  lund  of 
assurnnce froin Nr. Rhodtis mhich was calculated to plense  Chamber- 
lain, und may have related  to the flag.  Dr. Harris seizes tlie opportunity 
to reuow  his aolemn  warniugs  to  the effeot  which  tlie  absence  of  the 
Union Jaclc at Johannesburg would have upon Ilr. Ilhodes's position here. 
What does  tbat neun?  It cannot mean his position with the South 
-1frica  Compauy or tvith his fello~v-conspirators, for  they all lcnem  &P. 
Rhodes too well to make any difficulty about this trivial questiou of  a flag. 
Does it not snggest that there may have been  something in what seemed 
to be the exag$erated rumours  tbat  thc Colonial Secretary was pressiug 
for the -Version  OE   hat Ny.  Leonard  and IIr. Phillips regarded  as a 
perfectly moral nndlegitimate attempt to siibstitute au honest  for a  dis- 
honest Republican Governmeut, into the vU.tiia1 seiziire of  the Trausva&l 
by Blngland 1  This telegram, tomother  with all the rumours  mhich xverc 
eurrent  at the time,  und  mhi%  have. been  dqepened  by  overy  effort 
made to remove  them, is  at least  not inoompntible with  Lhe  story that 
while  the  Outlanders were anxious  to make an  honest  revolution  at 
Johaunesburg which would leave the Transvaal Republie still aRepubliciu 
the hands of  its citizens, Mr. Chamberlain would havepref?rred to use thin 
revolutionary movement ior the purpose of  destroying the independenceof 
the Trnnavaal und reducing the Republic to the status  of  a British Colony? 
Tliis  ~tt~temeiit  was  fre  uently alluded  to  as  a  matter  of  common 
knotvledgo in  those days, $  ut I did not ltnom until I canie  to  look more The Jmneson  Plan  tuccs  Wveched by the  Jameson  Raid, 
closely at the cablegrams for the compiling  of  this boolc  how  entirely it 
fits in with the references which are made to the subject in these oable- 
grams.  Dr.  Harris  was  in  a  perfect  terror  lest  the  movement  in 
Johannesburg should-as  a matter of  fact it did-refuse  to come off  under 
the British flag.  Th  story at Johannesburg was tliat Mr. Chambarlaiii 
would sup  ort nothiiig that was not done under the Union Jaclc, and it is 
certainly %ifficult to  see what  other  person  was  sufficiently  powerful 
to  thwart  &Ti:  Rhodes's  plans  und  put  Dr.  Harris  in  such  terror 
at a refusal  to malce  the insurrection  under  the  British  flag.  It is 
obvioiis, too, that Dr. Harris, or Miss Shaw, or  some  of  th~conspirators 
are constantly seeing Mr. Chamberlain, are well  aware of  his views, arid 
reud him cables frcm NI.  Rhodes. 
The only other passage in this telegram thati calls for comment is that 
"Flora suggest  16 December  celebrate Pretorii~  district  1880."  This is 
the first of thiee attempts by Miss Shaw to expedite the outbrealc of  the 
insurection.  The others will be recorded in due course mhen I come  to 
deal with her telegrams.  When examiued upon  this subject Dr. Harris 
explained  that  he  sent  Miss  Shaxv's  suggestion that the insurrection 
should break  out on  the  16th December,  which  was  Dinguan's  Day. 
TVhen Mim Shavr was asked about this, she cxplaiued-for  the lady was 
good at explaining-that  it was  merely a  remaylc inade  by  her in the 
course of  "  an idle conversation" with three or four people who  mere  dia- 
cussing in her presence wheu the rising was lilcely to take place,  saying 
that it ought to be  at a date between  the 12th December und  the  25th 
and theii, having in her memory that the lGth was the day 011  which the 
Boers had declared their indepcndeiice of  English authority in  1880, "I 
remurked there would bc a certain historic justice m a section of Bnglish- 
men declaing their independeuce on the same day '"  (8826). . The names 
of  the  threo or four persona  with whom  Miss  Shaw was  disciissing  90 
confidentially the right date for springing the revolutiou under the feet of 
Prosident Iiiuger wer8 never  aslced  for.  Had  the  uestion beeil  asked 
und anslvered correctly, Ive might have leained somet  Y1 ing as to the status 
of  the nersons .ivith whom  Niss Shaw holds  idle conversation " ag  to 
the dato of  forthcoming insurrections.  She was three  times a week  at 
the Colonial Office in those days, und  had frequent discussions about the 
contemplated inaurrection (9708) with Mi. Puirfield, Sii Richard R!tee.de, 
und,  possibly, with &Ir. Chamberlain also, although upon  this point  tlie 
Committee priidently left thc veil of  secrecy drawn very tight. 
No.  33.  Harris to Rhodes. 
November 29th, 1896. 
We  have  given British  South Africu  Company  oode  to  Flora. 
She has been registered  telemones, London.  Register on your  side 
this address telegrams go direct.  Keep her well informed. 
This is the last of Dr. Harris's oables.  In it he appears to make over 
his function as confidential reporter to Mr. Rhodes, und confideutial inter- 
mediaiy betweeu Mr. Rhodes und the Colonial Office to IIiss Flora Shaw, 
who certainly possessed many  ualifications eminently fitting her for thc 
post.  She was extremely intel?igent, und, lilw Sir Alfred Milner und Ur. 
Garrett, sherecaivedlier early training in journalism under iny direction at 
the Pa11  Xall  Gazette office,  und only tho other  day I came npon a vory 
interesting interview which I had with Gencral Joubert, when he was last 
in London.  I liinohed with bim on 7th August, 1890, at the Cape Agency. 
lfiss Shaw had iuterviewed Joubert that morning, und I find in rny  notes: 
the following curious passagc :- 
"  130th Joubert und Mills were loud in their praise of  Miss Shaw. 
Joubert  had  disinissed  two  Diitcbmen  from Holland  in oder to 
receive Miss Shaw, und was much struck with her intelligence.  He 
aaid, '  Of  all people who have ever interviewed me, no  oue  ever  put 
such sharp questions.  She is intelligent ;  she understands  politica.' 
Mills was so euthusiastic in her  rai~es  that he would  hardly allow 
any one else to  say anything,  a ways  calling her  that dear little 
girl.' "  B 
Of  course, I naturally concurred, und  quote the tribute to that "dear 
little girl " as a fair  resumption  that this  extremely sharp interviewer 
und crosa-qnestioner 8d  not visit the Colonial Office tmo  or  three times 
a week (8870 und 9707), und  have long  conversatious, varying from five 
to fifty ininutes, with  Mi:  Chamberlain und  his officials  (9844), without 
giviug hiin to know what she was thinking of.  She was also in charge 
of  the Colonial Department  of  the 'inies newspaper, und was hand-and- 
glove with M'.  Moberly Bell, tlie manager-editor as he may  be  called, 
in distinction to  Mr.  Buckle, who  was  only  editor-editor.  Over those 
mystoiles of  Priuting House Squam Miss Shaw piteously appealed to the 
Committee to drum a veil, a request with ~vhich  they  at once complied 
(8903). 
~hving  thus handed over the secret cipheF  of the Chartered Company 
to the custody of this acccinplished joullialist with the run of  the Colonial 
Office und the control of  the thunderbolts of  Printing House  Square, Dr. 
Harris sailsd for Capetown, feeling he hnd  left the intereats of  his mastei 
in snre hands. T.Vqrcked  Oy tlie  Jcmneson  Raid. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
TRE  I'  FLOIIA " CBl3LEOR.IDIS. 
WE  nom  come  to  the  second  series  of  telegrams,  mhich  mere  not 
included in the collection submitted by Ur. Hawksley to Mi.  Cl?amberla~n 
on June 7th.  Although Miss Flora Shu~  sent her telegrams wlth the aid 
of the cipher of  the South Airica Company, ehe  does  not  appeer to have 
!ommunicated the coutents  of  her telegrams to Mr. Hawksl?y or  Nr. 
Beit.  .It was only wben the cahle company was induced to.gnve up her 
telegrams that the morld hecame amare of  the fact that ths  lady, mho 
was  and ie still virtually colonial editor of  the Times, and mho  had vd 
has the free run of  the Colonial Office, had not only unäertaken to receive 
information from BI*.  Rhodes, but had, very muoh  in the old  Pa11 XaLl 
style, undertaken the direction of the South African Revol~tiou.  I remem- 
ber $Ir.  Morley askingme scornfully once, mhether I cpnsidered it was the 
duty of  a journaliat  in Northumberland Street to direct the movemeut 
of  tbe Mediterranean Fleet.  I promptly replied that on that occasion 
it was,  and  I still  think  I was  rigbt.  Miss  Sham  was  trained  in 
that  school.  Hence  she  was  uo  fiooner  armed  mith  the  cipher 
than  ehe  assumed,  mith  the  confidenoe  natural  to  the  trusted 
intermediary  betmeen  two  such  great  potentates  as  hlr.  Cecil 
Bhodes  und  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  that  it  was  her  duty  and 
her privilege  to  play  a  loading  art in  the conspiracy.  But I forgot. 
Niss Shaw had declared on  oath k'  efore the Committee that she was not 
in the conapiracy.  She onJy interested herself in it as a joiirnalist, ~vho 
bad to chronicle the evolution of  eveuts. 
(9784.)  I did not rognril rnyaclf  as  boing in nny any oonnsctcd witli tlio conspiriltor*. 
(5iSfj.) Thon oii do not conniaor thnt in  aiiy way yoii warn  conncolod witli  thil  coii- 
apirnoy I-~ortniii6 not in nny Way. 
It is useful to have au explicit statement that she was not connected 
mith  the  conspiracy,  because  it  enables us  to  understand the  valne 
of  any  statement  she might  make  as  to  tlie  non-eomplicity  of  Nr. 
Chamberlain.  For  if  it was  possible  for a person  to be  privy  to  all 
the secret  counsels of  couspirators, to be reported aa "  solid " mith the 
conspiracy, to be trusted mitb the duty of  confidential cabling in cipher to 
the chief conspirator, and to transmit any information which he might 
send  to  other  conspirators,  and  to  unclertake  thc  responsibility  of 
urging  formard  the  outbreak  of  the  conspiracy  und  generally to  act 
as intelligence department  for  the  ccnspiraey-if  all this ceu  be done 
and a person can still not be oonnectedwiththe conspiracy, theu it iu quite 
possible for that pereon to say thet Mr. Chamberlain ltneiv nothing about 
tbe Jameson plan, arid had ncither  part  nor  lot in the conspiracy..  Her 
statoment as to  her  own  complete  freedom  from  all  eomplioity in tho 
conspiracy affords us  a  test  of  the standard  by  mhich  she gauges  tho 
complicity of  conapiratore. 
The first cablegrai~~  mbieh Miss  Shaw aent  to Ur. Ehodcs shomed tbe 
zeal  aud  tboroughness  with  mliich  ehe  entcred  into her  duties.  The  cablegratii is as followe :- 
No:  73.  Miss Shaw to Rhodes. 
10th December, 1895.  Can  you  advise when wiii  you  commence  the plans,  we  wish  to 
send  at earliest opportunity sealed  instructions representative of  the 
London  Times  European  capitals;  it is  most  important  using  their 
inliuence in your favour. 
In  oross-examination Niss Shaw stated mhat she meant by  this.  She 
knew of the Jameson plan.  She knem that an insurrection was abou~  to 
break out in Johannesbiirg, siipported from the outside by Mr. Rhodes or 
by Dr. Jai~~eson  and his men  from the territory mhich had beeu handea 
over by Mr. Chsmberlain for that piirpose ayear and ten months before the 
time when he would liave hmded it over if  there had not  been  the  need 
for eupporting tbe insurrection.  She knem  that whenever  thia  event 
came off it mould have a very bad  look  abroad, and it ~as  most desirable 
that she ehould have a timely tip from the chief oonspirator in  order' tliat 
ahe might  send  rouna  confidential information betimes  to  tho  Til„os 
correspondents in foreign Parts, so that they might  knom  what to sey 
wheu  the  movement  ciilminated.  This was undoubtedly  an eesellent 
thing to do from  tbe point  of  viem  of  tlie  conspiracy.  It mas  an ad- 
mirable thing to do  also to bave the vast reticulation OE  the Times agents 
all over Burope properly postecl as to the true iiiivardness of  a movemeiit 
'phich mus  extremely lilcely to be misunderatood.  No one,  therefore,  cau 
in the least blame Niss Shaw for serving so zealously and mell a cause of 
the justice  of  which  she  was  oonvinced,  und  the leader  of  mhich  sbe 
entbusiastically  admired.  Like  many  exeellent  schemes  mhioh  are 
inuch  more  complete on  paper  than when  carried out in reality, Uiss 
Shaw's project xvas  never  reulized  in its entirety.  She drem  up a  eon- 
fidontial  letter  of  information,  and  sent  it to  the  correspondent  at 
Belgium, of  all places in the morld (9797), and at some other minor Stute. 
Why the great  oorrespondents at Pa'ie,  Berlin, Vienna,  Rome,  and St. 
Petersbiirg were not deemed morthy of  the tiinely tip  Niss  Sliam did not 
explain.  Yhe venturee iipon much  more  dangerous ground in  the nest 
telegram :- 
NO. 164.  Sham to Rhpdes. 
December 12th, 1895. 
Delay dangerous  sympathy  now  complete  but  will  depend  very 
much upon action hefore European power8 given time (to)  enter a Protest 
which as European Situation eonsidered serious might paralyze ffovem- 
ment :  general feeling in themt  very suspicious. $ ,; ,:  \ 
This is the firet of  two telegrams mhich were sent to Nr, Rbodek from  B 
London by  a person  in  touch  mith  tbe  Colonial  Offioe,  urging him  to 
expedite tbe outbreak  of  the revolution.  Let  any impartial  reader  ask 
himself  mhat  Nr.  Rhodes  inust  have  thought  mhen  he  received  that 
cablegram.  Mr.  Rhodee knem %Iiiss Sbnm veiy ivell.  He knew that ehe 
was estemely intelligent, thoroughly acquaintsd mith  all the secrets of 
tbo conspiraoy ; he knem also that every other day she was at the Colonial 
Office, and that she was every day ab  tbe Tivzas office;  that is to  say! ehe 
Ras, aa ahe proudly declared hefore the Committee, at the hetvrt of  tbings, 
mhereas Mr. llhodes was  at the oiitskirts (9818).  Being at the heost of 
E 2 things, with lier finger upon  the pulse  of  the world  at P~iutiog.House 
Square, aud having eveiy other day an opportunity of  disaussing intiinately 
in couversation, lasting from  five to fifty minutes, with  Mr. Chamberlain 
und Mr. Fairfield und  Sir Richard Meade, the true iuwardness of  things 
polilical, she  sends  to MY,  Rhodes, usiiig a cipher, which was itself  the 
mark  of  his confidence, a  telegam urging him not to delay.  Could he 
have thought anything else, excepting that the Colonial Office was urging 
him on to preoipitate action? 
No.  106.  Shaw to Rhodes. 
December 17th, 1895. 
Held an interview with Secratarg Transvnal, left here on~nturda~ 
for Eame Berlin Paris fear in negotiation with thoae parties. Ohamberlnin 
sound in Oase  of  interference ~uropean  Powers but huve Special  reazon 
to beiieve wishes you must do it immediately. 
This telegam must have removed any doubt which Mr. Rhodee might 
have entertained  as to the origin  und  authority npon which Miss Shaw 
had sent her previous telegram.  Here me  have it specifically stated by a 
trusted  friend und  fellow-couspirator that Mr.  Chamberlain wishes  the 
insurrection  to  come  off  at  onoe.  The  state  of  foreign  affairs  was 
threateniug  no  doubt,  as  President  Clevelaud's  message  concerning 
Venezuela hud  startled  the world  with  a prospect of  a conflict between 
the United States und  Great Britain.  Miss Shalv, who is in the olosest 
confidential tcuch with ML Chamberlain, leaves the Colonial Office,  vhere 
she had had a loug  talk with Mr.  Fairfield as to the outbreak  of  the 
insurrection, an$ where she has been told by him that "if  the Johannes- 
burg burghers ure going  to rise, it is to be hoped they will do it soon " 
(9657) ;  so sbe at once sits down und cables in cipher to Mi. Rhodes the 
positive statemeut  that  she  has  special reasons for knoming that Mr. 
Chamberlain jvishes the insurrection to take plaee at once.  Remember, 
also, that Mr.  Rhodes,  from  previous  telegams  which  have  not  been 
disclosed, together with those upon which I  have already commeuted, was 
absolutely assured that Mr. Chamberlain not only knew the insurrection 
was going to take place, und  that he, Mr. Rhodes, was going to support 
it from  the outside, but  that Mr.  Chamberlain had üriven a very hard 
bargain mith him,  by  virtue  of  his possession  of  that lruomledge,  before 
he  could  hand  over  the  territory  and  the  policc  with  which  that 
support  was  to  be  given.  Remember,  too,  that  Mr.  Rhodes'  had 
receivod urgent telegrams from his agents in Londou, mho were in touch 
with the Colonial Ofiice, which impressed upou him the necessity of  bring- 
ing the Britieh flag into it,  und  had, been  assured that it monld  weaken 
his position immensely if he did not take the British  flag in.  Rightly, or 
wrongly, Mr.  Rhodes must have  been positively conviuced, as me  know 
UR,.  a matter  of fact, he was conviuoed, from his communioatious to Dr. 
Jameson  und  others,  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  kuem  of  the  Plan  and 
~vished  it success.  Under those ciroumstances, what could  Mr. Rhodes 
think  of  a telegram from Miss Shaw saying that Miss Sha~  had special 
reasons for ltnowing that Mr. Chamberlain mishes it done immediately? 
Obviously Nr. Rhodea must have regarded that telogram as declaring the 
necessity  for  hurrying  thin  s  forward  at Johanuesbul.g.  DiIiss  Shaw 
admits  in  eo  many  terms  t  dt  Dlr.  Rhodes could ouly mean it tobe 
aceoptcd in that sense, und she had justi~ication  for .rvl~ut  she saia. 
The special reason she explained as follows to the Coiumitteo :- 
i lvouid lik6 to suy quitu fr.iiilily tl.lt diuiit tlint  porioJ, liiriii:  to go  to tltc Culoriiul 
Ollicc,  ond iilving U disous~  Soiitii .ifricnii  nlf.iira.  . .  . . 
Ti10  CIIAI~N,LN: 'J!Iiiit  poriod  boing  nboiit  tlie  liiiilillo  OE  DcccmbcrY-Aboiit  tlio 
niiildlo of Docombci;  I cniiiiot  ieinoiiibcr  osnotly.  Anvlio\v, tlio  wliclo  of tlint uituinii 
Sautli Africzionii qircstions i~,crii  frcquoutly aiidor riisciissioii. . . . .  At tlic Cclcninl Offico,  of  . 
coiimo,  n9  el8aivliora,  !vlioii  Soiitli  Afi~ieaii  nffniix ~vcro  takon into consiilorntioii, tiio Iiypo. 
tlicticnl Iiossibility tliiit  tliorc  ivoiild IJU n  rising nt  Jolianiiusbiirg lvar nt timos diuciissod. 
Aboiit tliiit tiiso, tlioii, Iinving oronsioii to  diaoiiss Soiitli AM=,  not  witli >Ir. Clirmborluiii, 
av  I snid liofoi~o,  biit witli  0110  of tlic Uiidor-Soorotai~ios,  it was sniil to niu,  iii tlic Course of a 
convor*ntioii, "\\'rll,  if tliu Joliniiiicsbiig burglicis nrc going to riso,  it  iu to bo Iiopcd tlioy 
will  do it ~ooii."  Tlint csprousioii  mns uscd. 
I.  Siir  \Vrb~i.i>i H.iiiiouirr:  Yoii  must  toll  IU,  ploaso,  wlio  snid tliot.-If  you  nsk 
ino I ~vill  ruply nt  onco.  It ivns 3Ir. Fnirfiold, wlio in disoiissing Soutli Akicaii nilhirs  iiscil 
tlint csprousioii  (OGGE  to  DB57). 
Therefore  it  was  she  felt justified  in sending that  telegram as to 
special reasons to believe that  Mr.  Chamberlain wished the British to 
make their rising immediately, for, as she said, 'I When I say, '  You miist 
do it immediately,' I ueau the British must make their rising immediately. 
I had no other meaning at all " (9669). 
What other meuniiig she could have had it is somewhat aiftii oult to See. 
The Chairman is examining. 
(9BFL.)  Jnst to  mnku it clenr, lct nio  hsk,  did yoii iiitaiid  to  coiivcy hy tlint tlint yoii 
Iiad spcoiul rowoii  ta  bcliovc tlint Alr.  Ciinmborlnin wislio<l tlieiii  to do it iniiiiodintoly '?-I 
mcniit to  oonvoy tliat I Iiad  sl?crceial rcnsoi'  to boliovo tliat tho  Caloiiinl  OOnloo  would  wisii 
to  Iiavo it <lono iiniiioilintoly. 
When asked as to  her special reasons, she said, first of  all, there Was 
her own  kuowledge of the  sitnation, mhich  led her to believe  that any 
riaing  at  Johan,nesburg at that  junoture  of  foreign  affaiss  would  be 
extremely inconvenient to the Colonial Office.  Theu she pr0ceeded:- 
I oould 1101 Iiolli ncuin  aiid ovory olio lvho  lind  tlio  kiioll~~lcil~  I Iinil  iiilist linvc  bcoli 
awarc, tlint  tiivru  coiild fnrdlY 11iiw boaii  i~ inoro  iiicoiivoniont tiino for  siioli  n tliing  ta 
zppcnr. 
This, of  courae, was obvioiis, for Miss Shaw explained again und agaiu 
with  great  volubility  that  the  ossenoe  of  tbe  Jc~meson  Plan  was  *he 
support which was to be given to it by the Imperial Goverument.  It was 
all important, as she said, 
tlint  tlio Iiiilicxiiil C;oi.uriiinciit  nlioiild bu  frco to den1 ivitli tlio  iiiovcmaiit fiilly, niid  in a 
satisf&ctory  soiisu ivlinii it took plnco (0035). 
Miss  Shwv never fox a moment  doubted, justiiied presumably by her 
frequent comiliunications with Ur. Chamberlain und the Colonial Office, 
that the Imperial  Government woiild  take  tlie  part  allotted  to  it  by 
the couspirators, for slie says :- 
I thoirgl~b  tl~u  (iovoia~n~iit  wonlc'  intoi~fcro  ilftor tlio niovuiiiciit lind  bcuii  initintcd, 
bccn~iso  you öuo tlia lilnn ati it l\.iis loid bofom mo ww tliin, to  pat it in onu scntonca-thnt 
tho  wholo inluiitioii  of tlio  l>luii itir tlint tlio  Englisli  in J,o!inniioobiir  vicru  going  to 
nppcal  from  tlic  locd  iiiitliority  to tlio  so~araiii  powor.  Llicy  rugnricd  tlic Imporiol 
autliorition n9 tlio siironiiii poiwr.  Tlioir plan,  ns  it liod  bca~i  osl~lniiicd  to ino, ivns tlint 
tlio  vciby inoniuiit tlioy waro goiiig to  ilncc it in tlin  Iinnda of tlio Higli Cotnniiseioiior, tlint 
is to  in tliu lioiids of tlio 1inPoi,in\ Govoainioiit.  I tlionglit  if  n  Eiiropcnii sitiintion of 
nny  dillioiilty ww  ta  ilcclnro iholf in  tlio incniitiiiio,  01.  il tlio Eiii~opcnii  Fo\vcrs lvcrc to 
protcst ngniiiat tlio Eiiglisli ,noraiiiont in Jol~nni~csbu~~g,  it iniglit pnrnlyrc  tlic ~:ovcmrnciit 
in dcdiiiß witli tllnt ~itnation  (D(IY7). 
She further explained that her reference to the L'general feeling on the 
Stook Mai+lret  very ssupicioiis," 
was  iiitaiidcd to uslilnin tlii~t  tliu tliiiig 11-n~  ooiiiiiig oiit, tlint it \\.U  aii iillu  ihn tliitt  tlioy 
coiild  kcoli ns  nii ~ibsoliito  socrot a tliing I<iio~vii  to so innny l>coplu,  aiid it mns in  vioiv  of 
it4  ooniiiig out  tlint  I tliuudit  tlio Eiiro icnii I'awuis  niiglit  nioko n protcst sliioli would 
rcndor it niom  tlinn ovor iliflioiilt  for IIur ~liijcsty's  Qovoriiiiiuiit to  taku ii froo Iiiio wlioii tlio 
time  ailmo (01140). 70  Tlte  Jct,nte.s»./t  Plcbi~ ?llcas 
The 11 free line,"  of  course, as has been frequentiy esplained, was that 
mhen the insurrection took place the High Commissioner Was  to W do~i 
8s representative of  the suzerain power,  und  to cUr17 it t0 the destind 
end, namely, the overthrow of  President  Xruger, und  the establishment 
of  Government which ~ould  act in the interests of  Great Britaiu.  UP?~ 
this point Niss Shaw was very distinct.  She re~eated  it agaiu und ngaiu. 
In answer to the Chairman, she said that while  there  had been  endless 
modijications in the details of  the Plan after she had been told about it in 
September, 
dint I noiilil  oint ioiit  k, tlint \vhntcvor mo~liiieitiuiin tlicm  may  Iinvrs  I>i.eii iii  dehil 
(I  not knasBom  ent or hotv sniall tliesc ivcre),  ono  tliiiig rcniained,, quitc +r<tiurt nnd 
quito eontinuous, nnrtllnt was tiint tlio  iiistniit tlio  movoincnt  mau  initintetl it 
plrrcd in tlio iiniids of tlio Iinl>orinl  Gorrrninent  (RGOO). 
She then read a telegram sent from Colonel Rhodes to his brother  at 
Capetomn on Dec. 21st.  The telegram nins in thia way :- 
Clinrtrr, Cape Toivn, Doc. 21.-Plensu  iiiionn  C.  J.  Xhodes it iu  atnted tlint Ciinir- 
mnn  (IVC  nll Iinoiv  tlint C1,aiimnn ~ms  tlie High  Corniuis~iuiier,  Sir 1Ici;eiiles Robinson) 
will not leni,o iinloss speoinl letter iniiting hiiii.  Definit0 ussiirniieo Iias Lcen  givon by ull 
of iia  that  on  tlio  <los  oi flotntian you und  lio xill 1eax.c.  Tlicrr niuat a~solutelp  lie 110 
dop~rhu.u  iroin tlis.  nu  iiiniig siibscribarsliavo  ngrced tu tnl;o  sliarrs 011 tliis asai~raiim  (PßßP). 
"The mowment, therefore, for me ever had any other sipificance at  f~ll 
except that the Johaunesburgers meant to appeal froni the loeal autliority 
of the Trunsvaal to the suzerain power of  South Africa, und they felt they 
had the right to do that.  Of  Course  it is  U  matter  of  opiniou whether 
thoy did or did not " (96G2). 
In other  words,  this  conspirator  lets  us  see  quite  pluinly  thal, 
from  first  to  last,  during  the whole  time  that ahe  was  having  con- 
fidential conversations with  bfr.  Chamberlain und  the  Coloninl  Office, 
ono  thing was never  absent from  her  mind,  iiamely, that the essential 
part  of  the  Jameson  Plan was that after tho "put up job " bad  been 
carried  through by  the local conspirators in  Johannesburg, encouraged 
thereto  by  the presenee  of  Dr.  Jameson  with  armed  forcee  on  tho 
jumping-off  strip  handed  over  to  them  for  that  purpose  by  Ifr. 
Chamberlain, the High Commissiouer, aoting of  course uuder instructions 
from Nr. Chumberlain, tvould carry the thing through to its destined end. 
This is the vital and es ential part of  this tele.gum. 
As  to  the rest  of&message,  she explained that  she  had  held  an 
inteidew mith Dr. Leyds,  und  drew the inference froin the fact that he 
expressed  such extreme ignorante of  the tvholc  position that he really 
;  knem all about it (9647).  The phrase as to Uhamberlain beiug I'  sound in 
caae  of  interference  European  Powers " she  explained  by  sayiug that 
she knew tliat people in South Afiica had faar of  the Colonial  Secretary, 
because they thought he was  a  Little Englander,  so she telegraphed to 
them this meseage, in order to reassnre theui, because  I felt there was 
no reason to suppose Dir. Chamberlain would,  under  any circumstances, 
tolerate interference by a European Potver " (964G). 
"Remeinber,"  she  told  the Uommittee, "  I imagined  myself  to  be 
B  eaking in absolute confidence to Mr. Rhodes, und  M?. Rhodes alone.  1  t:  t  ouglit lie mould perfeetly understand it '' (9649).  A supposition which 
does  cradit  to  hliss  Shaw's  appreciation of  the keen  intuition  of  Mr. 
l%hodos,  for there is every reason to believe he did understand it in exaotly 
the  eame  sense  iu  which  every  one  else  did.  She  says,  I  tele- 
graphed in the bowi fido belief  that Mr. Rhodes would take it e~actly  a~ I 
IQeant it, as a prii7ate  assurance from me of  ivhat I belieired Nr. Chaiuba~. 
lain's views to be " (9650). 
No. 402.  From Harris to Shaw. 
December 20th 1895. 
Thanks.  Are doing our best, but these things take time.  Do not 
aiarm Pretoria from London. 
This is the first tolcg~~am  from Capetomn to Miss Sham t~hich  appeared 
in the oablegrams produced by tho Cable Company, but she told the Com- 
iiiittee that there-bad been a previoue tele~am  in reply to her iuquiry of 
the 10th Deeeuiber as to when the plans were  to be  commenced, which 
she thoiight iii substanoe ran thus :-''  We  think abont the beginning  of 
tlie Nem  Peur " (9G31).  In cr6ss-examination upon  the 20th December  , 
oablegrani  slie  said  that  the  marning  "do  not  alsrm  Pretoria  from 
London" had  no  particular  significance that she  eould  remember.  It 
may have had reforeuce to the fact that the thing wasJeaking out  (9GGG). 
She repudiated indignautly the suggestion that  Mr.  Rms  could  have 
ßupposed for a monieut that she mould have communicated any hint as to 
Jameson's plaii to Mr. Secretary Leyds (9G68). 
No.  941.  From Harris to Shaw. 
December 27th. 1896. 
Everything  is postponed until after 6th  Jan.  We  are  ready, bnt 
divisions at Johannesburg. 
This cablegram needs no esplanation, escepting to reoall the fact that 
divisions at Johaunesbui.g had urisen over the quefition cf  flag, wliieh had 
been brought into such promiiience by messages hom London, the origin 
of  which probablg no one knerv better than Miss Sha~v  herself. 
On  Doc.  30th Dliss  Shaw calling  at  Nr.  Beit's  oBice,  whicli  was 
tlie headquarters  of  the  concpiraay in London, was  shomn a  telegratn : 
"  Jamesou  has  disregarded  instructions  und  crossed  border  mith  400 
iuen."  This  was  in  the  afternoon,  betweeil  2  und  4  o'cloclc.  She 
thereupon went at onee tc the Colonial Otfice und told Sir Robert &Ieade, 
\vho telegraphed at ouce to Mr. Chamberlain at Birmin  hain.  She then 
received two telegraiiis :-  !  went homo und went to bed (9747).  In the morning m en she moke she 
No.  1503.  Harria to Sham.  December 30th, 1895. 
Strictly Oonfidential. 
Dr  Janieson  moved  tc assist English  in Johannesburg because he 
received strong letter begging  Dr.  Jameson to come  Signed byleadmg 
inhabitants.  This letter will be  telegraphed to you verbatim to-morrow. 
Meuntime do not refer in Press.  We  a~e  ccnfident of  success.  Johaunes- 
burg united  und  strong  on  our  Eide.  Diasensions  (tliey) have  been 
stop(ped)  except two or three Germans. 
No. 1667.  Harrls to Shaw. 
Decemher 3Oth, 1895. 
Follcwing letter was received by Dr. Jameacn before he decided to go 
but if you  must not  use letter for Press nntil we  cable authority,it is 
signed by leading inhabitants of Johannesburg. 
Hore follo~vs,  not in cipher, the famous women und childr$~~&je-n'e_ 
cram. which was drawn uu in advance tc  be iised  after  the insurrection  i 
had i;rolcen  oiit.  - 
Theee telegrams mere handed to her mhen she mole in the uiorning of 
the Slst  (9747).  With  these telegrams in her haud she was  at once 
receivod  by  &Ir. Chamberlain  at 10  in  the  morning (9761),  und  it is 
prosumed she cominuuicated theix contents to Air. Ohamberlain. ilid iiot inciiu  tu bu  iii iiiiy Yrny  n eoinniiiiiientioii hctivecii hIi.  Clinmbei~lnin  niid 111..  Rlioiles 
in tlio sliglitcst tlogico. 
(OBY2.)  Yoii  tall  tlie  Committeo tliat, ns  a iiinttur  of  fnot,  it ivns  siinrly sour oit'n 
riw, nncl  iiot  hiundcd iipai ans corn~ni~~~icntioii  JOU  lud  hnil  froin iili.,  Clinl~erlliiiii 
-1t  \vns  hiinded  ii1~011  110  ~omn~~~nientiori  wlintuvor,  csrupt  tliat I lind tlio  priille~c  of 
seoing i\lr. Cliuiiil~cilniii  tlint nioriiing. 
Mr. Cliamberlain no doubt was  "a~vfully  angry,"  und rightlp, for  Dr. 
Jameson had upset  liis applocart as well as &Ir. Rhodes's.  Mr.  Rhodes 
~vas  bouud by close und intimate ties of personal  friendship to endeavour 
to screeu Dr. Jameson.  As  Mr.  Schreiner told us at the interview  that 
toolc place with  Mr.  Rhodes immcdiatelp after  the iiems  came that D'. 
.Jumeson had crossed the frontier, Mr.  Rhodea was utterly brolreu  down. 
"  I said, why do you not  stop him 1  Although he has ridden in you  can 
still stop him? "  He said, '' Poor  old  Jameson,  twenty  years we  have 
been frieiids, und iiow he goes in und  ruins  iiie.  I cannot liiuder it.  I 
caniiot go  and destroy him " (Capa  I~!q?liv?l  iizto tltc Euid,  p, 217).  Xr. 
Chamberlain  obviously had  no  such reasons for compunctiou,  for  Dr. 
Jameson by making the Raid had ruined everytlhg,  aud Mr. Chamberlain 
iiaturally  ment  for  Dr.  Jameson, boing rnoved  thereto  by  tho  double 
motive of  clearing himself from all complicity in the plan to which he was 
privy, aud also by his obvious duty as Secretary of  Stute for the Colonies. 
His Course  for  that moveinent  was quite clear.  Hence Miss  Sbaw was 
undoubtedly  right  in giving  Mr.  Rhodes a  plain iutimation that he had 
iiothing to expect from Mr. Chamberlain by  way of  saving Jaineson. 
But  before  this  telegricm  about  Mr.  Chamberlain  being  "awfully 
aiigry," therc caine anothor telegram froin hlr. Rhodes to Miss Shaw :- 
No.  1877.  Rhodes to Shaw. 
December 31st, 1895. 
Unless you can make  Uhamberlain instruct the High Commissioner 
to proceed  at once to Johannesburg the whole  position  is lost.  High 
Commissioner would receive splendid reception, and  still tu~m  poaition 
to England advantage, but  must  be instructed  by cable immediately, 
The instructions must  be  speciflc aa  he  is weak und  will take no re- 
sponsibility. 
Miss Shaw says of  this telegram that it was seut to lier for information, 
altliougli if  ever  there was  a cablegram in the morld which was sont to 
her for iiintriiction  as to action this was the cablegiain.  She says, how- 
wer, that she took uo action on  it ~vhatever. She sho~ved  it in the Tintcs 
Oilice, biit  never  sent  it to  the  Colonial  Office.  Miss  Sliavr  said  that 
eveiy one  in South Africa believed  that  Sir Hercules  Robinsoii  should 
go up, aiid  quotes  a dispatch from Sir Hercules to that effeot.  What 
she  omitted  to  call attention to  is  that Mr.  Rhodes's  appeal  to 31s. 
Ch~mbe~lain  to  order  the  High  Commissioner  up  maß  in  order  that 
the High Coiniuissiouer should turu thematter to "l3iigland's  advautage." 
Iii  otber words, an order that he should go at ouce  to tho Trausvaal in 
order to  cariy out  the  original  plan.  Even on  Jan.  2nd  there \vas  a 
possible  chance  that  this  plan  inight  have been  carried  out, for  thero 
was  a  kind of  rising in Johannesburg.  As  soon  as the  news  to  tliat 
effect reached  the High  Coiiimiasiouer, he telegraphed aslting Presidcnt 
Rruger if he  would  wish  to come  to Pretoria to  co.operate  mitli  him 
in endeavouring to bring about a peacefiil  settlcment.  President Krugcr 
replied that Dr. Jamesonhad fired upon Iiis burghers, but to prevent furthor 
bloodsbcd he accepted the Eigh Ooinmissioner's offer to come to Pretoria. 
Rhodes und his Ministers, with tho Chief Juetice and Mr. EIofineyr, wer0 all 
iufavour of  this step, which IWS approved of  by Mr. Chaiuberlaiiiand ultim- 
ately carried out.  The approval of  Mr. Hofmeyr and the Chief Justice, how- 
wer, was given subject to the eondition that President Iiruger iuvited the 
High Commissioner.  Such an invitation from Prbsident Ilruger was very 
diierent from the original idea, by  which the High Cominissioner was  to 
appear as the  representative of  the  suzerain  power  in response to the 
appeal of  British subjects in order to seoure the success of the iiisurection. 
It ie not  surprising that Sir Hercides Robineon shraiilr froin taking the 
responsibility  of  carrying out that project;  but it is significant  of  the 
confidence mhich  Mr.  Rhodes  had  in Mr.  Cbainberlain's  readiness  to 
support his plan und carry it througli, that he  should have sent those tmo 
telegrams to Miss Sbaw in tlie confident expectation that Mr. Chamberlain 
would play up und make the Governor take his allotted part. 
Me have now donc mith Miss Shaw's telegiains und mith Miss Shaw'a 
still wonderful explauations. 
It  is now  necessary  to pay  a little attention  to mhat  ~vas  done in 
South Africa, showing how  absolutely the  conspirators  relied  upon  the 
Support of the High Comuiissioner, und  at the same time hqm fatal to the 
success of the movement was  tho insisteuce, popiilarly attributed  to Mr. 
Chamberlain,  of  the introduction  of  the  Eritisli flag.  On  Dec.  2Gth 
Mr. Jameson  of Johaunesbiirg telegimphed  to  Dr. .Tainesou at Pitsani :- 
IL W  nb~oliitcly  iioecssny  to  io~tliciio Ilntatioi~ tliioii L  iiiiforcucori cirrui~~stnncc~ 
Iiuro nlto~vctliar  iinosliootud, niid iiiitil ~yo  I!nvo  0.  J. ~lioilcs'anfsolnto  plcdgo tliat niitliority 
of  1rnI~c~nl  Govorninont  will  iint  bi,  ~nsintail  iipoii.  Cliarles  Lcoiii~rd  loft luut  iiiglit  tri 
iiitori.icw  Rliodvs. 
TVbile  Mr. Lconard wae  8till on  his may  to Capetomn, &Ir. Phillips 
telegraphed from Jobanue8bul-g :- 
B.it, Clpotoivn.-Ir  i.i  AI ,..  .Iiitzly  iirc;ca:kiy  tu ilelr~  Ilu.itil,-.  II IorAgii i.iil>~ciiLri~ 
iiiiirt oii Ilontiiig, aiiricipttr ei~i.i~nlcrt.  fiiiliiic. 
Whoever insisted upon "  fioating without delay "  1  The only pressiire 
in that direction. excent Dr. Jameson, came froni London from the con- 
fidential emissary tot& Colonial Office, who telegraphed that "  delay was 
danaerous." und who had spcoial reasous for knowing that Mr, Chamber- 
laiu-wished  it doue  imiiiedlately.  Tlic London  Tilees also cables con- 
fidentiaily to  that offect,  postponeineut of  meeting would  be most unmis~ 
course!'-Deo.  31st,  Oale I?igztivg Repo~t E.  2&3..--Tl$?re  is a telegrain  \ 
from  Dr.  Harris  d&.~8€li;"-&aPeto~vn,  addreesed  to  Dr. 
Jamesou at Pitsuni, in whicli ho  used  the words <'foreigii  friends,"  as ro- 
ferring to quite distinct  persons  froiii "  foreign subscribers."  Dr. Harria 
explained to the Committee that ~vbeu  he iised the mords "foreigu frieuds " 
he ineaut the neonlo in Johan~iesbrirg.  und this indeed is obvious from the 
text of  his ca6le~am. Speaking oc the proposed  insurrection, he  says, 
"  Al1  our foreien frieuds are nom dead  agthinst it, und say public will not 
spend one penky towards it, even with you as a director.-Ichabod." 
Dr. Jameson, however, toolc  the bit  between bis tecth aud decided to 
go  in, and rely upou Mr. Rhodes to bring the High Commissioner und $17. 
Hofmeyr to Johannesburg.  Dr. Jamesou told the Committee that he harl 
arranged with  Mr.  Rhodes  that mhen  the rising took  place  he  shoulil 
go  to Johannesburg or Pretoria  ~ith  the  High  Cominissioner aiid  hlr. 
Hofmeyr  to mediate betwoen  the Trausvaal Goverqment  und  the Out- 
lauders.  <'I?rom my ümu  coiiversatioiis with  the High Coiiimissioner  I 
ltnew that wheu  tlie rising toolr  place he would go  to Johannesburg ür 
Pretoria " (4518).  Dr. Jaineson also said :-  ~-  - .  .  .  -.  .  .  \~~  ~, 
I 1;now  Iiis iilca wvas  tliot this  is so froni  «.  coiivowntioii ivitli  tlio I$öl:li  Comniissioiiei, 
tlint if tlicro  wns n riniiig iii Joliniincsbiirg, if lio lind goiiu  tlicro to inc<liatc,  it i~'0111d Li'  n fl~e  Jm~von  Plan  %uws 
.  - 
~hi~,  is affirmed almost without  oircuml'Jouti0U  in  the 
'report, which imputes to Nr.  Rhodes the morst motives for oblectlng t0  ju~t  right  to resort to any expedient  to deceive the nation mhom 
the pro&uotion  ~f  the  cablegrams.  Had the  cablegrams been  suEcient  You  sem,  is a deadly doctrine, which, if  tolerated, modd eat 
,evidente to prove the  complicity of  Mr. Chamberlain, it is asserted  theY  into the vital8 of  our national Sie.  Better any exposure ehan  allow the 
moula  once have  been  broiight  forward by  Mr. Ilhodes.  '2hoae whO  dootriue to be  impreased  upon  our people  that falsehood pays,  $hat 
knem NP.  Rhodes would have come to an exactly opposito conclnsion, but  oan afford  to lower the high  standard of  personal honour  has 
to  those Persona to whom the very name of Rhodes is  red rag  to  been evolved in the Course of  the oenturies. 
bull such U suggeetion mouid seem mere hfidsummer madness.  Iswell  *Ware  that  an  attempt will  be  made  to  represent  this 
ltia  uponthis,iudeed, &hat  Nr.  Chamberlain has traded. TheCommittee,  aarrative  as  the  product  of  personal  animosity  on  my  to 
he  told the Houae on Thursday, the 19th Oot., oontaiued.membersfi.omboth  ~hnmberlain. I am equally well amare that it \vould be  idle for me-no 
sides of  the Hause mhose  honour und integrity und  artiality noboa~  l 
matter  hom  trutbfully-  to  disclaim  any  suoh  sentim~~t.  when 
eould be found to dispute.  It ia, indeed, the high  stap ard  of  integrit~.  hhere  is  po  Oase  You  ouu  always  abuse  the  plaintiff's  attorney, 
honour which has been regarded as One 0f OUr  national glories mhioh  arid  those3ETiutterly  fail  to  explain  away  the  damning  record 
.harr etoodin the way of the disoovery of  the  tnith i?  thia  matter.  Tbc  contained  in  this  pamphlet  may  be  excused,  if  not  justified,  mhen 
H~~~~  of Commons itself has been made an accompllce after the fact by  the~  endeavour  to  obsoure  the  issue  by  the  imputation  of 
mrtue of  these appeals to vrhat  formerly was resardea  8s the normal  motivea.  These  things  do  not  affect me  in  the least.  This narrative 
itself is suffioient proof  of  the fact of  iny anxious desire 60  sareen 
etandard of  English publio life. 
After  the  Committee  of  no  inquiry  had  brought..up:.its  mhite-  Chamberlain, to minimize to the uttermost the esteut to mhioh  he was 
washing  report,  as  a  forlorn  hope  an  attempt ki's  made t0 induce  implicated in this matter,  und  it was oniy when  every effort 60  shield 
the Hause of  Commons to pass judgmeut  upon  the  method  in  him  was  thwarted  by  the  determination  to  inaist  upon  maKng  both 
prooeedings has been  conduoted.  That  attempt was thmarted by Sir  parties in the House of Commons aocomplicea in thia conspiruoy that I 
Willium Haicourt, who, referr~ng  to the suggeatiou that the Committea  TVas  driven to speak out.  What the oouae  uenoes may be I  not knom, 
had  engaged  in  a  plot  to  suppress  evidence  und  hush  up  obarges,  nor ii  that my business.  What I  salv at tze time was thst this resoit  to 
declared that in his opinion such aocusationa Tvere  worthy only of disdain 
U  refügo of  lies  would  infallibly entail  severe punishment  On  ug 
and contempt.  He added:  <'I  hope,  at least, that I shall not live to see  nation.  Alroady a2e  of ~10,000,000  sterling has been imposed upon  us 
tbe'day when the Houae of  Commons is prepnred to declare by a majority 
as  the  direct  consequence  of  tbis  soandal  at Westminder,  the 
that it does not truat theword of  its statesmen, andthat it has no reliance  finanoial peualty is one of the least of the burdens mhich we aha11  huve to 
of oonfidenoe in the good faith of  thia Committee."  Aa  I remarked at  the 
!  -  bear.  If it mere  not  for the los8 of gallant lives worse  than wasted in 
this wicked und criminal war, we might weloome, rather than deplore, the 
time, such appeals may  arr  divisio3, but they are impotent to reverse 
the verdict  whioh histo~fio'ord  upon  the  method  in ~vhioh  the  faot thpt slok-footed Nemesis has so speedily overtalren us,  for there ie 
nothi~g~more  terrible for man  or  ~iation  than  to  put thek trust in a  investigation was carried out.  The  division whioh  olosed  the  question,  falsehoqa und not to diacover their mistakke. 
so far as the Houee of  Commons was~erned,  was  neither more  nor 
less than a  vote  of  oonfidence  in  theb omn  most 2wurable selves,  . . 
a oertificate of character granted by the House of  Commons%be  House 
of  Commons.  As  Sir William  Haroourt  said, that Committee  was  an 
~~era~~~pJe  of the House of  Commons, und if the House of  Commons 
are  going  to  pass  such  judgments  as  that  upon  tbat  Committee, 
they are passing judgment  upon  themselves.  I continued, <'Facts are 
facts,  truth  is  truth,  anti  all  fiudings  of  Uommittees  und  votes 
of  the  House  of  Commons  that  are  in  diametiical  opposition 
to tbe facts are of  no more aooount thn  the rustling of mithered leaves in 
the autumn wind.  The making of  such reporta und  the registering of 
euoh  divisions  only  damage those  who  are  parties  to thia  fraud  and 
imposture, mhich, so far, has been Mth apparent success hoisted upon the 
morld.  The  eolf-respect  of  the  nation  is  no  doubt  outraged  by  the 
Suggestion that a  Minister frcm his place in Parliament could haveplayed 
it so lom down upon the House of  Commons and upon the Sovereign aa to 
employ  the  maohinery  of  U  Parliamentary  Committee in  order  not  to 
discover, but to oonceal the truth; "but facts are ohiels that winna ding, 
und daurna he disputed!' 
It  is a grievous and thankless taslc  to Set forbh  suoh facts  as those 
cbntained in tbis narrative before the eyes of  my countrymen,  anä not 
metely  of  my  oountrymen, but  of  our fellom-men  outside our frontiers. 
But  it  irr  far  more  serious to  aoquiesoe  in suoh  a  colossal  tciumph 
of  ~hacisaio  hypocrisy.  The  idea  that  it pays  to  lie,  and  that it ~.  .  .  -- .-  -  .-  . , -.. .  .  .  . 
~  - -.  .  ~-. 
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.of bis plan mere  sent by peraous who  were in close und constant com- 
munication mith the Colonial Office, and who  mere  evidently convinced 
that unlesa they could induce Mr. Rhodes to make the insurrection under 
f  ithe British flag-in  other mords, to jump the Transvaal for England-he 
acould  not count upou aupport here.  What person  here mas in a position 
.of  sufficient power to exercise ao&ful  an influence upon the counsels of 
the  uonspirators?  I8  not  the  answer  obvious?  NO one  escept Mr. 
*Chamberlain  was in that poaition.  CHBPTBR 11. 
Such is the terrible, and Imust aay the new, suspicion mhich the mere 
@ublication  in consecutive order of  the telegrams must beget  in  the public  TEE  MWEELEY  DOSSIER  IN TUE  INDEP~~JANCE  BELGS, 
miud.  Mr. Ealfour, until he reads this pamphlet, whioh of  Course he may  ,  . 
refuse to do until he can no longer lreep his bead thrust lilre an ostrioh in  ON  Friday,  Jau.  5th,  1900,  the  fiul-pendancc  Bclge,  of  Brusaels, 
the saud, may easily dismiss this suspicion as a trifle not fit  to disturb the  published  in &euch  and Bnglish  a  collection  of  letters  knom as the 
tranquillity of  Her Najesty's Ministers. But that tvill not be the conclusion  I  Hamksley Dossier. 
.of  the public, nor will it be  the final decision of Nr. Balfour himself.  The Iaddpcpoda7we  Bolgn  guarantees the absolute  authenticity  of  the 
,.  letters, und affirrna that it has received  them from  a  certaiu person mho 
,i  was a party to the Jameson Raid. 
It states that they shotv that Mr.  Chamberlain knem  and  encowsged 
the mork of  Mr. Ehodes and Dr. Jameson in the Johannesbwg revolt, and 
I  also  that  &IriIr.  Chamberlain  had  charged  Mr.  Bairfield  to  secure  the 
! 
I  acquittal of  Dr. Jaineson aud Mr. Rhodes by the Select Committee of  the 
#  Houae of  Commous.  They are alle ed alao to ahow that the evidenco for 
i  1  5,; the ~rosecut&n  was &o.&o.r~d,  and t  at speciul documents mere  lrept  back 
5,  from examinationby the Saect Committee. 
The folloming is  the text  of  these  documents as published  in  the 
fiz&pc~tda1u:c  Bnlgc :- 
.. .  .  FAULPIELD  TO  HHVI<BLEY. 
Colonial Office, May G,  1896. 
I can3t  find Meade's draft of  the private assurance about the charter, 
but there is Lord Selborne's version  of  it, and it seems to me the Same 
thiug.  'The aasurance is strictly private.  Nothing is  intended  versua 
tho charter pending an in uiry  (if  auy) aftor judicial  proceedings.'  You 
are amaro that  Chamber  ?  ain  ititends to  enlargo  in  his  speech on  the 
h,  advantage of  development by Company to develo  ment by Government in 
r  %  countries like  Matabelelaud.  You  are  aware  t  at  Chamberlain tvishes 
,,. 
J  ,  the  announcement  of  an acceptance to be made by  the Company, und 
.4  before Friday's  debate.  Labby evidently does not  iutend to press  his 
questions to-morrom.  I  don't  Imom about John Ellis, but he tvillprobably 
a150  not press. 
'I Yours  truly, 
I  E.  BA~PIELD!' 
FA~FIIXD  TO  HA~I<~ILEY. 
,  May 7,1896. 
"  Dnnn Hnwxsm~, 
Referring to my other letter of  to-d~y,  I have to say that if  the 
Board arrives at any other decision than that of  immediate acceptanbe of 
I  ri'a@ations  und immediate puhlications thereupon,my letter of  yesterda ,  9  in which I quote the minute of  Lord Selborne, is mithdrsmn.  It  is simp y 
WLZ  ct nolo avoiizb.  It reloted to a aupposed  state of  facts mhich,  in the 
event contemplated, will hc uon-existent.  Yours truly, HA\VKSLEY  TO FAIIIB~LD. 
"  30, Nincing Lane, B.C.,  July 22, 1896. 
"  NY DEAR  FAII~BII~LD, 
"1s the rumour true that I haar to the effect  that the Govern- 
ment have decided the appointment of a  Select  Committee of  the House 
of  Commons to inquire into the  circumstances of  Jameson's  action  in 
December last?  If  so, I suppose it will be possible for the views  of  the 
director  to  he  to  some  extent  considered  in  appointing  aome  of  the 
members?.  In this case may I suggest the names of  Carson, Q.C.,  A.  C. 
Cripps, Q.C.,  George Wyndham?  Will it be possible  to have  an oppor- 
tunity  of  discussing  with  you  the terms  of  reference  to  the  Select 
Committee 1  .- 
"  BOUROHIER  F,  HAIVK~L~Y." 
(Telegram.)  27th July, 1896. 
"  TO  Beit, Prince's  Chambers, Pall Mall. 
'' Just come in and find your telegram.  Have eeen Bourke, W  äham, 
and Fairfield.  Doing all possible to  secure Wyndham as mellas ~crtered 
nominee.  Regret impossible to call before dinuer, but shall be at Bur- 
lington bet\veen eleven and tmelve. 
I'  HAWIISLBY." 
.- 
(Telegram.)  "  1st August, 1896. 
"To  Fairfield, 7, Park Place, St. James's. 
"Best  thanlts  for note  und  all your  trouble.  Let  me  knom  any 
as to constitution  of  Committee.  Could call this 
"  ~\<'XSIEY." 
"  80, Mincing Lane, E.C., 2nd April, 1897. 
"Dnnn  Sm, 
"I  send you memo. about  Sir John Willoughby.  Will you put 
the points in this demo, to him, und also first paragaphs in the encloseä 
print?  With  regard  to the official  report, it does  not  seem  necessury 
that this should be rend through, but  Sir Sohn will mark certain para- 
graphs and read  them.  I am giving Mr. Nicholaon  further  piiuta  fbi 
circulation among the Committee. 
"  Believe ine, 
":Bounc~~nit  F.  HAwiis~ns. 
To;the Right Hon. W. Lawies Jaclceoii, M.P." 
Goldsmith Building, Temple, Aug.  7, 1897. 
DEAR  Mn,  H~w~aLns, 
14 Can Mr. Charles Leouardcome down to thenouse of  Commons 
to-morrow, at five o'clock?  The Committee meet  (prlv?tely) at half-past 
four, in Colonel Legge's room, and I could see Leonard immediately aftei. 
the meeting breaks up. 
"  Sours truly, 
"  JOHN  C.  BIQHA~I.'" 
'' 30, Micing Lane, E.C.,  June 15, 18961 
I'  MY DW  X'AIRF~LD, 
Referring to your letter of  the 9th inst., you will remember my 
lettes to you  of  the 6th inst.  covering the  copies of  cablegrame stated. 
These copies were  sent for ooniidential perusal  and  return.  I do  not. 
think I am at liberty to asaent to any use being made of  the copies until 
I have  had  the opportunity  of  cominunicding  mith Rhodes.  Shall L 
cable him ? 
'' Believe me, 
<'  Bouno~~nn  F.  HA\VIISL~Y.!' 
HA\VI<SLEY  TO  MAQUIRE. 
"30,  Ninoing Lme, E.C.,  Feb. 19, 1897- 
'I MY  DEI^  R~ACIUIR~, 
'I As far us I can trace to-niglit, but without exhaustive search, 
you and Harris cabled  Rhodes Aug.  18, 1895.  Hai~is  aud Beit on Aug. 
17.  Beit  cabled Nov. 26  and  28, and of  Course  you will remember youV 
telegams Deo.  20  and 21.  I think, but cannot be certain, that Grey und 
Earris both  sent cable Bug. 2,1896, and you remember on Nov.  4, 1896, 
Grey registered his  cable address  < Gotbical,'  and it was  cabled to Cape 
Tomu.  I  do  not  knom  whether, after  the receipt  of  this  cable advice, 
Rhodes did at any time cable direct to  Grey.  I need not  say that very 
many of the cables, althou h sent by Harris, were settled in consultation,  a  even if ultimately sent in t  e name of  Harris aloue.  I will consider this 
position further agaiust Monday. 
"  BOU~CAIER  F.  HA~VIISL~S." 
HAWXSLES  TO E.~L  GRET. 
11 80,  Mincing Lme, B.C.,  &b.  20, 1897. 
"  MY DEAX  Gims, 
dlThanle for  you  letter of  the  9th ult.,  vrhich  I read  with 
patt  interest.  Your will, of  Course, have hemd that the  Committee was 
rea pointed,  and has got  to  worlc.  I send you  official  rints  of  the  3  B  evi ence already taken.  Rhodes  has  done very  well, an  I thinlc will 
come out on top.  Ho was nervous the firat day, though his evidence was 
good even tben.  Yesterday he was simply splendid. .after it.  But I um  sorry to say that I do not feel that I can do it, nor do 
I believe that I should have the support of  my colleagues if  I brought the 
proposal before  them.  I have beenvery anxious to take this  line if  I 
.could;  but  this is the conclusion to which I have felt niyselE forced.  I 
-can ody  ask you to believe  that if  I cannot comply with the wirishes of 
ourself  und other  friends of  theirs,  it  is  not  owing  to hardness  of 
'gart, but  to the belief  tbat duty compels me otherwise.  But it is very 
.hateful to me. 
''  Very truly, 
The documents here end. 
For the sake of  clearnese the following particulnrs may be given :- 
.ED!VAUD  FBII~FIELD,  Assistant  Permanent  Under  Secretary  for  the 
Colonial  Office,  Nr.  Chamberlain's  confidential official,  was  the 
intermediary through whom Dr. Harris und  Mr.  Hawksley informed 
Nr. Chamberlain of what !vas  proposed tobe done in supporting the 
insucrection from  the outside.  He died after the Select Committee 
had been appointed. 
Bovnoxi~an  P. HA~ELBY,  Solicitor of  Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes, &nd  custodian 
of the suppressed cablegrams.  He was  the witness whose  evidenco 
was cut sbort by the Committee as soon as it was seen he was willing 
to speak the tmth. 
EARL  Gnnu, ono  of  the Directors of  the Chartered Company,  aiid  con- 
fidential friend of  both Mr.  Chamberluin und  hir. Rhodee.  Shortly 
after theRaid he was  sent out  as Administrator to  Rhodesia,  und 
it  mus  when  he  was  safely  out  of  the  may  in  Africe  that &Ir. 
Hawksley  wrote  him  the  above  letter.  Earl Grey  was  never 
examined before the Select Committee. 
.G~onan  WYNDHAN,  the  present  Under  Secretary  for  War, had  spent 
the autumn  of  1896 with Mr. Rhodes  in  South Africn.  He was 
a  pointed ns a member of the Committee to represent the interests of 
t%e  Chartered Company, und  as he knew the facts about the cable- 
grams,  he  refused  to  sign  the falsehood contained in the Report 
reflecting upon Mr. Rhodes's honour. 
?R.  MAGUIUE  ~vas  one of  the  inner group.  His telegrams of  Dec. 20th 
ana 21st mere never  asked for  by the Select Committee.  They mere 
subsequent  in date  to Flora  Sham's,  und  would, if  produced,  be 
invaluable evidence.  Mr.  Maguire is  nom  in Kimberley xvith  31r. 
Rhodes. 
'Mns.  RIOHA~D  C~AXB~RLAIN,  a daughter of Sir Jobn Swinburne, married 
intd the Chamberlain iumily, but never became one of  the olan.  Her 
a  pearance at Westminster on the first day of  the fnquiry led  to  e, 
eight  scene,  which  was  terminated  by  the  Oommittee,  at  &Ir. 
Chamberlain's instance, expelling all ladies froln the room. 
:SIR M.  W.  RIDLBY  ia the Rome Secrotary. 
hleann was Sir R.  Neade, the Perinanent Under Secretury at the Colonial 
Office. 
Mn.  CRIPPS,  Q.C., "  Chartered nominee "  on the Select Committee. 
J. C.  BI~~AJI,  M.P.,  member of  the Select Committee, who distinguished 
himself by  endeavouring to stop Mr. Hawksley's evidence. 
BBIT  is Alfred Beit, of  the firm of  Wernher, Beit & Co., who went halves 
with Mr. Rhodes in financing the Jamesou Plan. 
,Hmn~s  is  Dr. Ruthedoord Earris, Mr.  Rhodes's confidentiul envoy to the 
Colonial Office. 
"  JOHNNY  "  is Sir John Willoughby, Commnnder of  the Raid. 
PIUNK  is Col. Frank Rhodes, the brother of Mr.  Cecil J. Rhodes. 
There was no  fouiidation for  Es.  Richard  Chamberlain's  suspicion 
that Mr. ,Rhodes ever tbought of  "  giving away "  Dr. Janieson. 
i 
LADY  DUDLEY  is the Dowager Lady Dlidley, who was one of  the hero- 
worshippers of  Dr. Jamoson. "Tlio  Dog returnotli to  his T'omit  :  the Lior muat ont his  Lie-Tho  Devil's  A1outliful."- 
Qcorgc dic).dith. 
THE  publication by the Indipendanca  Belp of  the correspondence relating 
to the complicity of  the Colonial 0Ece in  the Jamemn-&des  conspiracy 
against the South African Republic may  at the eleventh hour Open  the 
eyes of  the nation to the original source and cause of  aii our sufferings to. 
an., 
In themselves the newly-published  documents may  be said to  prove 
comparatively little.  Their damning importance lies in the fact that they 
do not stand alone.  They come as independent evidence, every ward  of 
which confirms  the morst  suspicions of the  complicity of  the  Colonial 
Office  in  the Rhoaesian  oonspiracy.  They Open  numerous fresh $hks 
through which the nation can  catch many  glimpses of  the leading actors 
in the conspiracy, und they  are always grouped in the Same may.  W. 
Pairfield, Mr.  Chamberlain's  permanent offioial, is seeu corsulting in the 
most  friendly fashion with Nr. Eamksley,  the  solicitor of  Xr. Rhodes. 
Ms.  Hawksiey is Seen  writing to Mr.  Fairfield, Ur. Mayire, Dr.  Hawis, 
aud Lord Grey cn the assumption that something must at all hazards  be 
concealed-the  letters are, in short, just  what might be expecteä to be 
interchauged betwcen a company of consfiirators whose paramount desire 
was to conceal the complicity of their ohief.  -  - 
I do not think that we  are by any means out of  the wood, but there. 
does seem an off-chance of the plea of  piiblic interest boing recognized, und 
the oables  of  the last half of 1895, or rather  the  negotiations of  that. 
period, not  being  disclosed, though I um  bound  to  say that I think  on 
balanoe  the probability is that they will  ha~e  to oome out.  If  they do. 
Mr. Chamberiain will have no one but himself to thanl~." 
So Mr. Hawksley writes to Lord Grey, when the Committee of  (No). 
Inquiry had begun the farce which it called iuvestigation, but ~vhich  more. 
resembled  a  game  of  blindman's  buff.  The meaning of  this Passage is. 
perfectl  plain.  The object  of  the conspirators was to conceal from thc  E  ~ublic  t  e fact that in the negotiations of  the latter half  of  1895, which 
mere chronicled from time to time in oablegrams to  the chiof  conspirator 
in Cape Tomn,  Mr.  Chamberlain had  taken a leading hand in the game. 
Lord Grey was  then  at Bulawayo, where he was discreetly kept  so that 
hii evidence might not be forthcoming before  the Committee.  It would 
appear from this letter that he was privy to the ~on~piracy. 
Nom,  why should Mr. Chamberlain have liad reason to fear the story 
coming out 1  That he did so is assumed as amatter perfectly wo11  kuomn 
to Lord Grey, who ~vas  the close frieud of  Mt. Chamberlain.  Possibly he 
was eyen more.  A well-known Cape  politioian wrote me the  other  day 
declarlng that he was satisfied that it was through Lord Gray that all the, 
&.ippe?&dix..  97" 
more confidential communications passed between Nr. Rhodes aud Mr. 
Chamberlain.  Be that as it may,  this letter certainly assumes-first, 
that Lord Grey knem all about  tbe  negotiations of  1895 ;  secondly, that. 
the cables  threw  valuable light  upon  these  negotiations ; thirdly,  that. 
every effort would  be  used  to  preveiit  the truth coining  to light; and,. 
fourthly, that if  it did it mould be  so disastrous to Nr. Chamberlain tbat 
the conspirators relieved  their  own  oousciences by tlie reflection that in 
that Oase  he would  only have  hiinself to thauk.  Ur.  Ha\vksley's  fore- 
bodings were justificd-in  part.  Ilespite Mr.  Charnberluiu's  efforts in the 
way of  suppressing  evidtince und denying the facts, despite also the almost 
inconceivable ineptitudo of  the  Committee, some  cablegrams mere  ex- 
tracted from the Telegraph Company.  Mr. Chaniberlaiii had no  control 
over the Cable  Company, otherwise tliese cables mould have been  sup- 
pressed  as oompletely  as his famous letters  to  &Ir.  Hawksley, mhich htt. 
has never produced, although repeatedly challenged to do so in the House 
of  Commoüs. 
The  importance of  these' oablegrams is  immensely enbanced by  a 
Passage in &Ir.  Hawksley's  lotter to Dr. Hai~is,  in ~hich  he says:  - 
"I  need  not  say  that very  inany of  the  cables,  although  sent  by 
Harris, mere  settlod in consultation even if  ultimately sent in the name. 
of  Harris alone."  4 
The significance of  this admission will be  seeu by quoting one or two. 
telegams.  Xr.  Chaiiiberlain,  after being  made  privy  by  Dr.  Harris. 
through Mr. FairGeld-und  it would now appear also. by Lord  Grey-to 
the  general  outline of  Ur. Rhodes's  plan for promoting a  conspiraoy in 
Johannesburg, und supporting it by  Jamesou and his troopers, gave it his. 
approvsl.  He hauded  over  the jumping-off  place  to  $1~.  Rhodes,  und 
made  over  the inouuted police.  Up Qo that  time  the  conspiracy  xvas. 
nierely to upset a coi~upt  Governnient in Pretoris, und elect Gen. Joubert 
or some Progressive burgker as President  in  place of  President iiruger. 
Rut after llr. Chaiiibcrlain came into the oonspiracy a fatal change \vas.  -  ..-  ~  -  - 
made which wrecked everything. 
Pressure was  brougkt to bear  upon Mr. Rhodes to  change the mhole 
charaoter of  the  connpiraoy by insisting that Jameson must go  in under 
the British flag, und  that the nest Governor of the Trausvaal inust be 
t  annoiuted bv the Colonial  Office.  Soniebody wrecked the whole  scheme.. 
rho  was that somebody l 
It could have been no  other  peysou  than Xr. Chamberlain  himself. 
No  one elae was powerful enough to bring such pressure to bear upou  Mr. 
Rhodes  as  to make  him  entertaiu  a proposition so fatal to its  success. 
The riiandate to iiisist upou the British fing !$.its  seilt by  cable in the name 
of Earris, but as me  now know, it !vas  ",settled iii consultation" with the 
others, immediately after private interyiewa with Mr.  Ohambevlain.  No. 
one else but filr. Chamberlain had any interest in pushing tho claims of 
the Colonial 0Ec.e.  Suoh at least is t@ natural inference from the three 
cablegranis mhich  bear  iipoii  the syb~ect. I  only quote from the last, 
punctuating it so as to niake it intelligible : 
HAURIS  TO  RRODBS. 
"  November 26th, 1896. 
Very confidential.  Of  coiirsa. it is g'eat  pleasure to read your cable 
to J. Chamberlain.  I as neur  us possible warned  you  froui informntion 
peeeived ][now there is great dauger Phillips Leoiiard ; they can or niay 
ai .9 8  t4ppendix. 
be doing businens mithout assistance from British Soutli Africa Company, 
and  also  independently  British  flag.  It  ?uo!tld Ilnvc  serious  effeot  0% 
your 11ositwlt hcw.  I say this  very  confidential.  You  must  telegraph 
present reply, Dr. Harris, mithout fail." 
Under  the stress  of  thia direct  and unmistakable maining from his 
eonfederates in London, hfr. Rhodes hesitated-and  was lost.  Under the 
acrem put upon  hiin. by  Mr.  Chamberlain ho seemod to  maver,  and the 
Johannesburg  conspiracy ment  to  ieces.  The  Aiiierican  and  Liberal 
burghers mho mere willing  to risk  their  lives for a lcgitimate revolution 
under the Transvaal flag, absolutely refused to  take part in a movement 
intended to jump the Tranwnal for England. 
Mi'.  Chamberlain baving thon mrecked all hopes  of  success of  the in- 
surrection, began to press impatiently for the movement to be put throu  h.  i  Heuce urgent telegrams mere sent through the conspirntors to Rlr. Rho  es 
uygiug him  to hurry up.  Some of  these  have  been  published.  Others 
have yet to see the light.  Al1 alike emanated indirectly from the Colonial 
Office.  Mr. Chamberlain at that time did  not  know  tbat by  his  insist- 
ence  on  the British flag  and  the  annesation  of  the Transvaal he had 
destroyed the movement in Johannesburg.  Hence ha continued to press 
Jlr. Rbodes to move-with  the result tbat Dr. Jameson jumped  in an  the 
direct conseauence of  %Ir.  Chamberlain's imnatieuce, acting upon  an im-  -  -  - 
pulsivo und idvonturous disposition. 
If  nnv one doubts tbe relntion betmeen eause und  effect, let him rend 
the teleirams sent by Miss Flora Sham, mho  ncted as Mi'.  Rhodes's con- 
fidential correspondent.  She was  qualified for  thia  in  tmo  mays i  ehe 
w~s  eolonial editor of  the Times. and was everv other da7 as a urivileged 
visitor in eonfidentinl iiitercoursb mith 3Ir. Ch~mborlniu  Ör  hia  fermnnÖnt 
staff.  I urint  her  dispatches as  thov  were  dccipliered  before tbo  Com- 
uiittee, nierely nddingihe necesaary punctuation .Y- 
No. 73.  hf~ss  SHAW  TO  RHODES. 
"  10 Dec., 189G. 
"  Cau you adviee mhenmill you commence the plans?  Wo mish to send 
at eealiest  opportunity sealed instructions  representative of  the London 
qintes nuropean capitala; it is most  important  using  their  influence in 
your favour." 
No. 164.  MISS SHAW  TO RHODES. 
"  12 Deo., 1896. 
Delay dangerous.  S~mpathy  now complete.  But will  depend very 
much upon action befqre European Pomers given time (to) enter a protest, 
dich,  as European situation considered serious, might paralyse Govern- 
ment ;  general feeling in the Stock Market very suspicious." 
No.  106.  MISS SHAV  TO  RHODES. 
'I 17 Deo., 1896. 
''  Held an interview mith Secretary Transvaal.  Left here on Saturday 
for  Hague,  Berlin,  Paris.  Fear  in  negotiation  mith  these  parties. 
Cbamberlain aound  in  oaae  of  interference European  Ponrers, Out  l~auc 
speozal reason to Oclieve wishes yozb  71umt  do it  immelliutel~." 
The italics, of  Course, aro my omn.  Even lvithout the  itillics it is 
obvious  that to  Mr. Rhodos  and  Dr. Jamoson  tbey could only have one 
meaning.  hlr. Rhodes realized better thnn Dr. Jameson how fatally the 
Appendix. 
flag question had paralyaed Johannesburg.  Hence he never approved of 
the Raid.  That was undertaken by  Dr. Jameson on bis  o\vn responsi- 
bility under the goad of mhat he knem from iiliss Flora Sham's  telegrams 
was the desire of  Mr.  Chamberlain. 
In dincussiua  the subiect of the "  Hamkslev Dossier."  it is mall  to 
diiicriminato bc6voon  thiiga  tbat  diNer.  Espe&nlly is  &  uocessnry 'to 
distinzuish  betmeen  the  throe diffaroiit  conspirncies.  For  the  anke  of 
avoidfng confiision I will briefly describe thek 
The first is the conspiracy of  Rlideummer, 1895.  This conapiracy is 
known  as the Jamoson Plan, in oontrndistiuction to  the Jameson Raid. 
It was a movement on the part of  the reformers of  Johannesburg, includ- 
ing many Americans,  and oommandiug  the  sympathy of  many  Liberal 
burghers, to  make  a  little insurrection  tvhich  mould  have  the  effect of 
replacing  the corru&o&l-Tory  Government of  Prosident  Iirugor  by  a 
Liberal Admirii82rXtion under General Joubert, or Chief Justice Ilotzo, or 
some  other burgher  mho  did not  confuse loyalty to  the  Transvaal  liag 
mith  jenlousy  and suspicion  of  the Outlanders.  The  parties  to  tbis 
conapiraoy appear to have been, in the  first  Oase, &Ir.  Rhodes, Mr. Beit, 
Dr. Jameson, ivlr. Charles Leonard, Mr.  Lionel Phillips, and Dr. Ruther- 
foord Harris.  These constituted the original Ah-ican  ggrup mith rvhom 
the conspiracy may be  said to bave  originated.  As  aoon  as the African 
group  discovered that the Outlanders could iiot be  reliod u on to malre 
their insurrection unlees Dr. Jameson mith a force of  mouute i  police was 
etationed on  the  fronticr to  o.ct  ns  n &di$us  .botttc=holdor, ihoy  mero 
coin~ollcd  to  tnkc >Ir. Chamberlaiu into thoir con6dencc.  Then to  tlie 
Afriian wing of  the firnt conspiraoy was  added the British ming.  Those 
who mere made privy to this conspiracy were the officials of  the Colonial 
Office, headed  by  Mr. Chamberlain, Lord  Grey,  Mr.  Naguire,  aud  Mr. 
Hamksley, mhile  later Miss Flora  Sham was promoted to a position  of 
confidenee in oonnection with the group.  The original African group, mith 
the aid of  their  Bnalish confederates, suoceedod in aecurina the aseent of 
Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office to the cassion of  the jumping-OB 
alace, and the handing over of  the mounted  police, but &Ir.  Chamberlain 
ippeii.s  to  have inaiited, as  his price,  upon a condition  mhich  spoileä 
everything.  That  condition  was  the  introduction  of  the British  flag. 
The iuere  proposal to convert the conspiracy to bring about a logitimate 
revolution iuto n dishonest attempt to soize the  Transvaal for  Bnglaud 
mrecked everything, and the Jameson Raid was but a  desperate attempt 
made  by  Dr.  Jameson  under  tbe  stimulus  of  the  "hurry-up,  delay 
dangerous"  tolograms  emanatiug from  the  Colonial  Ofice, to nave  the 
insurrection from the ruin in mhich it had been involved by Rlr. Cbainber- 
laiu's insistence upon the British flag:  This brought to ailoee Conspiracy 
No. 1. but not before it had involved in its coils  Sir Graham Bomer,  tbe 
~mnn;inl  gecretarv.  Mr.  Newton.  the  British  maaistrate,  Sir  John 
L------  ---- 
%~lloughby, and Lny  other unfortunate victims, th;  most conspicuous 
of mhom.  holvever.  have been  arovidod for  by  the  Colonial  Secretary's 106  Appendix. 
obtain a  large  share  of  the  dynamite  und  railmay  concessione  they 
organized this Raid for the purpose of destroging the independence of  the 
countiy.  Ead they obtained their deaire, und secured a large interest in 
the dynamite und ruilway concessions, there would have been no Raid in 
this country."  I aguin  appealed to the President, und  requested him  to 
remain calm.  I said: "Admitting. all you say to  be correct, remember that 
the bulk of  the Uitlander population, as you say yourself, are innocent of 
these macbinations.  Why, then, punish them ?  It ia advisable, President, 
to shake hands with them, listen to their  grievauces, und  establish oood 
feeling throughout the mhole of  South Africa."  President Iiruger rep?iied, 
shaqly: "I mould do it, but my ccnfidence is gone.  What is to prevent 
&Ir. Rhoaes und  his coadjutors from  again engineering some  diubolical 
attempt  against  the  independence  of  my  country? "+  I  left  the 
President,  und  at  innumerable  interview  that  I  had  with  him 
subsequently I endeavoured  by  all  the  means  in my  power  to con- 
ciliate him, und bring him  to a  botter frame of  mind, und  get  hirn  to 
shake off  the terrible incubue of  the Jameson Raid, mhich rvas disturb- 
ing his mind, und, withaim, the whole burgher population of  the countly. 
I could mrite  volumes on this matter, but your  space is limiteä, und I 
sbali  reserve full  und  elaborate details of all these matters for  a book 
which I intend to publish,  und  mhich  will be  entitled <'  The Transvaal, 
und the Tme History of  tbe Jameson Raid." 
The points that I have now refei~ed  to must convinco the public that 
Dfi.  Balfour was  uite  right, und  that any move made by  tle Imperial  CI  Government  moul  have only couvinced  the Trunsvnal und  the  Dutch 
element throughout South Africa that the British  authorities were con- 
nected mith the Jameson Raid. 
So far Mr. Robinson. 
Heis  uite right, und Mr.  Balfour is  quite right.  Nothing could be  %  done, not  ecause of the Raid, but because Mr.  Chamberlain was mived 
up in  the Conspiracy that culminateä in the Raid, und  unless Ministers 
shed Mr.  Chamberluin they wem pa!alysed.  Hence the WUY.  ,. 
! 
CHAPTER V. 
som COXUIENTS AT'  Iionrn  AND  ABROAD. 
i.  ENQLAND. 
The Bvitislb Weekly says: "Nr.  Balfour spoke at Manchester in detenca 
of  the Government.  The Toiy papers, so far as we have seeii, agee mith 
>  the Liberal in finding the  apologia  a complete failure.  Mr. Balfoiu. said 
that the Government knew that tlie Republics were arming mith the most 
modern weapons, but their hands were tied und their mouths rvere  closed 
at the time by the Raid.  '  Eow could we  say to the Boer  Government, 
I' You disarm; you huve nothing to fear ixom  us?"  The ansmer is vei'y 
simple, und could not be better piit  than it is in  a Conservative journal, 
the Swt.  The Su%  says, in effect, that the Raid was a private affair.  &Ir. 
Balfour's argument only holds gooa on one hypothesis, as he himself must 
1  see-und  that is, that the British Government knem of  the Raid, und had 
responsibility in it.  This, happily, is not U possible hypothesis.'  We wish 
it mere possible to say this of  every momber of the Government.  A series 
of  iin  oitant  letters  und  documents  relating  to  tbe  Raid  have  been 
publis  ed  ' in U  Belgian Paper.  They hure been practically boycotted by 
the Unioiiist press in this country, but no  one has been blind to the fact 
,  that, mhile they prove nothing, they suggest much  of  a most unpleasant 
bind.  No  doubt the  attention  of  Parhament will be called to them, und 
in the end the mhole miserable budness will be draggea into the light." 
I  The Speakov sa s : I'  All the great Organs of  public opinion which  ive 
i'  Dfr. Chamberlain t  E  eh  valuuable  supporl have, vith one accord, failef to 
i 
notice  that LII?adFpcnda?~ce  Bclgo  has published anything of  interest to 
Englishmen  at all.  Such  a  coincidence is  evidently inspired-though 
mhether by heaven or by man .ive must leave these enterprising journals 
1  to explain.  What adds to our surprise is the failure of  our contemporaries 
t'  to  record  the  interest  mhioh  these  revelation~,  huve  aroused all over 
the  Continent4  The  responsible  Press  of  Paris  und  other  Duropean 
I  capitals is full of  them, und  yet  the able  correspondents of  the Tinles 
giVe no  The  epidemic of  blinduese  which  has  attacked Printing 
I  Hause Square must be catching, as it is nowperfeotlyclear that the 'geat 
interests which  are  at stake'  require  the ,immediate produotion of  the 
telepams.  We make no charge on the sub~ect  against Mr.  Chamberlain, 
save this-his  persistent refusal to let us know  what he Bnows is fatal to 
national dignity and good faith.  England is incurring in the eyes of the 
morld the very reproach which  she was so eager to lay upon  France over 
the  ~~~~f~~  affair.  The  duty of  the Liberal partg is to insiyt, as  an 
I  ex-Minister insists in  oui. special article to-day, that ehe  Colonial 'Office 
8hall lay bare what is hidden, in order that thes? suspicions und inainua- 
tions may cease because there is nothing left to disclose." 
'-=re 
A oorres  ondent signing himself  A. X. writes to the Xor12hq Lendovas 
folloms : "  8 is to be  hoped that the 'Raid' correspondence which you axe iippetzcl ix. 
~n&~oulallcc  Belgc  are never  made iinless  they can be  supported.  The 
article concludes: "  The simplest process would be  to use this uupleasant 
affair as a reason for ending the war before the reputation  of  the English 
is further  damaged.  The revelations offer the only means  of  bringing 
the war to au end withoiit sacrificing English self-conscionsness!' 
The ultra-Couservative IZrei~z  Zaitt~ly  prints extraota, prefacing theni 
mith the ~vords  : "  Chamberlaiu's machiuations before the commencement 
of  the Boer  war have been  condemned by almost the entire earth, und 
that judgment has only the more loiidly been maintained when this man 
dared to dish up  before  the  morld  a Suggestion of  the  ideal staiidpoint 
mhich alone impelled England to war." 
The National Zeittblzg mrites: "  If the correspondence is authentic, it 
only furnishes proofs of mhat for a long time past has been  mith more  or 
less probability ascribed to Mr. Chainberlain." 
The disclosures, accordiug to  the Taegliol~  Rz~72*lsclzals,  the Dcz~tsoha 
Zoituttg,  and the  70~wacrts.  confirm  mhat  everybody kuew,  or,  as the 
Dci~tsclie  Zeitzbng  says :  "  Vhet was believed, but could not be definitely 
proved." 
FR~~XCE. 
"  The inquiry of  1S96," says the AUatin,  "  was simply a hiding  of  the 
light;  it was  desigued  t0 shield >Ir.  Chamberlain  und  all  his eminent 
coadjutors in the scheme." 
The FQaro also  usks  in astonishrnent holv a man  like  Sir William 
Harcourt  could have  been  so hoodwinked in  the  iuquiries.  The  Same 
journal adds, that from  the absence  in  the English Press of  denials of, 
aud  protestations  against, the "dossier,"  it is clear that hfr. Chamber- 
lain is laid bare at last, that the Colonial Office will  not  lcnow him  much 
longer. - 
I  The Joicntal (10s Dibats says : ''Zvery ono knew it." 
The Petit Blez~  says: "  Before the revelations Mr. Cbamberlain was a 
surprise;  now he ia a scandal to Europe." 
The Dutch nemspapers are all reproduciug Ihe letters mith regard to 
hfr.  Chamberlain  und  the  Jameson  Raid  which  have  appeared in the 
IiuGpendance Bebe of  Brussels. 
The  coniments mhich  are being  made  are  exceedingly  severe,  ~nd 
1  show that the letters, which  are considered of enormous importance, are 
creating much excitement. 
The I?tflipenda?tco  Balge  says that Mr.  Chamberlain will  be  fatal  to 
England.  It  is  certain  that  she has never  hud  imy  atatesman  who 
reudered her morae  seryices.  The new  Ollivier of  the new  Empire, he 
has  plunged  mith  a  light  heart  iuto  a  terrible  war  mithout  adequate 
Appendix. 
I  '  preparation, but he has done  even  morse  in exciting against his country 
by  the incorrectitude of  his proceedings not only  the Sentiment  of  the 
masses  on  the  Continent,  but  even  the  moral  disapprobation  of  the 
Pomers.  We  cannot  doubt  that, when  the English people  realixe that 
they  have  been  made  the  victim  of  a baae  intrigue, they will separate 
their  cause  und  their  interests  from  those  of  Mr.  Rhodes  und  Mr. 
Chamberlain.  The ~roceedinas  of  the 8011th  African Committee reeull the 
~ualogous  pr~ceedins  to thoäe in which  Henry, Gribelen und  Paty  du  f  Clam tried to stille t  e truth in the affair Dreyfus. 
AUSTIUA. 
The News  Wieqter  Jowne.1  sa s : '' A thorough purification of  public 
life is necessary in England.  ~%e  principles  and methods  of  men  like 
t.  Rhodes und  Chamberlain must be  got rid of  at once, und I-ingland may 
then  regain  that  forcign  sympathy  mhich  the policy  of  unscrupulous 
Jingoes has cost her.'' 
The Wienßr Extrablatt says if therevelations ure accurate, Chamberlain 
is brauded as a criminal of  the deepest dye. 
The Dcz~tschcs  Volksblatt  says  the revelations  prove  that  lvholes$e 
bribery or other uudue inflnences Tvere employed by members of  the Privy 
Coiincil to suppress facts at the Committee of  Inquiry. 
The  Wiencr  Alierilblatt regards Chamberlain's  continuance in  public 
life as impossible after these disclosures. 